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Abstract 
The notion of the national park as an area where human enjoyment of natural scenery took 
precedence over, and was incompatible with natural resource development was constructed 
in Canada between 1907 and 1931. During this time period, Canada's National Parks Branch 
went from building its own dam on Lake Minnewanka, in Rocky Mountains National Park 
(later Banff National Park), to vigorously opposing the construction of new dams on that and 
other park lakes. The emerging parks and conservation movements ultimately diverged over 
the proposed development of the Spray Lakes and Lake Minnewanka between 1922 and 
1931. The result - a recognition that human enjoyment of national parks was incompatible 
with resource development, but that development projects could take precedence over park 
land - was a compromise which reflected the divergence between these two branches of the 
Canadian environmental movement. 
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1 
Introduction 
In Search of Wilderness? 
Towards a Canadian History of National Parks 
Controversies over the construction of hydroelectric dams, particularly in national parks, reflect 
contested visions of nature and its proper uses by society. Between 1907 and 1931, Canada's 
National Parks Branch went from building its own dam on Lake Minnewanka, in Rocky 
Mountains National Park (later Banff National Park), to vigorously opposing the construction of 
new dams on that and other lakes in the same park. By the time the issue came to a head in the 
so-called Spray Lakes controversy between 1922 and 1930, new institutions and organizations 
joined the debate, each articulating its own vision of national parks. The privately owned Calgary 
Power Company and water power development advocates, including the federal Water Power 
Branch and former government surveyor William Pearce, campaigned—eventually 
successfully—to remove the Spray Lakes from the park and develop them as a second 
hydroelectric reservoir. Another set of federal offices and organizations—including the National 
Parks Branch and the Alpine Club—demanded that the damming of park lakes be prohibited. 
This position was reflected in the final version of the National Parks Act of 1930, though not 
necessarily in the compromise over the Spray: the Spray River valley was removed from the park 
and turned over to developers. My work begins with a deceptively simple question: over what 
principles, or conceptions of the place and role of nature within national parks, were these groups 
actually in conflict? 
Although water controversies were once an important component of parks history, since 
the 1990s Canadian environmental history—including conservation and park history—has 
moved away from natural resource development controversies, exploring in much greater depth 
2 
issues such as hunting, game conservation, and predator control. Nevertheless, water history 
remains relevant. Contested water power developments provide a window into the sharp 
ideological differences and power relationships between early groups within the environmental 
movement, such as parks groups and conservationist development organizations. One recent 
special issue of Environmental History, devoted to Canada, featured three articles (out of a total 
of seven) on dams and other aspects of river history. A pair of recent books—Christopher 
Armstrong, Matthew Evenden, and H.V. Nelles's The River Returns, and EJ. Hart's J.B. 
Harkin—also touch on the continuing relevance of water controversies in national park history. 
Recent developments in the field of American environmental history also suggest that it is an 
opportune time to reconsider the role of water power development in Canadian parks.4 
Canadian park historiography is unfortunately less rich than one might wish. Two of the 
leading edited volumes on Canadian environmental history, Chad and Pam Gaffield's 
Consuming Canada and David Duke's Canadian Environmental History, open with chapters by 
American authors; in Duke's case, eight of seventeen chapters are written by Americans, about 
American history.5 Alan MacEachern recently complained that 
1
 Jennifer Brower, Lost Tracks: Buffalo National Park, 1909-1939 (Edmonton: Athabasca University Press, 2008); 
Karen Jones, Wolf Mountains: A History of Wolves along the Great Divide (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 
2002); Tina Loo, "Of Moose and Men: Hunting for Masculinities in British Columbia, 1880-1939," Western 
Historical Quarterly 32 (2001), 296-319; same author, States of Nature (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006); John 
Sandlos, Hunters at the Margin: Native People and Wildlife Conservation in the Northwest Territories (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2007). 
2
 Shannon Stunden Bower, "Watersheds: Conceptualizing Manitoba's Drained Landscape," Environmental History 
12 (2007): 796-819; Stephane Castonguay, "The Production of Flood as Natural Catastrophe: Extreme Events and 
the Construction of Vulnerability in the Drainage Basin of the St. Francis River (Quebec), Mid-Twentieth Century," 
ibid., 820-844; and Tina Loo, "Disturbing the Peace: Environmental Change and the Scales of Justice on a Northern 
River," ibid., 895-919. 
3
 Christopher Armstrong, Matthew Evenden, and H.V. Nelles, The River Returns: An Environmental History of the 
Bow (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009); and E.J. Hart, J.B. Harkin (Edmonton: 
University of Alberta Press, 2010). 
4
 Robert Righter, The Battle over Hetch Hetchy: America's Most Controversial Dam and the Birth of Modern 
Environmentalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
5
 David Duke's Canadian Environmental History and Chad Gaffield and Pam Gaffield's Consuming Canada, begin 
with chapters by American historians - indeed, in Duke's case, eight of seventeen chapters are written by 
Americans, about American history: Duke, ed., Canadian Environmental History: Essential Readings (Toronto: 
3 
there is no history of Canada's first parks commissioner James Harkin... There is no 
history of Parks Canada the institution... There is not even a readily available general 
history of the parks system... Keyword "Banff history" into Amazon.ca and the first hit is 
to The Banff Coastal Command Strike Wing versus the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe, 
]944_1945.6 
A biography of Harkin has been published since MacEachern spoke these words, but his broader 
point stands. In strikingly similar terms (but referring to the subjects rather than writers of 
Canadian history), J.G. Nelson lamented in 1989 that environmental "conflicts have always been 
more visible and of greater public interest in the United States than Canada... [W]e have had no 
spokesmen for the wilderness with such power and persuasiveness as to be able to found the 
preservationist school of thought or... the Sierra Club." Nelson thought that perhaps Canadians' 
"more compromising style" was to blame. Both are correct insofar as the Canadian 
historiography is, and the parks movement was, in some respects derivative of their American 
counterparts. At the same time, however, both go somewhat too far, both in terms of the 
perceived inadequacy of the Canadian historiography and of the alleged conciliatory banality of 
its historical subjects. At times, national inferiority seems to be as deeply held a tenet of the 
Canadian historiography as exceptionalism is of its American counterpart. 
In any case, it is inescapable that an essay on contested visions of nature in Rocky 
Mountains Park water power controversies both draws upon, and must be placed within the 
context of the established field of American environmental history. That field has, since the 
1960s, devoted considerable attention to a "remarkably similar" conflict over the Hetch Hetchy 
valley in Yosemite National Park.8 Between 1906 and 1913, preservationists such as John Muir 
Canadian Scholars' Press, 2006); and Gaffield and Gaffield, eds., Consuming Canada: Readings in Environmental 
History (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1995). 
6
 Alan MacEachern, "Writing the History of Canadian Parks: Past, Present, and Future" (Parks for Tomorrow 40th 
Anniversary Conference, Calgary, May 2008), 1. 
7
 J. Gordon Nelson, "Wilderness in Canada: Past, Present, Future," Natural Resources Journal 29 (1989), 86. 
8
 Ted Binnema, review of Graeme Wynn, Canada and Arctic North America: An Environmental History, in 
Environmental History 12 (2007), 1015. Reichwein, "Hands Off," 142, also notes that the two controversies 
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and the Sierra Club clashed with Progressives such as the city of San Francisco and Forest 
Service chief Gifford Pinchot over the proposed damming of the Tuolomne River in the Hetch 
Hetchy Valley of Yosemite National Park, for use as a drinking water reservoir for San 
Francisco. As at the Spray Lakes, those favouring the dam were victorious, although the dispute 
was followed by major reforms—in Canada the passing of the National Parks Act, in the U.S. 
the creation of the National Parks Service. 
American historians have advanced various explanations for this conflict, ranging from 
the contentions of Samuel P. Hays, Roderick Nash, Alfred Runte, and William Cronon that 
Progressive conservationists urging rational and efficient development of natural resources 
encountered a parks movement determined to protect untouched wilderness areas, to Robert 
Righter's recent portrayal of the controversy as a conflict between Progressive advocates of 
public ownership of water utilities and advocates of park development for purposes of nature 
tourism.9 In the same span, the limited Canadian historiography of the Spray Lakes conflict has 
not advanced appreciably beyond a position approximating that of the conventional American 
interpretation (that wise-use conservationists squared off against defenders of wilderness), and, 
in particular, has devoted surprisingly little attention to the motivations of those supporting dams 
in Rocky Mountains Park, beyond—in the case of the Calgary Power Company—the obvious 
incentive of financial profit. 
"resembled" one another. MacEachern, too, recognizes that the affairs were similar, although he maintains -
incorrectly, as is demonstrated here - that in the Spray Lakes dispute, in contrast to the Hetch Hetchy dispute, "no... 
[large-scale, public] support arose in Canada to save the Spray Lakes": MacEachern, Natural Selections, 283, fn 70. 
9
 Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 189-1920 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999 reprint); Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); William Cronon, "The Trouble With Wilderness," Environmental History 1 
(1995), 1-28; and Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience (Lincoln: Nebraska University Press, 
1977). 
10
 Canadian discussion of the Spray Lakes controversy is predominantly limited to Leslie Bella, Parks for Profit 
(Montreal: Harvest House, 1987), esp. 1-2, 39; and PearlAnn Reichwein, '"Hands Off our National Parks': The 
Alpine Club of Canada Hydro-Development Controversies in the Canadian Rockies, 1922-1930," Journal of the 
5 
Since at least a moderately similar complex of social and political movements seem to 
have been present in the Spray Lakes and Hetch Hetchy controversies, my analysis of the former 
begins with a consideration of the much more substantive historiography of the latter. However, 
the Canadian park historiography is neither wholly derivative nor in any way irrelevant. A new 
and expanded analysis of the Spray Lakes and Lake Minnewanka controversies, bearing in mind 
some of the recent insights of the American literature (particularly the work of Robert Righter 
and William Cronon), reveals a somewhat different conflict occurring within—and over—Rocky 
Mountains Park. Between 1912 and 1931, an emerging Canadian conservationist movement 
consistently advocated for the rational and efficient harnessing of natural resources, including 
those within national parks (and, at least in Alberta, often actively downplayed the potential 
benefits of publicly owned utilities), while an equally nascent parks movement moved from 
welcoming projects which would beautify scenery to opposing the same projects on the grounds 
that they would detract from scenic value for human visitors, to the point that dam projects, in 
particular, were incompatible with national parks. 
Environmental history is at best a vaguely defined field of inquiry, beyond the self-
referential notion that it is a history of human interactions with the environment. In an influential 
1988 essay, Donald Worster suggested that work within the field could be classified according to 
three basic levels of inquiry: first, the functioning of "nature itself..., and not the least the human 
organism as it has been a link in nature's food chains"; second, the "socioeconomic realm as it 
interacts with the environment," meaning the ways in which social and economic organizations 
and power relations reflect environmental factors and in turn affect the environment; and, finally, 
Canadian Historical Association 6 (1995): 129-155; Armstrong, Evenden and Nelles, The River Returns, 130-135; 
and MacEachern, Natural Selections, 27-28, 176, 283 fn 70. 
6 
the linguistic and ideological construction of "an individual's or group's dialogue with nature."11 
By this latter, Worster meant the ways in which people engage "in constructing maps of the 
world around them, in defining what a resource is, [and] in determining which sorts of behavior 
may be environmentally degrading and ought to be prohibited."12 The analysis presented here is 
principally concerned with the third category, although, as Worster observed, the three are of 
course interrelated rather than mutually exclusive. 
The historiography of national parks actually begins outside of environmental history as 
such, with histories of the bureaucracies which sprang up to shepherd and maintain the parks, 
such as the American National Park Service.13 Into this category may be placed W.F. Lothian's 
encyclopedic four-volume History of Canada's National Parks.14 Since the publication of 
Samuel Hays's Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency in 1959 and Roderick Nash's 
Wilderness and the American Mind in 1967, however, park history has been concerned not 
simply with the bureaucratic and institutional history of the parks but with the social, economic, 
and ideological factors which informed how parks were formed and what they meant not only to 
policymakers but to visitors and residents.15 Moreover, conflicts over the shaping and altering of 
river valleys within parks have been particularly useful windows into conceptions of nature and 
the environment at varying points over the past century. 
The Hetch Hetchy and Spray Lakes controversies are a particularly useful initial point of 
comparison because, although few Canadian historians have discussed the Spray Lakes 
11
 Donald Worster, "Doing Environmental History," in The Ends of the Earth: Perspectives on Modern 
Environmental History, edited by Donald Worster and Alfred W. Crosby (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), reprinted at <http://ssil.uoregon.edu/geog410/pdfs/1206/worster.pdf> (accessed September 2010), 4. 
Worster's own work straddles these fields, but his Marxist-inspired history of water politics in the western United 
States, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity and the Growth of the American West (New York: Pantheon, 1985), is an 
excellent example of the second level of inquiry. 
12
 Worster, 4. 
13
 See, for instance, John Ise, Our National Park Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961). 
14
 W.F. Lothian, History of Canada's National Parks (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1976-1981). 
Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency; and Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind. 
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controversy, there is a rich and growing American historiography on Hetch Hetchy. Since 
Roderick Nash published Wilderness and the American Mind (1967) most historians have 
accepted his argument that "those who would preserve undeveloped land ... as wilderness found 
themselves opposed to resource managers with plans for efficiently harvesting nature's 
bounties."16 This classic narrative pitted so-called preservationists—those interested in 
maintaining national parks as pristine wilderness areas—against so-called conservationists— 
those interested in the wise use of natural resources, including the development of artificial 
reservoirs for drinking water or water power purposes, particularly when doing so also afforded 
the opportunity to convert allegedly unattractive, mosquito-rich natural valleys and lakes into 
more visually appealing artificial lakes. More recently, this line of argument has been taken up 
by Rosalind Warner, Neil Henderson, and Christine Oravec, among others.17 
In the 1970s, Alfred Runte added further depth to this position in National Parks: The 
American Experience. Runte advanced two important claims about national parks: that they were 
an insecure young America's attempt to find in nature monuments capable of rivalling the 
grander, older architecture of Europe; and that the importance of this search for prestigious 
"natural wonders," while not negligible, ranked a distant second to that of economic 
development, so that Congress was only willing to create national parks on lands that had no 
other demonstrable economic value. These arguments are known, respectively, as 
monumentalism and the worthless lands thesis. The second is most important for the present 
purpose. According to Runte, "the national park system was allowed to expand because most of 
16
 Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 425-426. 
17
 Rosalind Warner, "A Comparison of Ideas in the Development and Governance of National Parks and Protected 
Area in the US and Canada," International Journal of Canadian Studies 37 (2008), 21; Norman Henderson, 
"Wilderness and the Nature Conservation Ideal: Britain, Canada, and the United States Contrasted," Ambio 21 
(1992), 394-99; and Christine Oravec, "Conservationism vs Preservationism: The 'Public Interest' in the Hetch 
Hetchy Controversy," Quarterly Journal of Speech 70 (1984),444-458. 
18
 Runte, National Parks, 77. 
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its units were predominantly worthless from the standpoint of natural resources"—a position 
which early preservationist John Muir captured more concisely in his cynical observation that 
"nothing dollarable is safe."19 Runte argued that the Hetch Hetchy controversy was the first 
dispute in which the early environmental movement began to clearly articulate the argument that 
national parks should not be opened to resource development even if they were proved not to 
90 
contain solely worthless lands. 
There are shortcomings, however, with the portrayal of advocates of the Hetch Hetchy 
dam solely or even principally as wise-use conservationists—and, as will be discussed shortly, 
with the portrayal of opponents as defenders of pristine wilderness. Nash recognized early on 
that Progressive advocacy for a publicly owned water supply played an important role in the 
91 
Hetch Hetchy controversy. In 1979, this argument was more fully developed by Kendrick 
Clements. Clements largely accepted and set aside the analysis of the preservationist movement, 
but argued that the movement supporting the Hetch Hetchy dam be understood as "a skillfully 
planned and executed campaign" by San Francisco Progressives to create a publicly owned water 
company.22 The latter, Clements noted, campaigned for the Hetch Hetchy development on the 
grounds that it "was absolutely essential to save the city from 'monopoly and microbe[s]."' 
Clements was less concerned with preservationists opposing the dam, except as they unwittingly 
allowed themselves to be manipulated by corporate water suppliers opposing a city-owned water 
supply. Instead, he confined his analysis largely to municipal politics in San Francisco, but in 
doing so succeeded in exploring this dimension of the Hetch Hetchy controversy. 
19
 Runte, National Parks, 64. 
20
 Runte, National Parks, 70-73. 
21
 Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 430. 
22
 Kendrick Clements, "Politics and the Park: San Francisco's Fight for Hetch Hetchy 1908-1913," Pacific 
Historical Review 48 (1979), 186. 
23
 Clements, "Politics and the Park," 185. 
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Since the 1970s far more critical attention has been devoted to the early (so-called) 
wilderness movement—those hoping to block dam development in national parks. The next most 
serious revision of the historical understanding of Hetch Hetchy came in 1995, with the 
publication of William Cronon's provocative essay "The Trouble with Wilderness." Cronon, 
who was already well-known for important monographs in American environmental history, 
argued in his provocative 1995 piece that wilderness was "quite profoundly a human creation— 
indeed, the creation of very particular human cultures at very particular moments in human 
9A 
history." It has been quite some time since historians in either country regarded (if ever they 
did) national parks as, in the words of one Canadian promotional writer in the 1960s, "natural 
museums where the native trees, plants, animals, and birds may be seen and studied in their 
9S 
natural state." Cronon went further, however, arguing that the very idea of pristine wilderness 
was a peculiar creation of late 19th-century and early 20th-century American culture, fusing 
earlier European ideas of the natural sublime and American ideas of the vanishing frontier.26 
Ultimately though, Cronon still accepted a relatively conventional explanation of the Hetch 
Hetchy controversy, albeit from a more theoretically sophisticated perspective, as a contest 
between "the merits of 'reclaiming' a wasteland" and the "portray[al of] such an act... as 
97 
desecration and vandalism" of the untouched wilderness. His contribution in this regard was 
the caution that wilderness was not simply an uninhabited, pristine natural setting passively 
awaiting its fate at human hands, but the actively constructed product of a problematic "dualistic 
vision in which the human is entirely outside the natural." Cronon's work may be read as 
24
 Cronon, "The Trouble with Wilderness," 7. For Cronon's previous significant work, see Changes in the Land: 
Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983); and Nature's Metropolis: 
Chicago and the Great West (New York: Norton, 1991). 
25
 Robert Scharff, Canada's Mountain National Parks (Toronto: Musson, 1966), 2. 
26
 Cronon, "The Trouble with Wilderness," 9. 
27
 Cronon, "The Trouble with Wilderness," 12. 
28
 Cronon, "The Trouble with Wilderness," 15. 
10 
suggesting that the creation of wilderness was a specifically American phenomenon, although 
the existence of similar conflicts north of the border suggests otherwise. 
Significant to Cronon's thesis in "The Trouble with Wilderness" is the notion that the 
early parks movement did not merely find uninhabited wilderness in America: it created that 
wilderness. Nor was this, allegedly, an unproblematic or nonviolent process. Cronon argued that 
"the removal of Indians to create an 'uninhabited wilderness'... reminds us just how invented, 
just how constructed, the American wilderness really is."29 Cronon was not alone in advancing 
this argument. The same decade, for instance, saw the publication of studies by Mark David 
Spence, Robert H. Keller, Michael F. Turek, and Louis S. Warren advancing similar 
arguments. In Dispossessing the Wilderness, Spence presented case studies of Aboriginal 
removal from Glacier, Yellowstone, and Yosemite national parks, arguing that post-Civil War 
America conceived of wilderness as necessarily uninhabited, and therefore could not create 
national parks without removing the inhabitants of that wilderness—namely, the Aboriginal 
•7 1 
peoples who lived there. The supposedly pristine parks which later anti-development activists 
were defending, then, was actually a comparatively new, recently depopulated, and carefully 
constructed presentation of nature. 
This understanding of the historical construction of wilderness has encountered its own 
difficulties. It is apparent from Spence's own work that, while Aboriginal communities were 
indeed forcibly removed from national park lands, attempts to divorce the image of the Indian 
from the image of nature in the national park were partial and inconsistent at best. In each of the 
Cronon, "The Trouble with Wilderness," 15. 
30
 Mark Spence, Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making of the National Parks (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999); Robert H. Keller and Michael F. Turek, American Indians and National Parks 
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998), 19; and Louis S. Warren, The Hunter's Game: Poachers and 
Conservationists in Twentieth-Century America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 128. 
31
 Spence, Dispossessing the Wilderness, 5. 
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three national parks surveyed, he notes Indian communities that were either desired or actually 
maintained by park officials: the failed Dot Island settlement in Yellowstone, the Blackfeet who 
became "Glacier Park Indians" at Glacier, and the Indian Field Days at Yosemite.32 
The unsettled understanding of wilderness has been further complicated by findings that 
ideas of wilderness as pristine empty natural spaces to be enclosed and protected—however 
these ideas may have been culturally constructed—simply did not play a substantial role in early 
park history. The most recent reinterpretation of the Hetch Hetchy conflict, Robert Righter's The 
Battle over Hetch Hetchy, is indicative of this new critical understanding. According to Righter, 
contrary to much of the past forty years of work on Hetch Hetchy, "wilderness... was not an issue 
in the Hetch Hetchy fight"—long regarded as the definitive clash between advocates of 
wilderness and wise use. Even the park's defenders "consistently advocated development... [for] 
nature tourism," he observes.33 Instead, Righter argues that the Hetch Hetchy conflict actually 
occurred between those favouring development of the valley for tourism and enjoyment of 
natural landscapes, and those favouring Progressive public ownership of water. Christine Oravec 
in the U.S. and Leslie Bella in Canada have faulted early preservationists for rhetorically 
compromising with their opponents by defending "beautiful scenery" on the grounds that it was 
"a source of profit" (and therefore "us[ing] one economic argument to counter another"); 
however, Righter's analysis suggests that the economic and social potential of such "scenery" 
was precisely what motivated many so-called preservationists in the first place.34 The second 
component of Righter's argument—that those advocating for dam development were largely 
Progressives hoping to create a publicly owned utility, rather than conservationists seeking to 
Ibid., 69, 83, 116-120. 
Righter, The Battle over Hetch Hetchy, esp. 5. 
Oravec, "Conservationism vs Preservationist!!," 440-458; and Bella, Parks for Profit, 57-58. 
12 
efficiently develop natural resources—is equally well-developed, although it treads (albeit more 
thoroughly) ground already covered by Kendrick Clements.35 
What emerges from Righter's work is a significantly more nuanced understanding of the 
Hetch Hetchy controversy, as a conflict between those who argued that the best use for the valley 
was as a public water supply, and those who argued that it could best be developed for nature 
tourism purposes (and, furthermore, that the two development projects were mutually exclusive). 
That preservationists were more than irrational spiritualists is an insight already persuasively 
established by Susan R. Schrepfer.36 However, Righter's argument that defenders of the valley 
were not motivated by a vision of wilderness protection but rather of the benefits to the public of 
"playgrounds" and "picturesque spots" is distinct, and is one of his most original contributions. 
The argument is, at times, frustratingly incomplete—Righter, for instance, writes that Sierra Club 
founder John Muir would have been "surprised... to learn" that the Hetch Hetchy valley already 
bore the marks of human habitation, and subsequently left Yosemite in disgust over the growth 
in tourism-related projects there. Towards the end of the book, Righter weakens his argument 
to the intriguing but comparatively mild observation that Muir, as a genuine "prophet of 
wilderness," employed arguments about nature tourism out of pragmatism rather than principle.38 
His original thesis nevertheless bears particular relevance to Canadian historians, given that the 
promotion of nature tourism was both an early objective of national parks policy and the primary 
raison d'etre of early Canadian parks organizations like the Alpine Club of Canada. 
35
 Clements, "Politics and the Park," 185-215. 
36
 Susan R. Schrepfer, The Fight to Save the Redwoods: A History of Environmental Reform, 1917-1978 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1983). 
37
 Righter, The Battle, 14, 211, 206. 
38
 Righter, The Battle, 211. 
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Compared to the American environmental historiography, the literature on Canadian 
national parks is smaller and less diverse, but not impoverished. Since the 1960s, Canadian 
historians have undertaken important—if often derivative in theoretical terms—inquiries into the 
history of the country's parks movement. The first generation of park historians in the late 1960s, 
working predominantly with government annual reports and records of Parliamentary debates, 
constructed an understanding of the early parks as areas in which parks officials and developers 
found nature inadequate, even unsettling, and undertook numerous projects to enhance it—as 
well as tolerating resource development projects, when they did not overly detract from (or 
perhaps even improved upon) beautiful scenery. 
In the most influential article of the period, Robert Craig Brown argued that early parks 
policy was characterized by a "doctrine of usefulness." During the Macdonald and Laurier years, 
this meant that it was premised on the assumption that "natural resource potential was... 
unlimited and that the resources must be made 'useful'" in the most productive way possible, be 
it tourist resorts or coal mines—which could and did exist in the park, for example at Bankhead 
in Rocky Mountains Park.39 Particularly prior to the rise of the conservation movement in 1911, 
Brown argues that "the reservation in its 'wilderness' state was not a park... With the 
construction of roads and bridges, the establishment of a townsite and the provision of tourist 
facilities from baths to elaborate hotels, the reservation would become a park."40 After 1911, 
under the influence of conservationists, the priority shifted from "unregulated exploitation" to 
the "rational use of natural resources."41 As Robert Borden informed the House of Commons, 
Robert Craig Brown, "The Doctrine of Usefulness: Natural Resource and National Park Policy in Canada," in The 
Canadian National Parks; Today and Tomorrow, edited by J.G. Nelson and R.C. Scace (Calgary: University of 
Calgary, 1968), 103. For a description of the Bankhead coal mines near Banff townsite, see Lothian, History, IV:96. 
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"conservation does not mean non-user; on the contrary,... great resources should be both 
developed and conserved, so that they may be of the greatest possible advantage."42 
On one level, Brown's thesis bears obvious similarities to Runte's subsequent worthless 
lands thesis (described above): both historians argue that early national parks policy viewed 
economic development—including exploitation of natural resources—as paramount. Thus, 
according to Runte, American politicians stressed that the creation of Yellowstone and Yosemite 
would not impede the national development because the mountains they were protecting were of 
little productive use otherwise, while, as Brown argues, Canadian politicians viewed national 
parks as only one means of making lands useful (that is, profitable) for the nation. At the same 
time, however, there is a key difference. Runte characterizes nineteenth-century American 
politicians as arguing that national parks would not impede development because they were 
enclosing otherwise worthless lands. The idea that the creation of a national park was in itself an 
obstacle to resource extraction or other forms of economic development was not a common 
position in early Canadian debates over national parks. No objection was raised over the creation 
of the coal mining community at Bankhead, or—at least by the Parks Branch—over the 
damming of Lake Minnewanka in 1912. It was not until the dam controversies of the 1920s that 
the notion that dam construction and national parks were incompatible—and thus, that a given 
space could incorporate one but not both—became widely (and still far from universally) 
accepted in Canada. 
Brown's work is now widely cited by other historians. However, several scholars in the 
late 1960s articulated an essentially similar position, most of them working with geographer J.G. 
Borden, quoted by Brown, "The Doctrine of Usefulness," 106. 
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Nelson at the University of Calgary (who edited the book in which Brown's chapter appeared). 
Research into Rocky Mountains Park history by Robert Scace and Roger Byrne, both students of 
Nelson, revealed the early history of environmental manipulation in Banff, including widespread 
introduction of new plants and animals, beautification of unsightly marshy areas, and distraction 
from the Banff fauna and landscape—in the early years of the park, heavily burnt over and 
largely depopulated of elk and mountain sheep—through a zoo featuring such diverse animals as 
tropical birds, monkeys, and polar bears. The work of this short-lived school is particularly 
impressive given its attempt to articulate, over twenty-five years before Cronon published "The 
Trouble with Wilderness," the carefully managed and modified "wilderness" of early Banff— 
which, indeed, led from park officials' and visitors' dissatisfaction with the less heavily modified 
nature they found upon their arrival. 
One of the most important shortcomings of this first generation of Canadian park history 
is that, while it was largely compelling in its analysis of very early parks policy (subsequent 
analyses, with access to the Parks Branch archives, have seldom challenged them on these basic 
points), it is less helpful in understanding how or why ideas about parks changed (as they clearly 
did) by the time of, or after, the First World War. Brown, Scace and Byrne might have led 
Canadian park history into a critical questioning of the place of nature or wilderness and its 
meaning in the minds of park officials and visitors. However, subsequent scholarship largely 
J.G. Nelson and Robert C. Scace, ed., The Canadian National Parks: Today and Tomorrow (Calgary: University 
of Calgary Duplicating Services, 1968). 
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moved in this alternative direction, instead seeking to identify the moments at which early 
usefulness-inclined officials and policies were replaced by preservationist efforts to protect the 
wilderness from commercial exploitation. In the 1980s, C.J. Taylor, Leslie Bella, and PearlAnn 
Reichwein identified the Spray Lakes controversy as the major period of transition, resulting in 
the passage of the National Parks Act in 1930 and—through that legislation—the protection of 
park lands from further resource development without Parliamentary approval. 
Bella's Parks for Profit, published in 1987, asserted that while "national parks are 
supposed to be about preservation," Canada's parks were instead the product of an uneasy 
historical "compromise between the demand for profit and the need for preservation."45 Like Sid 
Marty, whose popular history A Grand and Fabulous Notion appeared in the same decade, Bella 
argued (in considerable and convincing detail) that the creation of Rocky Mountains Park, 
followed by Glacier, Yoho and Jasper national parks, was driven by national railway interests 
hoping to derive substantial profits from mountain resorts.46 However, she argues that the early 
parks movement aimed to "remove [parks] from economic development," and especially "to stop 
hydroelectric development in the parks." These approaches clashed decisively in the Spray Lakes 
controversy, in which "one [group] wanted to preserve the parks, and the other to maximize their 
profitability."47 The result, in one chapter of Parks for Profit, is an intriguing examination of the 
sparring indulged in by two prominent figures in the public controversy—retired surveyors 
Arthur Wheeler of the Alpine Club of Canada, and William Pearce of the Canadian Pacific 
Railway—which, disappointingly, fails to examine in comparable detail much of the rest of the 
45
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controversy, including roles played by government and corporate officials who played a more 
direct role in the decision-making process regarding potential dams in Rocky Mountains Park. 
In the 1990s, this ground was revisited separately by C.J. Taylor and PearlAnn 
Reichwein. Taylor, while exploring the origins of the 1930 National Parks Act, acknowledged 
Brown's thesis that when Banff was created, "a certain degree of private development was 
tolerated... [and] game and unspoiled scenery were what many people came to see."48 In the 
early twentieth century, however, public organizations and a new National Parks Branch—eager 
to establish itself in terms of bureaucratic influence and permanence—championed new "park 
values," not least among which was "inviolability"—the principle that national park land could 
not be "violated" by natural resource exploitation.49 Taylor was somewhat vague on what these 
"park values" were, although one was "the preservation of wilderness." 
PearlAnn Reichwein supplies a more detailed history of the early parks movement in her 
doctoral dissertation, a history of the Alpine Club of Canada, from which she drew material for 
an article on the particular subject of water development controversies.51 Reichwein argues that 
the Alpine Club and the Parks Branch were, by 1921, motivated by "the principle of 
inviolability," by which she means "the conservation of certain areas [i.e. parks] of primitive 
landscape with all their original conditions of plant and animal life and other natural features 
intact." According to Reichwein, the Spray Lakes and Minnewanka controversies were the 
"greatest impetus" behind the early parks protection movement.53 She argues that the Alpine 
Club "stood firmly against tampering with watersheds in the Rockies," fearing this "would ruin 
48
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the natural environment and set a dangerous precedent for commercial encroachment on national 
park territory."54 John Marsh and Bruce Hodgins have advanced a similar argument.55 
Even on its own terms, this argument requires considerably greater development than has 
thus far been attempted. Bella's attempt at an analysis of the Spray Lakes controversy in Parks 
for Profit reduces the broader dispute to a personal contest between Alpine Club of Canada 
president Arthur Wheeler and Canadian Pacific Railway irrigation proponent William Pearce— 
neither of whom held a position in any government bureaucracy or at Calgary Power during the 
controversy.5 Reichwein's work is markedly superior in most respects, but she is concerned 
principally with just the preservation side of the debate, and more specifically with the role of the 
Alpine Club. Even the most recent work in this vein, by Hart and by Armstrong, Evenden, and 
Nelles, fails to consider what role may have been played by such conservationist organizations as 
the Canadian Commission of Conservation and the Department of the Interior's Water Power 
Branch (led by John Bow Challies), both of which printed works advocating the development of 
the Spray beginning in the 1910s. That these organizations would be ignored in the parks 
literature is unsurprising given the general lack of historical attention they have received.59 
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While the appreciation of the conservationist movement which supported dam 
construction is poor, the analysis of the anti-dam, or preservationist, movement is also 
incomplete and inconsistent. To begin with, park historians have proved far too willing to rely on 
simplistic descriptions of the parks movement as opposing commercial or economic activity in 
parks. Thus Reichwein attributes to the Alpine Club of Canada a "leading" role in opposing 
"commercial encroachment on national park territory," while Alan MacEachern, discussed in 
greater detail below, writes that during the 1920s the national parks were "threatened by 
economic exploitation."60 This leads them to allege, as Oravec did with respect to Hetch Hetchy, 
that the parks movement compromised itself (and the parks) by, as Bella puts it, "not argu[ing] 
purely for the intrinsic value of... the preservation of natural landscape. They had used one 
economic argument to counter another... Wheeler and Harkin saved the national parks from one 
kind of exploitation, but by ensuring their exploitation from another."61 Reichwein, too, writes 
that the Alpine Club of Canada struggled to resolve a "structural dialectic pivoting on the 
contending imperatives of human use and nature preservation." 
To some extent, these historians are simply reflecting the language of their sources, 
which regularly denounced the "commercialization of Parks waters," the dangers of allowing 
"commercialism and private gain" into the parks, and the threat posed by those who would "dot 
the parks with... [the] paraphernalia of commerce."63 Yet this represents a somewhat surprising 
lack of critical attention to the historical (and current) reality of national park affairs. 
Commercial operations were commonplace in the mountain parks, and still are. During the 
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1920s, Alpine Club director Arthur Wheeler himself operated a commercial tour operation in the 
Spray valley, and Parks Branch director James Harkin was an outspoken advocate of increased 
tourist activity in Rocky Mountains Park, which necessarily meant increased opportunities for 
private businesses in Banff, Lake Louise, and elsewhere. In the 1920s, denunciations of 
commercialism invariably referred only to particular forms of private enterprise—those seeking 
to invest in water power and resource development. This is an important distinction. In the 
1920s, the Canadian parks movement still conceived of national parks in terms of the benefits 
they could provide to human beings—but it maintained that the spiritual and economic benefits 
of fisheries and beauty spots unimpeded by dams and other resource extraction projects 
exceeded, and was incompatible with, the potential proceeds from such projects. 
The first major publication on Canadian parks to appear following Cronon's intervention, 
Alan MacEachern's Natural Selections, accepts much of the dominant narrative regarding pre-
1930 parks, but also bears the recognizable marks of the wilderness debate. MacEachern opens 
with the assertion that "we cannot see national parks as natural without understanding that it is 
our culture that has made them so and declares them so"—shortly after declaring, 
problematically, that parks are areas which "favour the natural over the cultural." His book 
primarily involves the establishment and management of the Maritime parks during the late 
interwar and early postwar period, with discussion of the mountain parks, pre-1930, confined to 
his first chapter. Much of this narrative does not differ fundamentally from Reichwein's, 
although MacEachern does interject an important warning that historians should not assume that 
the small Parks Branch bureaucracy was monolithic, or that Harkin either brought to his new 
MacEachern, Natural Selections, 4. 
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agency a strong commitment to preservation or experienced a "rapid conversion to wilderness 
advocacy" upon taking up his position.65 
Beyond this, however, much of the chapter is a relatively conventional account. For 
instance, MacEachern accepts that the Spray Lakes controversy was a contest over the principle 
of the inviolability of nature within national parks, and that its conclusion was "a victory for 
inviolability, demonstrating that when threatened by economic exploitation the Parks Branch 
would chop off its hand rather than have its whole body infected. Inviolability has been an 
intrinsic part of the national park ideal ever since."66 (MacEachern also advances the 
demonstrably flawed claim that the Spray Lakes controversy involved neither "widespread 
opposition" to dam construction, nor "public support for the national park idea.")67 
The most original argument advanced in Natural Selections, however, is that the Brown 
thesis underestimated the degree to which preservationist impulses—defined by MacEachern as 
calls for the absence of human use, activity, or (in its most extreme form) mere presence—were 
present from the beginning of the parks system. MacEachern recognizes that, following Cronon, 
both preservation and use—which, to MacEachern, includes both tourist and visitor facilities as 
well as resource extraction—can be seen as forms of human intervention.68 He argues that parks 
managers have always seen these as compatible joint purposes of the parks system, and that their 
work should instead be interpreted according to "the changing level of intervention that the Parks 
Branch permitted... in the name of both use and preservation." MacEachern contends that "the 
barometer of intervention moved up and down for both... simultaneously."69 
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On the whole, the evidence for preservationist interventions in the parks prior to the 
1920s is weak at best, and MacEachern is forced to rely upon the same sort of evidence he 
dismisses as inadequate and misleading in Brown's work—short, carefully selected quotations 
from debates in the House of Commons.70 More importantly, MacEachern's differentiation 
between preservation and use is anachronistic and unconvincing. According to MacEachern, 
"reintroducing a species to a park would be an act of preservation...[, while] adding a storey to a 
71 
park hotel would be in aid of use." However, other policies and practices are far less easy to 
pigeonhole. These include the introduction of new species, the active management of existing 
populations (by culling of animals identified as undesirable, or reintroduction of new animals, in 
the case of fishing rivers in Banff), and the damming of Lake Minnewanka in 1907 to beautify 
the shoreline. The problem is particularly acute because of the absence of evidence that officials 
debating and implementing these policies conceived of their actions within the same framework 
that MacEachern applies to them. 
Similar perspectives are still articulated in some more recent work. In the past year, two 
books have appeared which illustrate the continued relevance to historians of water power 
controversies in Canadian national parks. The first is Banff local historian E.J. Hart's first 
publication on an academic press, a biography of James Harkin. Hart's tome is impressive both 
in scope and length (at 564 pages), but somewhat less so in terms of making a focused 
contribution to the literature or defending a clearly articulated argument. At times, the reader is 
left with the impression that Hart would have preferred to write an actual history of the Parks 
Branch, and not just of Harkin. Hart provides a largely conventional account of the water power 
controversies (to the extent of titling a chapter on resource politics with the same quote from 
70
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Alpine Club circulars as Reichwein used to title her own article), though he does add the 
important caveat that the Parks Branch had an obvious material interest in buying into an 
ideological position—the inviolability of wilderness areas—which would bolster its own power 
79 
within the government. 
In the second, The River Returns, a trio of prominent historians—Christopher Armstrong, 
H.V. Nelles, and the younger Matthew Evenden—explore the history of Alberta's Bow River, 
the watershed of which includes both Lake Minnewanka and the Spray Lakes. Armstrong and 
Nelles have long been leading historians of the political economy of water power, including a 
major study of the origins of publicly owned hydroelectricity in Ontario.74 In their new book, 
however, they move in the direction of Evenden's scholarship, analyzing the social history of 
human interactions with rivers and the ways in which today's Bow River is a product of those 
7S 
past interactions. The Bow River, according to these authors, is "a joint project of nature and 
human culture."76 By this they mean that it is "a partially human construct yet... a natural 
phenomenon as well," having been extensively modified by logging, hydroelectricity, fishing, 
urban sanitation, and numerous other processes.77 
Both books are, to an extent, products of the critical inquiry which has followed William 
Cronon's identification of wilderness as "profoundly a human creation." Although Cronon's 
location of wilderness in the interaction between the sublime and the frontier does bear some 
hallmarks of American exceptionalism, his call to examine the social construction of wilderness 
72
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clearly has relevance on both sides of the border. In many other ways, however, The River 
Returns must be said to be a disappointment. Echoing earlier Canadian work, Armstrong, 
Evenden and Nelles take for granted that the National Parks Branch and the Alpine Club of 
Canada could be expected to oppose proposals to dam Minnewanka and the Spray Lakes in the 
1920s, though they do not explain why, or how, this position would be taken—or why this 
position changed after 1912. (They do note that the Parks Branch operated its own power plant 
within the park during the controversy, but inexplicably dismiss this merely as a "sublime act of 
bureaucratic hypocrisy.")7 A promised analysis of the Brown thesis does not materialize, and 
the citations in their chapter on water power are suspiciously incomplete. 
There is, in Canada, no recent work equivalent to Righter's The Battle overHetch 
Hetchy, in terms of its critical reappraisal of both park preservationists and pro-development 
conservationists. However, recent work in game conservation history does show some promise in 
this respect. Representative of this approach is Patricia McCormack's study of Wood Buffalo 
National Park, and Jennifer Brower's more recent history of Buffalo National Park (informally 
known as Wainwright National Park). Unlike the mountain parks, these early game 
conservation parks were, as McCormack puts it, "designed to protect [particular species of 
game], not to accommodate visitors."82 At the same time, however, such parks made no pretense 
of either protecting or beautifying nature beyond maintaining the particular species they were 
created to sustain. To that end, Buffalo National Park—admittedly an extreme case—actually 
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functioned as a sort of government-owned ranching operation, complete with fencing, employees 
with experience herding cattle, and, after 1922, a bison slaughterhouse.83 
Much of this seems to venture somewhat far afield from water history, but the emerging 
new history of sport and game conservation is still relevant because of its critical attention to the 
role of the wilderness ideal (or lack of such) in early park policy. For instance, Ted Binnema and 
Melanie Niemi have argued that early Canadian parks controversies seldom revolved around 
ideals of uninhabited wilderness. Their analysis, as well as that of a similar article by John 
Sandlos, is a reaction to a predominantly American thesis (imported into Canada by historians 
such as Ian McLaren and Celeste Urion) that Aboriginal peoples were removed from parks as 
part of the attempt to create uninhabited wilderness. These authors indicate that Canadian park 
officials did not imagine themselves responsible for safeguarding a pristine or uninhabited 
natural landscape as they removed Aboriginal people from the national parks. Instead, they were 
responding to conservationist interests such as tourism promoters and white sport hunters 
seeking to restrict Aboriginal hunting. Indeed, according to Binnema and Niemi, "aboriginal 
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people were not removed to create uninhabited landscapes, but in the service of efforts to create 
landscapes abundant in wild game (primarily for sportsmen and tourists)."86 
In both Canada and the U.S., then, in the past decade scholars have grown increasingly 
suspicious not only of the cultural concept of wilderness, but also of the historical relevance of 
this concept during the early twentieth century. Righter's reinterpretation of the Hetch Hetchy 
controversy, coupled with Binnema and Niemi's similar dismissal of wilderness ideals in the 
context of Aboriginal alienation, raises the important question of whether the Spray Lakes 
controversy should be subjected to a similar reinterpretation. The underlying question therefore 
remains pertinent: over what exactly, during the 1920s, were proponents and opponents of new 
dams in the Spray River valley and on Lake Minnewanka in conflict? 
The records left by important participants in the Spray Lakes and Minnewanka 
controversies, such as the federal government's National Parks Branch and Water Power Branch, 
the Commission of Conservation, the Alpine Club of Canada, the National Parks Association, the 
Calgary Power Company, and prairie booster William Pearce, reveal a different picture than that 
portrayed, as yet, in either the American or Canadian literature. The construction of the second 
Lake Minnewanka dam, in 1912, was an important turning point in the evolution of both the 
parks and conservation movements. The latter regarded the dam as an important symbol of the 
simultaneous achievement of park improvement (beautification) and economic development 
through provision of new electrical power, while the former opposed new dam construction less 
out of concern for untouched wilderness than for the damage dams would do to nature tourism 
and other benefits humans derived from visiting national parks. By 1930, the parks movement 
had successfully established that dams and parks were incompatible types of projects, but, in that 
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year, a proposal to dam that lake for a third time brought to the fore the problem of which of 
these projects should take precedence—that is, whether this principle meant that dams should not 
be constructed on park lands, or whether lands should simply be removed from parks prior to the 
construction of dams, a position resembling that of Runte's worthless lands thesis. The parks 
movement won this dispute in 1931, although it was an incomplete victory caused in part by 
Calgary Power's reduced growth prospects during the Depression; indeed, in 1941, beyond the 
scope of the present analysis, the lake was dammed anyways under the emergency powers of the 
War Measures Act. 
In the first chapter, I explore the justifications and aftermath of the construction of the 
first and second dams on Lake Minnewanka, in 1907 and 1912. Between 1907 and 1921, the 
Parks Branch went from supporting dams both to beautify the scenery and facilitate resource 
development, to opposing them, in part, as a result of a long and drawn-out conflict with Calgary 
Power over the management of the newly artificial Lake Minnewanka reservoir. Parks Branch 
and Water Power Branch officials initially agreed that, in addition to supplying power, a dam 
could "very much improve" the appearance of the lake and "increase revenue for the Parks."87 
Conservationists regarded the dam as an impressive achievement, and the Water Power Branch 
and Commission of Conservation made a major survey of the Bow River watersheds, searching 
for additional sites to develop (which first identified the Spray Lakes as one such site). A decade 
of conflicts over filling the lake on schedule and logging the damaged shoreline, however, 
persuaded the Parks Branch to oppose new dam proposals. 
The second chapter explores Calgary Power's attempt, in the face of strenuous opposition 
from the Parks Branch and from civil society organizations like the Alpine Club of Canada, to 
87
 Library and Archives Canada (LAC) RG 84-A-2-a, vol. 660, file B16-29, pt 1, Mitchell to Challies, July 22, 1912, 
and vol. 492, R39-8, pt 1, Harkin to Cory, December 24, 1912. 
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return to Rocky Mountains Park in the 1920s and construct a new, much larger dam at the Spray 
Lakes. Opponents of the dam, in a manner similar to what Robert Righter found in California, 
justified their position on the basis of the attractiveness of the lakes, what they offered to visitors 
(in terms of aesthetics and opportunities to fish), and the public ownership of the national parks, 
not out of a desire to preserve the intrinsic value of pristine or untouched wilderness. In 
contrast, proponents of the dam appealed less often to Progressive values of public ownership 
over power or water, than to the need to conserve and efficiently exploit available natural 
resources in the interest of regional and national economic development—although they did 
maintain that a dam would "turn a valley full of muskeg, nigger heads and old burnt stumps" into 
a "glistening sheet of water."89 By 1925, it was apparent that Minister of the Interior Charles 
Stewart, in whose hands the decision rested, would side with Calgary Power. 
He did not do so immediately, however, in part because of the intervention of the Alberta 
provincial government, which filed its own application for the valley as part of the complicated 
politics of resource transfer which occurred during this decade. The third and final chapter 
explores the implications of this during the end of the Spray Lakes controversy, between 1925 
and 1930, as well as during a second controversy over a proposed new dam on the Lake 
Minnewanka storage reservoir, which occurred in 1930 and 1931. It reveals that while, as other 
park historians have claimed, this period did see the emergence and recognition of the principle 
of inviolability, the actual interpretation and application of that principle was bitterly contested. 
Parks movement activists claimed that the principle established in the Spray Lakes controversy 
88
 Indeed, as Arthur Wheeler remarked, Canadian parks would never "emulate Switzerland" - his ideal model of 
parks development - "until some life is imparted to them... There are a few who are interested... in retaining them as 
primeval solitudes but... the majority look for something in the way of life": LAC, RG 84 A-2-a, vol. 2243, file Y16-
3, pt 1, Wheeler to Harkin, January 23, 1914. 
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was that development could not occur in national parks, while development advocates countered 
that the precedent established at Spray Lakes was that exploitable regions, since they could not 
be developed within parks, must be separated from the parks and subsequently developed. This 
period featured both an important "resurvey" of park boundaries by Richard W. Cautley, 
established on the premise that national parks should not contain resource-rich areas (and on 
which basis the Spray Lakes were removed from the park), and an abortive new dispute over 
Lake Minnewanka in 1930 and 1931, in which company officials and some politicians argued 
that the latter reservoir should be removed from the park, as well. 
The contest between park development and water power development, it must be 
stressed, cannot be understood solely within the narrow confines of a history of federal 
government institutions. C.J. Taylor, in his history of national historic sites, adopts a pluralist 
position, arguing that public organizations must also be included in any park analysis, since "the 
interaction of the [government] program with various participants shows the multifaceted 
relationship of the federal government both internally and to the society with which it 
interacts." Unfortunately, as MacEachern remarks, park historians (including himself) still do 
tend to end up producing institution-centered, "more traditional accounts of environmental 
policy-making," even when they aim for something deeper. To this end, the Parks Branch 
admittedly does figure prominently in my analysis. Where appropriate, this project also analyzes 
the role of the Commission of Conservation (an organization which has nearly escaped the 
attention of Canadian historians) and the Water Power Branch (an organization which has wholly 
Quotes from Christopher Gainor, "Alberta's Resources Negotiations and Banff and Jasper National Parks," Past 
Imperfect 11 (2005), 8. See R. W. Cautley, Report Accompanied by Seven Maps and One Album of Photographs on 
the Selection of Permanent Boundaries of Rocky Mountains Park, Jasper Park and Jasper Park Extension of the 
National Parks of Canada (Ottawa: Department of the Interior, 1928). 
91
 C.J. Taylor, Negotiating the Past, x. 
92
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escaped such attention), both of which at times contributed substantially to hydroelectric 
development in national parks. 
At the same time, however, much is revealed—both of the ideologies underlying different 
positions, as well as the ways in which particular pressures were placed on different branches of 
government—by examining groups and individuals in civil society. Many of these figures and 
organizations will be at least somewhat recognizable to those familiar with the Canadian parks 
historiography, such as the Alpine Club of Canada, the National Parks Association of Canada, 
and retired surveyors Arthur Wheeler and William Pearce.93 Others, such as Norman Luxton and 
the Banff Advisory Council, may be somewhat less so. Reichwein has written that "the history of 
Canada's national parks has focused most frequently on the dual agencies of state and 
commerce, yet the parks were also shaped by their users."94 One may easily add—though, in 
Canada, few have—that the parks must also have been shaped by their residents.95 
The most important, though by no means the only, source of primary documents 
consulted during the preparation of this thesis was the archive of the National Parks Branch, 
housed in Record Group 84 (RG 84) of Library and Archives Canada (LAC).96 The records of 
the Parks Branch from this period, when Harkin was director and Mabel B. Williams the 
secretary, tend to be particularly thorough and well-organized. LAC also contains the records of 
For a weak but adequate biography of Pearce, see E. Alyn Mitchner, "William Pearce and Federal Government 
Activity in Western Canada, 1882-1904," PhD dissertation, University of Alberta, 1971, and same author, "William 
Pearce, 1904-1930" (Edmonton: University of Alberta Department of History, 1974). 
94
 Reichwein, "Beyond the Visionary Mountains," 3. 
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the Water Power Branch in Record Group 85 (RG 85), which are viewable but markedly less 
well-organized. 
In addition, this project draws on a number of archival sources in Alberta which were of 
local or regional relevance. First, the Pearce Papers, at the University of Alberta Archives, 
contain the prolific writings of one of the most outspoken public advocates of water power 
development in the Rocky Mountains during the 1910s and 1920s, former surveyor William 
Pearce. Second, the archives of the Whyte Museum for the Canadian Rockies, in Banff, house 
documents left by local businessman Norman K. Luxton (owner of the Crag & Canyon 
newspaper as well as a theatre and hotels), the Alpine Club of Canada and its executive 
members, as well as from the various incarnations of the local municipal advocacy organization, 
the Banff Advisory Council (at certain times the Banff Board of Trade and the Banff Citizen's 
Association).99 
In addition to the above, numerous newspapers and published primary source material 
were very illuminating. Several relevant Albertan newspapers, including the Banff Crag & 
Canyon, the Calgary Albertan, and the Calgary Daily Herald, are now available in digital 
(though not searchable) format from the Alberta Heritage Digitization Project.100 The Parks 
Branch maintained its own extensive press clippings file, collected from newspapers across the 
LAC, RG 85. Note that some Water Power Branch files, particularly those pertaining to Prairie projects prior to 
1930, appear to have been removed and transferred elsewhere, presumably to the Prairie provinces (and, also 
presumably, can be found in provincial archives). In addition, a large proportion of the Water Power Branch files 
still held in Ottawa are listed as restricted, or classified; however, in the research for this thesis, these files were 
made available by the archives after only a cursory inspection by staff following an informal request. Given that the 
files pertain to publicly known economic development projects of the 1920s and earlier, this is likely to be the 
experience of other researchers approaching other portions of RG 85, as well. 
98
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country, which is now found at LAC.101 Internal and public circulars of the National Parks 
Association of Canada are held in digital format by the Acadia University Digital Archive.102 
For instance, LAC, RG 84 A-2-a, vol. 935, file R39-8, parts 1-5. 
Acadia University, Digital Collections, Internet: <http://library.acadiau.ca/ContentDM/digitalArchives.html>. 
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Chapter One 
"From a Scenic Standpoint":1 
Dams and Hydroelectricity in Banff National Park, 1907-1923 
Although the Parks Branch strenuously opposed new dam construction projects in national parks 
in the 1920s, in 1907 and 1912 it first constructed its own dam on Lake Minnewanka, and then 
actively supported the construction of a second, larger dam on the same lake. This apparent 
discrepancy is not well researched or understood by Canadian historians, although a pair of 
recent books—Christopher Armstrong, Matthew Evenden, and H.V. Nelles's The River Returns, 
and E.J. Hart's J.B. Harkin—both contain references to the second of these dams. Armstrong, 
Evenden and Nelles observe, without explaining the transition, that the Parks Branch supported 
the second dam on Lake Minnewanka in 1912, and even constructed a power house to make use 
of this dam in 1924, but opposed subsequent dams on the Spray Lakes and on Minnewanka— 
which they label a "sublime act of bureaucratic hypocrisy."2 Hart, in his biography of Parks 
Branch director James B. Harkin, is more forgiving, suggesting that Harkin was a bureaucratic 
"neophyte... faced with a fait accompli," whose preference would have been to oppose the 1912 
dam, as well.3 
Both books, to an extent, are products of the critical inquiry which has followed William 
Cronon's identification of wilderness as "profoundly a human creation." Although Cronon's 
location of wilderness in the interaction between the sublime and the frontier does bear some 
hallmarks of American exceptionalism, his call to examine the social construction of wilderness 
has relevance on both sides of the border.4 Armstrong, Evenden and Nelles thus recognize that 
1
 "From a scenic standpoint the conditions are very bad," Harkin lamented in 1921: Library and Archives Canada 
(LAC), Record Group (RG) 84-A-2-a, vol. 661, file B16-29, part 3, Harkin to Cory, January 26, 1921. 
2
 Armstrong, Evenden and Nelles, The River Returns, 131-132. 
3
 Hart, J.B. Harkin, 261. 
4
 Cronon, "The Trouble with Wilderness," 7. 
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the Bow River is "partially human."5 Recently, however, other scholars have questioned whether 
the wilderness ideal, per se, was significant in early park and preservation debates. According to 
Robert Righter, "wilderness... was not an issue in the Hetch Hetchy fight"—long regarded as the 
definitive clash between wilderness and wise use. Even preservationists "consistently advocated 
development... [for] nature tourism," he observes.6 Similarly, Ted Binnema and Melanie Niemi 
convincingly argue that the removal of Aboriginal Peoples from Banff National Park had as its 
aim game conservation rather than creation of uninhabited wilderness. There is now a need to 
return to the territory first claimed by environmental historians—dam conflicts in national 
parks—from the new, critical perspective, as Righter has done with respect to Hetch Hetchy. 
Canadian historians have long recognized that the first generation of national park 
management was markedly less concerned with wilderness preservation than were its 
institutional descendants. Indeed, Ted Binnema and Melanie Niemi in some respects return full 
circle to Robert Craig Brown's argument that "the term 'wilderness' was scarcely used... 
[except] to suggest a primitive condition demanding 'improvement,'" and that early park 
advocates saw a role for resource exploitation provided that the unsightly remains remained out 
of sight.8 Alan MacEachern has argued that Brown overlooked "preservationist impulses present 
at the establishment of the first park," and that parks policy has since been an attempt to pursue 
5
 Armstrong, Evenden, and Nelles, The River Returns, 21. 
6
 Righter, The Battle over Hetch Hetchy, esp. 5. 
7
 Ted Binnema and Melanie Niemi, "Let the Line be Drawn Now: Wilderness, Conservation, and the Exclusion of 
Aboriginal People from Banff National Park in Canada," Environmental History 11 (2006), 728,740. 
8
 In the words of John A. Macdonald, national parks would "recouperate the patient and recoup the treasury": 
Brown, "The Doctrine of Usefulness," 107. Brown's thesis bears surface resemblance to Alfred Runte's argument 
that the U.S. created national parks only on "worthless lands": Runte, "The National Park Idea: Origins and Paradox 
of the American Experience," Journal of Forest History 21(1977), 64, 73; and National Parks: The American 
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extraction purposes. 
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preservation and land use, simultaneously.9 Despite this argument, in its first thirty years Banff 
welcomed both natural resource exploitation (the large Bankhead coal mine is the best-known 
example) and, more significantly, undertook to revitalize "nature" in the park—introducing new 
tree species, reintroducing decimated game stock such as elk and buffalo, and operating a zoo 
featuring various exotic species when the latter failed to yield sufficiently impressive results for 
sightseers.10 The latter insight predates the wilderness debate, having first been made by James 
Gordon Nelson, Robert Scace, and Roger Byrne, in a series of seemingly forgotten papers.11 
Brown and Scace offered an insightful critique of early park philosophy, without 
identifying the turning point between Brown's doctrine of usefulness and any subsequent 
doctrine of preservation. According to the currently accepted theory, which has never been 
analyzed in great depth, that turning point was the Spray Lakes controversy. The result of the 
seven-year conflict was authorization for Calgary Power to dam the Spray Lakes, after the lakes 
were removed from the park. Thus, according to C.J. Taylor, the Parks Branch's "aim... to 
establish national parks as a distinct resource" collided with development, resulting in the 
articulation of the doctrine of "inviolability" in the National Parks Act: development was 
incompatible with national parks and, "if pressed hard enough, the Parks Branch would rather 
sacrifice part of a park than compromise on this principle." Comparable arguments have been 
advanced by Leslie Bella and PearlAnn Reichwein, who add the important dimension of the role 
9
 MacEachern, Natural Selections, 15, 18. 
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 For a description of Bankhead, see W.F. Lothian, History of Canada's National Parks (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 
1976-1981), IV:96. 
' ' Note that the Nelson school organized the 1968 conference at which Brown presented his successful paper on the 
doctrine of usefulness. See Scace, Banjf, and Byrne, Man and Landscape Change. In language strikingly resemblant 
of later historical critiques of wilderness, Scace lamented that "misrepresentations of 'unspoiled natural landscape' 
and of 'animal and plant life that have lived for centuries in their natural surroundings' persist in official and popular 
literature": Scace, "Banff Townsite," 772. 
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of non-government groups, such as the Alpine Club of Canada, and individuals, such as William 
Pearce.13 
Simultaneously, however, the Branch's and the Club's ardent opposition during the 
1920s begs a further question: where did this opposition come from? In 1912, the Branch 
accepted a dam without protest; by the early 1920s, its opposition was strident. The beginnings 
of an answer may be seen in the fact that, in the 1920s, both proponents and opponents of new 
dams often rested their case upon their interpretation of the consequences at Lake Minnewanka.14 
Indeed, the first dam to be strenuously opposed by the Parks Branch was an unsuccessful 
proposal to expand the Minnewanka dam in 1914, which seems to have escaped scholarly 
attention except for a brief—and incorrect—claim in The River Returns that the proposal was 
rejected by the Department of Fisheries.15 
In truth, Lake Minnewanka was no longer pristine wilderness by the time Calgary 
Power's proposal was authorized in 1912, having already been dammed in 1907. However, the 
Parks Branch experience at Minnewanka between 1907 and 1921 is vital to understanding the 
Branch's later opposition to development in the park—just as the experience of its rival, the 
Water Power Branch, contributed to that office's subsequent support for further dams. These 
experiences may be partially reconstructed through a variety of sources, principally the Parks 
Branch archives but also newspaper accounts, government publications, and park promotional 
literature.16 Between 1907 and 1921, the Parks Branch went from supporting dams both to 
beautify the scenery and facilitate resource development, to opposing them, in part, as the result 
13
 Bella, Parks for Profit, esp. 1-2, 39; and Reichwein, '"Hands Off our National Parks,"' 129-155. 
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 See, for example, William Pearce's letter in Calgary Daily Herald, May 30, 1923; and RG 84-A-2-a, vol. 492, file 
R39-8, pt 1, Harkin to Cory, October 13, 1922. 
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of a protracted conflict with Calgary Power over the management of the modified Lake 
Minnewanka. 
This argument also contributes to two other minor historiographical debates. The first 
involves James Harkin. Challenging an alleged tendency to see Harkin as a "rapid conver[t]" to 
(and zealous advocate of) wilderness preservation, MacEachern argues that Harkin would have 
relied heavily upon his Branch staff to formulate early ideas about parks.17 Hart challenges this 
thesis, writing that the director's vision was already developed through previous experience, and 
that he was even inclined to oppose the 1912 dam, had the Parks Branch only been better 
1 ft 
established when the decision was taken. In this paper, I side with MacEachern, arguing that 
during his first years in office Harkin behaved consistently with existing practices. 
Second, the hydroelectricity debates of the 1910s also played a significant role in the 
development of conservationism, or wise-use philosophy. Two conservationist organizations 
were established just prior to the Parks Branch, the Canadian Commission on Conservation and 
the Water Power Branch. The first has attracted only modest scholarly attention; the second, 
none.19 Both organizations were interested in the Bow River watershed from an early stage. Just 
as the Parks Branch later came to regard the Minnewanka dam as a regrettable concession to 
outside power interests, the Water Power Branch regarded it as a precedent-setting victory for 
wise use. Both organizations merit much more historical research. 
"Nature cannot be improved on," Banff park commissioner Howard Douglas claimed in 
1900: therefore, his "wise policy" was simply to "afford the sight-seer the easiest... routes to the 
17
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18
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wonderful sights which nature has lavishly worked." Such statements seem to corroborate 
MacEachern's suspicion that preservationist impulses were present at the creation of the parks.21 
In fact, however, officials such as Douglas had been "improving" nature for years by 1900, and 
would continue to do so. Neither were they quick to trust in the "lavish work" of nature where 
thorny problems such as endangered species were concerned: after the first small buffalo herd 
was purchased in 1898, Douglas and his subordinates built "a new Corrall" for their acquisition 
00 
and kept them "with some other cattle... in order to prevent their wandering off." Later, 
Douglas and F.G. Rothwell drew up ambitious plans to manage the herd—described as "badly 
divided" because it consisted of "consist[ed] of ten males and ten females"—by bringing in 
muskox and "a number of suitable cows, ([of] a certain long-horned, long-haired Scotch breed)... 
to cross with the buffalo," the funds for which would be raised in part by the sale of "young 
buffalo bulls" to private buyers outside the park. If, as C.J. Taylor writes, "game and unspoiled 
scenery were what many people came to see," those people were either unaware or quite tolerant 
of efforts to make appealing game and scenery available to them.24 This was true in the 
presentation of water in particular, as will be discussed shortly. 
In retrospect, it is not surprising that early visitors to Banff did not see it as an 
uninhabited, pristine wilderness: game and forests were depleted and, until their relocation, the 
Stoney First Nation's trails crisscrossed the backcountry.25 In 1902, surveyor Walter D. Wilcox, 
Department of the Interior, Annual Report 1900, Sessional Papers 1901, session 10, vol. 35, report 25, part iv, 4-
5. 
21
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as he hiked to the Spray Lakes, passed "uninterruptedly for two days" through a forest of timber 
burnt by "the white man," his view obscured by "clouds of smoke from forest fires." He 
walked on "good Indian trail[s]" and slept in "a former Indian camping ground, in fact our men 
97 
used their poles." On the shores of Minnewanka, too, Harry Brittain reported that trees had 
"been consumed by the flames which licked up the mountain side." 
Perceptions that this landscape was inadequate go some way toward explaining the drive 
for park improvement identified by Brown. The first superintendent, George Stewart, lamented 
"the want of variety in our foliage" and the "large areas of dead timber," which he sought to 
90 
rectify by importing thousands of trees from Ontario. Elk and mountain sheep were "now... 
scarce," added Fisheries Commissioner William Whitcher.30 In 1903, mountain sheep were still 
regarded as "one of the rarest wild animals," and the reported killing of a sheep by "an Indian 
hunter" gave the Banff Crag & Canyon newspaper an opportunity to denounce alleged 
"1 1 
Aboriginal over-hunting. The zoo, the buffalo enclosure, and the park museum—which 
Whitcher hoped would hold the remains of "animal species weeded out (i.e., predators)"—were 
all responses to the perceived inadequacy of the local fauna. As late as 1937, when the zoo 
closed, the Crag & Canyon still feared that few tourists would "see a bear long enough along the 
road to study any of its funny habits." Fish, too, were found to be in insufficient supply for the 
place names within the park and even, in one case, the "Elixir of Life" of the hot springs: Mabel Williams, The 
Heart of the Rockies (Hamilton: Larson, 1926), i. Not all were so impressed by the famed hot springs; one cynical 
visitor commented that "you emerge smelling like a cheap Canadian match, and fearful of rubbing against the wall 
and igniting... [T]he stone steps... are more slippery than ice, and much harmless enjoyment is furnished in 
watching the brave and the fair alight, not always on their feet": Frederick George Aflalo, Sunset Playground 
(London: Witherby, 1909), 217. 
26
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enjoyment of human visitors—who, while they could no longer hunt within the park, could still 
fish there. "The Bow River itself has been pretty well fished out," R.H. Campbell reported in 
1908. Consequently a new "good fishing ground... in the vicinity of Banff was necessary, and 
Campbell proposed using Devil's Lake (now Lake Minnewanka) and a pair of nearby, smaller 
lakes (since flooded by Minnewanka as a result of hydroelectric dams) for this purpose. 
Arrangements were quickly made to import 10,500 trout into the park to stock the lakes.35 
Such landscape modification and animal management reflected park priorities. However, 
as Brown has argued, early park policy also reflected the largely uncontroversial status of 
economic development for resource exploitation within the parks. Douglas may have been trying 
to make the best of a poor situation when he praised the Bankhead coal mining town as "a 
popular stopping place," with its "beautiful homes and its teeming industrial life"—or, again, 
when he described the Exshaw cement plant as the "beautifully situated... centre of a great 
manufacturing industry."36 However, the CPR also featured both industrial towns in its 
promotional literature, and Crag & Canyon editor Ike Byers looked forward to the day when 
"rows of summer houses... stretch in all directions."37 
From the beginning, Banff officials and residents considered water through this broader 
rubric of beautification and economic development. Numerous (and mostly abandoned) schemes 
for modifying lakes, rivers, and swamps can be found in the Parks Branch archives and in the 
Crag & Canyon. Whitcher, for example, imagined turning "an extensive waste of beaver 
meadow" into "a pretty group of small lakes," and, upon his recommendation, Ontario wild rice 
34
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was planted in the "unflooded portions" of the Vermilion Lakes. This, he reasoned, would 
"replace the rank weeds" and afford greater "food and concealment to wild geese."38 Such 
visions were neither isolated nor short-lived: in the 1920s the Parks Branch repeatedly attempted 
to extirpate mosquitoes by contaminating stagnant pools with oil, and one resident called for the 
draining of "hundreds of acres of swamp land" to create a "beautiful valley."39 
At the same time, the bright future heralded by Byers, when "the hotels will number 
dozens with accommodation for thousands,"40 required the use of water for another purpose: 
power. In 1901, Byers suggested that the Bow River Falls be harnessed to "generate electricity... 
to make our town gleam in the darkness of night like a Jewell [sic] in a crown of glory."41 
Douglas agreed that electricity would "add to the attractiveness of the park" and, like Byers, felt 
that "the Bow falls afford unlimited water power for electric lighting and water power."42 
(Instead, electricity was furnished by the CPR coal plant at Bankhead until 1924.) After street 
lighting was installed, the Crag observed happily that the lights "show up well against the dark 
foliage of the pines."43 
The first dams, at Lake Minnewanka and Lake Louise, were products of this easy 
acceptance of environmental modification in the pursuit of beautification and power. There 
remains considerable confusion about the dam constructed in 1907 on Lake Minnewanka—a 
Quotes taken from Byrne, 124. 
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consequence of the fact that local officials, operating without guidance from Ottawa and feeling 
their work was thoroughly uncontroversial, either failed to record their activities or subsequently 
lost the paperwork. Thus the dam is variously claimed to be constructed in 1907, 1908, and, 
according to Parks Canada itself, 1895.44 Separate explanations were submitted to Harkin in 
1911 by superintendent Douglas and George Hunter, who actually built the dam. According to 
Hunter, the dam was built in October 1907, while Douglas was visiting Montana.45 Douglas 
claimed the dam was built in 1908, while he was facilitating the purchase of buffalo from the 
Flathead Reservation—a trip which occurred in 1907.46 Hunter's date seems to have been the 
correct one. 
In any case, the two men agreed about why the dam had been built: it was necessary to 
facilitate boating. According to Hunter, his dam raised the lake three feet, "allowing] larger 
boats access to [the] wharf [and] also freshening a] smaller lake which was later stocked with 
ten thousand nipegon trout"—probably the full order of trout referred to earlier.47 The steamboat 
tours of the lake had been having difficulty "landing at the wharf," Douglas agreed, and 
"something had to be done." The following year, he had the dam lowered to 18 inches because 
"a very fine grove of trees" was endangered. Unfortunately, "quite a number of trees were... 
destroyed before the dam was lowered." 
In 1911, the Dominion government's oversight of both parks and water power changed 
immensely. That year, the Laurier government passed the Dominion Forest Reserves and Parks 
Act, combining the existing patchwork of national parks and forest reserves under the authority 
44
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of the new National Parks Branch. Douglas moved to Edmonton and became the Chief 
Superintendent, responsible for all mountain parks; in Banff, he was replaced by A.B. 
Macdonald. Harkin, previously a political aide to Liberal Minister of the Interior Clifford Sifton, 
became the branch commissioner. As Hart notes, his small Ottawa staff—including Frank 
Williamson, Maxwell Graham, Mabel Williamson, and J.E. Spero—was drawn principally from 
the Forestry Branch.49 
The same year, the Department of the Interior also established a new office to oversee 
hydroelectricity, the Water Power Branch. In comparison to the Parks Branch, this organization 
has attracted negligible historical attention. The same is true of its first director, John Bow 
Challies. Challies's resume inside and outside of public service was impressive. As head of water 
power work at the Department of the Interior, he led the Canadian delegation to the International 
Engineering Congress in 1915 and the World Water Power Conference in 1924.50 That year, he 
left the public service and took up an executive position at the Shawinigan Water & Power 
Company (like Calgary Power, a Montreal-based corporation).51 Challies was one of Harkin's 
principal partners, and later rivals, on park development issues. 
When Harkin became director of the Parks Branch, he inherited and initially accepted the 
practice of environmental modification. In November 1911, CPR solicitors informed Harkin that 
the railway company had "spent a very large sum of money... beautifying the surroundings at 
Lake Louise," in exchange for an unofficial monopoly on construction of buildings there.52 It is 
unknown what "beautification" the CPR undertook at Lake Louise previously, but, after New 
Year's, the same persons proposed a new scheme. Like Minnewanka, they explained, Lake 
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Louise was "very shallow and it is at times quite difficult for boats to land." The solution was to 
extend the shoreline outward into the lake, building "a retaining wall some... fifteen feet in the 
water and... mak[ing] an attractive green sward... to correspond with the existing ground in front 
of the hotel."53 
The C.P.R.'s proposal amounted to improving scenery to facilitate tourism. The 
lakeshore, the company explained, was "very rough and uneven and... unsightly"; moreover, "at 
periods of low water it is impossible for small boats to land." Both "objectionable features" 
would be eliminated, and the lake front would be made "uniform and... pleasing." Two 
additional features were proposed: a "driveway" on the reclaimed land, and a small hydroelectric 
dam "on Louise Creek where it leaves the lake." The dam would be covered by a picturesque 
bridge, "in keeping with the character" of its surroundings.54 
Harkin's response indicates that, at this early date, he accepted the earlier practice of 
permitting "improvements" to the scenery. He reported to deputy minister W.W. Cory that "the 
proposed work will constitute an improvement" and recommended its prompt approval, provided 
only that the bridge over the dam was made "wide enough to carry... traffic."55 After consulting 
the Water Power Branch, permission was also given for the dam and bridge, along with a "small 
water power development."56 Save for arranging an engineering inspection that July to ensure 
that stumps had been properly removed and a later note that land along the banks of Louise 
Creek should respect the "fisherman's... prerogative to stand on either shore whilst engaged in 
en 
the art," Harkin seems to have trusted the C.P.R. to supervise its own affairs. 
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Within several weeks of the Lake Louise discussion, Harkin's attention was wrested 
away by a more important issue: a proposal by a new regional electrical utility, the Calgary 
Power Company, to dam Lake Minnewanka, raise the water level 12 feet, and use it as a storage 
facility. (Two good histories of this company currently exist: Armstrong, Evenden and Nelles's 
The River Returns, and an earlier monograph William Hawkins, Electrifying Calgary).5* The 
company was founded in 1909 by Robert B. Bennett (the Conservative Member of Parliament 
and future prime minister) and Maritimes financier William Maxwell Aitken (the future Lord 
Beaverbrook), before being taken over by Aitken's eastern partner, Izaak Walton Killam. Shortly 
after its founding, it secured a contract to supply power to Calgary and then built two dams and 
power houses outside the park, at Horseshoe Falls and Kananaskis Falls. Building a storage dam 
on Lake Minnewanka was not only the next step in the company's harnessing of the Bow River, 
but, as Armstrong, Evenden, and Nelles observe, it was a way of correcting the unanticipated fall 
in the Bow's water levels (and, thus, power output) during the winter months.59 Minnewanka 
would be filled and drained as necessary to regulate water flows. It was, as one engineer later 
reported, "not only the largest storage area in the Bow River Watershed, but... the most easily 
formed by the construction of conservation works."60 
Calgary Power's plans for the lake necessarily conflicted with existing uses of it. An 
imagined lakeside village had never fully materialized, but a dozen cottages stood at 
Minnewanka Landing. Basil Way's lakeside chalet, in the words of the Crag & Canyon, was "a 
comfortable house" for "picnic and fishing parties."61 Two tour boats plied the lake, one owned 
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by Banff entrepreneur Norman K. Luxton and the other by John Standly. (Luxton also owned a 
hotel, the Crag & Canyon newspaper, a curio shop, and, later, the Lux movie theatre.)62 
Hart argues, in the context of the 1912 dam, that Harkin was "a neophyte... faced with a 
fait accompli," left to "put as good a face as possible on the decision." To the contrary, one of 
the Parks Branch's first reactions was surprised internal reflection that the contract would 
guarantee "park interests." In a pair of unsigned memoranda (presumably never circulated 
outside of the Branch), Harkin and his subordinates pondered what "park interests" might be 
involved. One five-page report summarized these interests in several categories: power, grounds, 
timber, scenery loss, the Minnewanka Landing townsite, fisheries, and parks revenue. The 
second report contained a similar list, condensed to just two pages. 
In addition to making arrangements to compensate leaseholders along the former 
lakeshore and claiming rights to water power from the dam sufficient to secure the future 
electrical consumption of Banff, the Branch was concerned principally with scenery. To this end, 
the memoranda recommended, Calgary Power should be required to "remove all timber growth 
from the flooded area, cutting trees low enough to protect navigation of the lake and at the same 
time to prevent the marring of the scenery." Parks officials should also claim the right to 
establish further directives for "the preservation of scenery" as construction progressed.65 In 
general, the second report concluded, park interests were as follows: "the preservation of the 
beauty of the scenery; the protection of the interests of lot holders...; the restoration of all roads, 
For more about Luxton, see Laurie Meijer Drees, "Making Banff a Wild West: Norman Luxton, Indians, and 
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trails, bridges,... [and] wharves;... removal of debris, etc."66 What is particularly interesting about 
this discussion, albeit brief, is that it is the first clear articulation of "park interests." The final 
version of the contract, signed on March 1, affirmed "park interests" and granted Harkin the 
power to regulate the clearing of the shoreline, relocate Minnewanka Landing at Calgary 
Power's expense, and prevent "operations proving... detrimental to the scenery." 
The question of Minnewanka's scenery, or "natural attractiveness," was the subject of 
another, lengthier series of correspondence with the Water Power Branch, which employed or 
contracted a total of four engineers at Minnewanka—J.T. Johnston, M.C. Hendry, C.H. Mitchell, 
and K.H. Smith—and argued that any effects of the dam would be improvements. According to 
Mitchell, there were three potential risks: large quantities of "dead standing timber, brule and 
similar debris between the present... shores of the lake and... the highest proposed water level," 
damaged fish stocks, and the alteration of the "peculiarly clear and bright blue" waters of the 
lake. None of these were serious problems, Mitchell believed: the shore could be pre-emptively 
logged, a fish-ladder could carry fish over the dam, and the sediment would "quickly settle... 
and will retain in the deep lake the same attractive color."68 Challies forwarded the reports to 
Harkin with a cover letter assuring him that "the works will cause no permanent injury to the 
scenic beauty of the Park, but rather... the attractiveness of Lake Minnewanka will be 
enhanced."69 Harkin also received advice from the Geological Survey of Canada that "the 
diversion... would improve the appearance" of the lake.70 
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At least as significant to the Parks Branch's position, however, were the reports of its 
own officials. Chief Superintendent Douglas recommended that the thousand acres of "young 
Pack [sic] Pine and Spruce" be logged lest they become "an eye sore [and] prove dangerous for 
boating," and that Calgary Power be held responsible for reconstructing wharves. (This closely 
paralleled the Branch's internal discussion of "park interests.") Douglas felt the dam feasible, but 
warned ominously that "unless... the ground... is thoroughly cleaned up it will always present a 
most unsightly appearance when the water is drawn off."71 Banff superintendent Macdonald 
agreed that "the timber being cleared away... does away with any fear" and that "the present 
79 
blue color of the lake" would not be "replaced... by a milky color." On this occasion, Harkin 
accepted the substance of the report: "I note with satisfaction your confidence that the scenic 
value will not be impaired," he informed Challies, pronouncing himself satisfied that "the 
"7 "2 
plans... contain nothing which is likely to jeopardize Park interests." 
Although the Parks Branch thus acquiesced to the dam, support was not unanimous. The 
Calgary Albertan, later a passionate advocate of the Spray Lakes dam, announced that "the 
beauty of one of the chief natural attractions of the Banff National Park is threatened with 
defacement by... desecration."74 The CPR, too, sent a letter of protest urging that "no action be 
taken" that would endanger either "the railway company's irrigation interests" or "one of the 
natural beauty spots in the Banff Park." Local opposition was advanced by the tour boat 
operators, Standly and Luxton. Both denounced the construction project and demanded 
relocation of their buildings and reconstruction of their docks. "Is it fair, Mr. Harkin," Luxton 
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asked rhetorically, "that these people can come in... and dictate to me where to dock my boat 
and [sic] cripple a business that has done so much to further the pleasures of the tourists"?76 
According to Standly, Minnewanka was "Canada's beauty lake," and any dam, aside from 
altering "the most wonderful blue of any water in the world," would doom the lake's "beautiful 
moss-covered banks." Interestingly, Standly suggested that the Spray Lakes would be "a better 
storage site," making him one of the first recorded advocates of that site.77 It is significant that 
even this opposition rested its case upon protecting beauty, not wilderness. Challies, fearing the 
influence which might be garnered by "a considerable body of opinion that will view the project 
as a desecration and calamity," suggested to Harkin that together they "control... timely 
publicity... with the object of assuring the public."78 
Construction of the dam occurred between April and May, and, at least initially, seemed 
to fulfill all expectations. Smith reported on May 29 that "the color and cleanness of the water... 
will not be seriosly [sic] impaired" and that "a much more pleasing" shoreline would soon be in 
place. Mitchell's final, upbeat report observed that "the clearing of timber" was mostly 
complete and that "the general appearance of the lake... [was] very much improved as the shores 
have been cleared of dead standing timber... and the lower end which was low and swampy is 
now covered with water." (Incidentally, this "dead standing timber" was likely the result of the 
1907 dam.) The Crag & Canyon also pronounced itself pleased, writing that "the raising of the 
level of water... has greatly improved the scenery... [W]ith such fine sheltered lagoons at their 
Q I 
service the people... ought to go in for boating and canoeing next summer." Even Harkin 
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advanced a cautious endorsement of the dam, saying it would "increase revenue for the Parks" 
89 
and "redound to the credit of the Department throughout the Province." 
If the damming of Lake Minnewanka seemed successful to the Parks Branch, it seemed 
even more so for conservationists. The Bow watershed was an important early model of prairie 
water power potential for both the Water Power Branch and the Commission on Conservation, 
both of which played substantial if largely unrecognized roles in the development of Canadian 
perspectives on water power during the 1910s. Although the Commission turned its interest from 
hydroelectricity to coal in its final years, the Water Power Branch—predictably—remained a 
fervent advocate. In 1923, reflecting on the internal bureaucratic feud over the Spray Lakes, 
minister Charles Stewart observed that "I have within my department the Water Powers Brach, 
who look at this matter from... the advantage of having cheap power..., and on the other hand 
the Parks Branch, whose business it is to preserve the scenic beauty of our parks... and the views 
of the two branches are widely at variance."83 While an adequate history of either organization 
cannot be presented here, their relationship to the Bow River watershed is worth noting. 
The Commission of Conservation is only moderately more appreciated by Canadian 
environmental historiography than the Water Power Branch, the only substantial work having 
been published by Michel Girard. Between its establishment in 1909 (part of a failed effort at 
transnational environmental cooperation) and its demise in 1921, the organization produced the 
seven-volume Conservation for Life and 150 special reports. These included comprehensive 
surveys of hydroelectric sites in Canada, beginning with Water Powers of Canada, written by the 
8Z
 RG 84-A-2-a, vol. 492, R39-8, pt 1, Harkin to Cory, December 24, 1912. 
83
 Bella, Parks for Profit, 51. 
8
 Girard, L'ecologisme Retrouve. 
85
 David Wood, "Picturing Conservation in Canada: The Commission of 1909-1921," Archivaria 37 (1994), 64-65. 
The Commission should have had counterparts in the U.S. and Mexico, but neither were created. 
51 
Commission's Hydro-Electric Engineer, Leo German Denis. According to the instructions sent 
out to contributors by Arthur White, "the inland water resources of the Dominion of Canada are 
of unique and exceptional value, and exist as a widely-distributed national asset." This had 
caused "persons [to]... seek to use large quantities of water in special ways." The Commission 
had therefore determined "to conserve the common interests of the people" by preparing "a 
preliminary inventory of the possible water-powers." He reminded his presumed audience— 
engineers—that they had a self-interest in facilitating the survey, since "one of the first classes in 
the community to feel the benefit of such new development is the engineer."87 
The predominant interest in water power development on the Prairies was almost 
certainly because the federal government retained power over natural resources there until 1930. 
A systematic survey of the potential of the Bow west of Calgary, extending to its sources in the 
Rockies, was made by Hendry and Mitchell between 1912 and 1914, and was the basis for a pair 
of book-length public reports on the river published by the Water Power Branch and the 
Commission on Conservation.88 The report, in its various manifestations, presented a classic 
conservationist case for efficient development. According to Hendry, "Lake Minnewanka offered 
a splendid site for storage." It had "required careful treatment in order that its value as a resort 
for tourists would be enhanced," and, in his judgement, Calgary Power had succeeded admirably, 
leaving the lake "in good shape." Further sections described the Spray Lakes, the battleground 
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of the 1920s, as the "best storage scheme in the Bow basin." In the final version, published by 
the Commission of Conservation, the authors explained that the Bow River, once fully 
"conserved," would be an ideal model of enlightened development: 
conservation of... the Bow river is of the utmost moment, for upon it directly depends the 
agricultural and industrial prosperity of... southern Alberta. Rising in the high and 
remote regions of the Rocky Mountains National Park, and... furnishing the most 
interesting and attractive feature of its world-famed scenery, the river emerges... only to 
be harnessed to supply energy for... Calgary... After furnishing the hydro-electric 
energy, the same waters have, by irrigation, converted thousands of acres of otherwise 
useless lands into the most fertile tracts within the province.9 
Reflecting the still-cordial relationship between the Water Power and National Parks Branches, 
the report optimistically predicted an expansion of the dam at Minnewanka, which faced minimal 
opposition because, though it lay within "the jurisdiction of the Parks branch," the "natural 
conditions... no longer obtain" and the outcome would be "entirely beneficial."92 
Eventually, the Conservation Commission moved away from water power, concluding 
that the number of useful undeveloped power sites was too low to be of further interest. In 1919, 
White informed the Industrial Congress in Calgary that, except for the Spray Lakes and Bow 
Lake, all of the "falls of considerable height" located nearby "the well-settled portions of the 
province" were already dammed. Therefore, it was "necessary... to consider measures to 
supplement... power from water." Alberta's future lay in coal mines, not on rivers.94 
Challies was unconvinced—and remained a passionate advocate of water development, 
beginning with the Spray Lakes, throughout the 1920s. "Water resources are inexhaustible," he 
explained in 1922, "traveling in the continuous circle ocean-vapour-rain-river and back to ocean 
again." As a result, "true conservation... lies, not in withholding them from development, but in 
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their efficient utilization in the public interest." 5 Moreover, explained his subordinate Norman 
Marr, "cheap power is one of the essentials of comfortable living conditions in a modern 
community." Marr was prepared to acknowledge that the initial management of Lake 
Minnewanka had been "unsatisfactory... in its scenic aspects," but he believed this was easily 
rectified.97 Reviewing an article by Challies in 1924, the Calgary Herald commented that "the 
water power branch realizes the value of the development of cheap hydro-electric energy. The 
QO 
parks branch appears fearful of it." 
If the Parks Branch was "fearful," this was in part because its experience at Lake 
Minnewanka was decidedly less positive. The problems, for Harkin and his colleagues, actually 
began the month after the dam was completed, when they were informed by William Found of 
the Department of Fisheries that the latter office would not support the Parks Branch's demand 
for the construction of a fish-ladder. According to Found, "it would not appear that the 
conditions are such as to call for a fishway."99 He later explained that the lake trout present "do 
not appear to pass out of the Lake under normal conditions," and therefore had no need of a fish-
ladder. I0° Irate, Harkin replied that "the preservation of fish... is of vital importance to this 
Branch and Lake Minnewanka has been one of the important bodies of water in which tourists 
have fished." He warned that there would be "strong protests" unless the fish-ladder was built as 
originally intended.101 The fish-ladder was never constructed. 
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The most enduring conflicts over the lake, however, involved two other problems: 
maintenance of desired water levels, and arrangements for logging and cleaning up the shoreline. 
The first of these problems, although it was dealt with comparatively amiably, illustrates best the 
problems of operating an artificially constructed scenic lake. At peak flow in the Bow River, 
Minnewanka was allowed to fill. When the Bow was low, particularly during the winter and 
early spring, the power company released water from Minnewanka to maintain river levels. In 
theory, it agreed to keep the lake full throughout tourist season, roughly from June to September, 
under supervision from the Parks Branch. This enabled the tour boats to operate with minimal 
difficulty, and presented to visitors the carefully cleaned and presentable new shoreline rather 
than a fringe of mud banks. After tourism fell off in early autumn, the lake could be drained at 
will—provided that water levels were restored by the next summer. The Lake Minnewanka that 
visitors were intended to see, therefore, was a carefully stage-managed joint production of the 
Parks Branch and Calgary Power. 
Management of the lake was not perfect, however. In some years water levels fluctuated, 
or did not reach the required high-water mark on schedule. In April 1915, Challies warned Drury 
that Minnewanka water levels were too low and continuing to fall, and that the lake should "not 
be at an undesirable low level during the early stages of the tourist season."102 In April 1916, 
Challies again reminded the company that the lake was three feet below the required level and 
falling, and that the previous year's "regulation of the lake" had also been "unsatisfactory."103 In 
both cases, Challies copied his instructions to the Parks Branch, which seems to have been much 
less well-informed of the situation in the park than the Water Power Branch was. After the 
LAC, RG 84 A-2-a, vol. 661, file B16-29, pt 2, Challies to Drury, April 28, 1915. 
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second incident, an indignant Harkin ordered his officials to inform him of further breaches 
before he had to find out "through the medium of another branch."104 
By far more the serious problem, from the Parks Branch's perspective, was maintenance 
of the new shore line. Its understanding of the March 1912 contract was that Calgary Power was 
responsible for removing all trees affected by the dam, and for paying 80 cents per 1000 feet of 
"merchantable lumber" thus removed.105 However, logging was not completed before the lake 
was flooded. Large numbers of trees died, and hundreds of logs were left floating in the lake. As 
a result, the Crag & Canyon newspaper complained, the tour business had received "the sourest 
kind of lemon," and boat traffic was "much curtailed owing to the... logs floating in the lake."1 6 
As engineer K.H. Smith reported to the Department of the Interior, "the logs in the lake are more 
or less of a menace," and Luxton—who owned the Crag & Canyon as well as his tour boat 
business—had "som [sic] cause for complaint."107 Calgary Power's dismissive response—that its 
own engineers had counted no more than thirteen logs on the lake at any given time, "and all 
close to the shore"—is less credible than game and fire warden H.E. Sibbald's own count of 
several hundred logs "piled up against the east end of the lake," five hundred at the west end, and 
also "a number of logs... around the old chalet."108 Harkin informed Calgary Power that the lake 
had to be "absolutely clear of logs" and it was the company's responsibility to ensure that it 
109 
was. 
Instead of clearing the lake themselves, Calgary Power hastily arranged a contract with 
local businessman and doctor Robert G. Brett. The town doctor may seem an unlikely choice for 
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a logging contract, but Brett was an accomplished entrepreneur, of a sort. Originally a CPR 
physician, he settled in Banff in 1886 to run a combined hospital and hotel, capitalizing on the 
supposed healing properties of the nearby hot springs and billing his facility as "a first-class 
summer resort for invalids."110 In addition to dispensing expensive and dubious treatments at his 
hotel complex, he also held a lucrative monopoly on "Banff Lithia Water," said to be beneficial 
for kidney health, which was bottled locally at the hot springs and then sold nationally, including 
in CPR dining cars.111 Harkin's original hope had been that the logs would "be so disposed of 
that it will not be possible for anyone to charge that they are a menace to life in connection with 
navigation.""2 However, what followed in the wake of the Brett contract was a nine-year-long 
struggle through a maze of contracts and subcontracts over the future of the Minnewanka logs. 
According to a subsequent Water Power Branch report, Brett "made several ineffectual 
attempts" to hire subcontractors to "properly boom" the logs in the lake in the fall of 1912, and 
then let them freeze in place. The following spring, Macdonald reported that "all logs... are 
still in the Lake."114 A similar complaint soon arrived from Luxton, predicting that he and 
Standly were "going to be up against the same old trouble that we were last summer." Luxton 
estimated that there were fifty thousand logs boomed on the west end of the lake, and about the 
same number floating freely, which were "going to cause a lot of trouble."115 Among the floating 
logs were several thousand trees which had been growing above the new high-water line, and 
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which the Branch believed had fallen "due to the softening of the ground by the raising of the 
waters... and the removing of the small trees."1 
Harkin and Challies both attempted to resolve the problem.117 While the Water Power 
Branch sent K.H. Smith back to Minnewanka, Harkin informed Calgary Power secretary V.M. 
Drury that "the tourist season is approaching and... it is out of the question for the Department to 
allow any unnecessary menace to... pleasure craft." He sent a duplicate to Brett, for good 
1 i o 
measure. Smith arrived in late April and met with company engineer Harold Johnston, who 
provided vague assurances that "they were determined to have the matter straightened out by 
June." Although no longer technically working for the Parks Branch, Smith warned, in a report 
which Challies copied for Harkin, that he had no confidence Brett could handle the logs and that 
"a very strong stand... by the proper authorities" might persuade Calgary Power to "take the 
matter entirely from the hands of the present contractor."119 Harkin responded by sending 
another letter to Drury demanding that the "driftwood" be collected and either burned or 
removed "before the tourist season" began in June.120 
Smith's suggestion that Calgary Power take over the logging implies that the company 
felt the improvement of the shoreline was important, which seems unlikely. Dairy's response to 
Harkin was a terse message quoting the company's Calgary general manager, explaining that in 
his opinion the weather was too poor to visit the lake, let alone haul logs from it. On June 2, 
after the power company's self-imposed deadline had come and gone, Smith informed his 
superiors that Brett had paid a subcontractor "to have the logs... all secured by June 1st," but the 
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man in question had "only concerned himself with the merchantable timber, leaving considerable 
driftwood free." As he wrote, four men were removing some logs from the lake, but "there are 
still... many old dead trees and snags on the shore ready to be washed into the Lake." Many trees 
had died, Smith repeated, because they were "water soaked and... easily blown over."122 
Despite Brett's initial failure, in the autumn of 1913 the Parks Branch agreed to expand 
the logging operation at Lake Minnewanka, hoping to remove trees already in the lake and to cut 
enough along the shore to prevent a repeat of the experience of the previous winter. To this end, 
Brett was permitted to construct and operate a sawmill on the west end of the lake, "hidden from 
view of tourists." The work would be completed—and the sawmill dismantled—by May 1914.123 
Brett's operation could claim all logs already in the lake. Meanwhile a second contract was 
drawn up, with Harold Johnston, to log the "tangled mass of trees" along the shoreline. (Johnston 
also worked for Calgary Power as an engineer, but this contract seems to have been a separate 
1 74 
engagement.) The new arrangements did not solve the problem: when K.H. Smith returned for 
his annual visit in early 1914, he reported that Brett's estimate had slipped to July and that "my 
own confidence in Dr. Brett's ability to successfully handle these logs is slight."125 Moreover, 
during the winter, two thousand of the increasingly vulnerable "larger trees" (and presumably 
large numbers of smaller ones) along the shore were "blown down," contributing further to the 
roughly ninety thousand logs then believed to be in the lake.126 
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It was in this context that Calgary Power applied for a license to raise the dam—and the 
water level—in 1914. Armstrong, Evenden and Nelles suggest that this proposal was blocked 
due to opposition from the Department of Fisheries.127 It is true that the Parks Branch sought and 
received advice from that source that any future dam would be devastating to the "salmon trout" 
spawning beds. However, the Branch's opposition to the increase in storage would have 
occurred anyhow. Harkin successfully campaigned for a letter to be sent to Calgary Power, 
advising them that they were in violation of their 1912 obligations to clear the "large number of 
logs from the" lake, and that no license would be considered "until the lake is cleared of all these 
logs." The following month, the company regretfully acknowledged that Brett "has not 
fulfilled his agreement with us," but promised it was "negotiating with another party do this 
work... in a short time." All of the logs in the lake, it went on, were the fault of Brett, who 
through poor maintenance had allowed his log booms to break and "scatter over the lake."130 
The Department of the Interior's continuing disappointment that work was not being 
done probably, at least in part, reflected an exaggerated notion of the logs' economic value. As 
late as January 1914, Smith continued to believe that "the disposal of this timber is self-
supporting," to the point that the Parks Branch could take it over and make it "a revenue 
producer." If the operation was so profitable, however, one would have expected Brett and 
Johnston to have completed it more quickly. In May, the company protested that the requirement 
that their second contractor, Johnston, "remove all stumps and roots of the overturned trees" 
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could be met only with "serious loss," and therefore that he should be given "alleviation in some 
other form"—namely, by not having to pay the established "stumpage dues."132 
At this juncture, the Water Power Branch judged Calgary Power to have "satisfactorily 
completed" its obligations to the Department, and suggested that the Parks Branch do likewise 
and grant Johnston the requested relief. The Parks Branch refused. As one memorandum 
noted, "this Department drew up an agreement with the Calgary Power Company. ... Because 
the Company sublets the contract... should not make any difference."134 The 1912 agreement 
required Calgary Power—and, by extension, its contractors—to remove stumps and 
unmarketable logs as well as the timber from which it could turn a profit. Hesitantly, Banff 
superintendent S.J. Clarke informed Johnston that there could be no relief from the stumpage 
dues until, at the very least, he supplied "a statement of the actual cost." That August, 
Johnston responded with a vague explanation that he "st[ood] to loose [sic] on the work" due to 
"extraordinary conditions," and adding that he was personally experiencing "serious financial 
difficulties." That autumn, Sibbald, chief forester A. Knechtel, and a pair of other Interior 
officials toured the lake and submitted yet another lament for the damaged shoreline: "the logs 
cut by Dr. Brett are scattered around the shores... and a large number are floating. One hundred 
logs belonging to Mr. Jonston [sic] are lying where they were cut... Tangles of logs, brush and 
trees come... right to the edge of the water, and in some cases the basis [sic] of the trees are 
submerged... [T]wo acres... [are] flooded and the trees are mostly dead. 
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No correspondence on the logs survives for 1916, but in 1917, reports indicated that the 
problem persisted. Moreover, the contractual situation became considerably more complicated. 
That summer, Johnston went bankrupt. The saleable portion of his timber on shore was promptly 
seized by his creditors, the Imperial Bank and the Alberta Box Company.138 As a result, Harkin 
was informed by his disappointed subordinates, there was "no timber worth seizing [by the Parks 
Branch] remaining in the park," and therefore no way of forcibly collecting the dues on the 
timber removed or of holding Johnston or his creditors to account.139 
In the meantime, Brett had also become more difficult, having left Banff to become the 
Lieutenant Governor of Alberta in 1916. The Branch was understandably reluctant to press its 
claims too hard against him. In February 1919, Macdonald hesitantly wrote to "Drs. Brett & 
Brett" (the first correspondence not to be addressed personally to Brett, but rather to his hospital-
hotel company in Banff) noting that "the Department is anxious to have everything cleaned 
up."140 However, he admitted to Harkin, it was doubtful that any recompense would be 
forthcoming, and there was also a risk of "the gentlemen [sic] ignoring his letters." In any case, 
his pessimistic judgement was that "it will no doubt fall on the Department to make the final 
clean up."141 Brett nevertheless responded, insisting that he intended to remove the lumber the 
following month and—with no small amount of gall—offering to "quote [the Parks Branch] a 
price" for the lumber on the grounds that they might have use of it "in the Park this coming 
season."142 
Further correspondence followed, to similar effect, but it was not until 1921 that the 
lumber was finally removed. The lake's appearance had not improved, Harkin complained to 
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Cory. Moreover, "the auto road passes close by and from a scenic standpoint the conditions are 
very bad." Later, Water Power Branch engineer Arthur Ford recalled that upon visiting the 
dam he had noticed that "the lake itself was full of logs and debris and most unsightly," and that 
he had promptly instructed a company official present to "remove such an eye-sore from the 
public park."144 Yet another promise from Brett to collect and dispose of the logs "within the 
next couple of weeks" followed, with the usual warning that more time might be required 
because "a good many are still in the Lake."145 This time, Harkin requested and received from 
Cory the power to seize the logs and turn them over to a new contractor, one G.B. Hitis of Banff. 
It seems that Hitis promptly carried out the required actions, though the Minnewanka logging 
files come to an abrupt end without confirming this conclusion.146 
Exactly nine years after Calgary Power had completed its dam on Lake Minnewanka, the 
Parks Branch completed what it regarded as the most important aspects of the clean-up 
operation. Rather than the anticipated beautification of the lake, the result had been years of 
difficulties for the Branch. The power company, the Branch had learned, could not be trusted to 
uphold the Branch's interpretation of an agreement. Even after the logs had finally been cleaned 
up, the balance between the Parks Branch's desired appearance of the lake and the power 
company's desired application of its waters required continuous joint management. What is most 
significant to note here, however, is that the Parks Branch continued to regard its role as 
managing beautiful scenery. Without being trite, it is fair to say that the 1912 dam was simply a 
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case where this management had turned out to be much more intricate and difficult than 
expected. 
By the 1920s, Harkin felt—as he informed Cory—that "water in the form of falls, rapids, 
lakes and streams is an absolute-essential to scenic beauty," which must be safeguarded lest it be 
reduced to "little value."147 When in 1922 Calgary Power submitted its proposal to dam the 
Spray Lakes, Harkin's first response was that it was a ploy to "mix up the Spray and the 
Minnewanka schemes," and emphasized that any future Minnewanka project "cannot under any 
1 AQ 
circumstances be tolerated." The "damage to scenery" would be excessive, he claimed, and 
explained why in reference to the past decade's experiences at Minnewanka: 
the reduction of the [Spray] river... will seriously impair the scenery... The alternate 
lowering and flooding of the area will utterly destroy the scenic beauty of the lakes 
themselves. It is quite true that power engineers seem incapable of recognizing that flithy 
[sic] and flats and bare shores without a vestige of timber or flower growth destroy 
scenery. But the average person who has seen what the small dam at Lake Minnewanka 
has done will, I submit, hold a different view.149 
The oft-remarked-upon doctrine of park inviolability was invoked after these remarks, and, 
notably, in the Parks Branch's formulation (as opposed to the Alpine Club's) was always limited 
to external commercial bodies, those who could not be adequately controlled by the Parks 
Branch and were not presumed to have an enlightened self-interest in protecting the scenery. 
Between 1912 and 1922, the National Parks Branch went from supporting to opposing 
the construction of dams within the park for hydroelectric purposes. During this time, the branch 
consistently cast its decisions in terms of improving or protecting scenery, without reference to 
wilderness. Nevertheless, the decision to support Calgary Power's dam on Lake Minnewanka in 
1912 resulted in nearly a decade of unexpected conflict over the management of what amounted 
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to an artificial, heavily manipulated lake. At the same time, the branch's conservationist rival 
within the Water Power Branch concluded that the Minnewanka example was a success and a 
model for future development. In 1912, both branches were new and their relations quite cordial. 
However, during the next major dam dispute, over the Spray Lakes, they would be bitter rivals. 
Having begun to explore the development of views of hydroelectric dams in parks within the 
Department of the Interior during the 1910s, it is now possible to turn again to the better-known 
Spray Lakes controversy of the 1920s. 
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Chapter Two 
"Every Drop of Water Will be Desired":' 
The Spray Lakes Controversy, 1922-1925 
In the 1920s, the National Parks Branch largely continued to regard its mission in the mountain 
parks as maintaining beautiful scenery for the benefit of Canadian and international visitors— 
and, as discussed in the previous chapter, it was coming to believe that large storage dam 
projects jeopardized that mission. During the 1920s, therefore, a new proposal to dam the Spray 
Lakes on a much larger scale (albeit in a much more remote location), submitted once again by 
the Calgary Power Company but supported by a range of influential conservationist individuals 
and institutions both inside and outside government, was strenuously opposed by the Parks 
Branch—as well as by a number of its own supporters outside government, like the Alpine Club 
of Canada and the National Parks Association of Canada. However, this conflict is still only at 
best partially understood. If Rocky Mountains National Park was meant to showcase nature, 
which nature was that, how was it to be showcased, and why, between 1922 and 1925, was the 
Spray Lakes proposal in particular so controversial? This question must be settled, before turning 
to the matter of how the Spray Lakes controversy ended, in 1930, with the removal of the Spray 
valley from the park, the passage of the National Parks Act apparently preventing further 
developments within parks, immediately followed by another (unsuccessful) application by 
Calgary Power to develop Lake Minnewanka. 
Answering this question involves inquiring into how different parts of Canadian 
government and society viewed nature and national parks, as much as about the specific context 
of the Spray valley. National parks, Alan MacEachern writes, "are as much cultural constructs as 
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natural ones." This would not have surprised many residents of Banff during the 1920s, when 
the town's newspaper reflected that the park combined the best of "all that the people made and 
all that nature made." Still, George Warecki, in his history of Ontario provincial parks, has 
claimed that Canadians were "indifferent to preservationist efforts" prior to the 1960s because of 
the perceived superabundance of wilderness, while George Colpitts argues that westerners 
(including those in the parks) "tirelessly flaunted images of a wildlife Eden."4 During the 1920s, 
this was sometimes the case for the fish in the park's rivers and lakes, but not for the waters 
themselves. Both proponents and opponents of the Spray Lakes dam rested their arguments on 
the premise that their desired resource (respectively, dammable rivers and mountain beauty 
spots) was actually in exceedingly scarce supply. 
There is currently no disagreement about the basic facts of the Spray Lakes controversy 
in the very small body of published literature which gives the matter more than passing 
attention.5 Bracketed on both sides by failed bids for a new dam on Lake Minnewanka, Calgary 
Power waged a seven-year campaign between 1922 and 1929 to win authorization to construct a 
large storage dam in the Spray River valley (at the time part of Rocky Mountains Park). In this 
cause it was supported by such people as retired surveyor William Pearce, and such institutions 
as the Calgary municipal government and the federal Water Power Branch (although the latter's 
involvement has been almost wholly neglected). Against the plan were ranged the National Parks 
Branch and non-governmental organizations such as the Alpine Club of Canada and the National 
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Parks Association of Canada. The power company succeeded in having the Spray Lakes excised 
from the park in 1930, at the cost of the passage of the National Parks Act, which barred further 
resource development within parks without the passage of special enabling legislation. Dam 
construction plans were waylaid first by the Great Depression and then by the Second World 
War, so that the Spray valley actually remained undeveloped, outside of the park, until 1947. 
Since Robert Craig Brown's thesis that parks policy after 1911 was conservationist and 
encouraged development (as discussed in the previous chapter), a generation of historians has 
identified the passage of the National Parks Act of 1930 as the conclusion of the Spray Lakes 
controversy and the point at which preservationist, pro-wilderness forces decisively won out over 
those desiring to exploit resources within the parks both for private profit and national 
development.6 According to Leslie Bella, "one [movement] wanted to preserve the parks, and the 
other to maximize their profitability." PearlAnn Reichwein has advanced a more balanced but 
essentially similar argument, focusing on the role of the Alpine Club and Wheeler in standing 
"firmly against tampering with watersheds in the Rockies, which [they] feared would ruin the 
Q 
natural environment and set a dangerous precedent." The result was the principle of inviolability 
(that parks must not be "violated" by resource exploitation), allegedly enshrined in the National 
Parks Act. More recently, Alan MacEachern and E.J. Hart have advanced similar arguments, 
with Hart even borrowing for his chapter on resource conflicts the same slogan from an Alpine 
Club circular ("Hands Off Our National Parks") with which Reichwein titled her article.9 
Although these authors have done much to explore the individuals and groups which 
contributed to the evolution of national park policy in Canada, there are several unsatisfying 
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elements to their assessment of the Spray Lakes affair. Most historians are aware of an apparent 
contradiction between the preservation of untouched wilderness and what C.J. Taylor calls "the 
threat to park values posed by recreational development."10 According to Reichwein, the Alpine 
Club, like the Parks Branch, struggled to reconcile the "structural dialectic pivoting on the 
contending imperatives of human use and nature preservation" inherent in its twin objectives of 
constructing "national playgrounds" while preserving "the mountain places and... the fauna and 
flora in their habitat."11 Indeed, according to MacEachern, the effort to find the appropriate 
"balance" between use and preservation has always been at the center of Canada's national park 
project. (This conveniently dovetails with his own philosophy of parks management, which is 
1 9 
that "a park system demands both" preservation and use.) 
However, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, the chief park priority prior to the 
1920s is better characterized as maintaining, protecting, and where necessary creating beautiful 
scenery, rather than preserving untouched nature. Like American historians of the Hetch Hetchy 
dispute (such as Christine Oravec), Canadian historians such as Bella have criticized Wheeler 
and Harkin for "not argu[ing] purely for the intrinsic value of the scenery, for the preservation of 
natural landscape. They had used one economic argument to counter another... Wheeler and 
Harkin saved the national parks from one kind of exploitation by ensuring their exploitation from 
another." However, neither of these men—nor many of their supporters, besides—actually 
seem to have regarded their "economic arguments]" as merely a rhetorical ploy, ill-advised or 
not. Indeed, Canadian parks advocates of the 1920s do not seem to have been animated by a 
concern for the "intrinsic value of the scenery" so much as the economic, cultural, and spiritual 
10
 Taylor, "Legislating Nature," 136. 
11
 Reichwein, "Beyond the Visionary Mountains," 6-7. 
12
 MacEachern, Natural Selections, 5, 16. 
13
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value of that scenery, the latter two of which they hoped would soon be extended to more 
Canadians (or at least more middle-class Canadians) than ever before. Indeed, neither Lake 
Minnewanka nor the Spray Lakes were likely sites for a battle over pristine wilderness by the 
1920s, despite the fact that both ultimately became such battlegrounds: the one was already 
dammed, while the valley surrounding the other had been cleared of timber by the Eau Claire 
Lumber Company two decades before. 
Moreover, aside from Bella's analysis of William Pearce and a brief but helpful overview 
of Calgary Power's early years by Christopher Armstrong, Matthew Evenden, and H.V. Nelles, 
there has been no serious consideration of what motivated dam proponents, aside—obviously— 
from the company's desire for profit.15 Indeed, one of the most outspoken supporters of Calgary 
Power in the 1920s was also one of the men most responsible for the creation of Rocky 
Mountains Park in the 1880s, William Pearce. Bella dismisses Pearce as an establishment man 
who freely conflated "CPR interests... [and] his own... with the public interest," and who 
persuaded policymakers to support the Spray Lakes dam through a conclusive 1926 
memorandum.16 Alongside Pearce, though, federal agencies such as the Water Power Branch and 
the Commission of Conservation (the latter largely neglected by Canadian historians, and the 
former completely so) also took an active interest in the exploitation of the Bow River and its 
Byrne, Man and Landscape Change, 119-120. 
15
 Armstrong, Evenden, and Nelles, The River Returns, ch. 5. 
16
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423, Pearce to Webster, November 23, 1925. 
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tributaries. Through their efforts, officials such as interior minister Charles Stewart were 
persuaded of the desirability of a Spray dam at least by 1925. 
In addition, neither the background to nor the significance of the Spray Lakes controversy 
should be understood solely with reference to Canadian park history. This is not only so because 
the Canadian literature on wilderness and nature remains poorly developed—although that is 
certainly the case. Reichwein and MacEachern have recognized, in passing, the striking 
similarities between the Spray Lakes controversy of the 1920s, and the Hetch Hetchy conflict 
which decided the fate of (a part of) Yosemite National Park between 1906 and 1913. In that 
affair, conservationists such as Gifford Pinchot sided with the city of San Francisco in promoting 
publicly owned and efficient development of natural resources; spiritually inclined 
preservationists such as John Muir and the Sierra Club demanded that parks be protected from 
this development; and, while the conservationists won the battle and dammed the Tuolomne 
River, the conflict prompted the establishment of protective federal legislation and the National 
Parks Service. The similarities make all the more important an (as-yet largely absent) 
comparative analysis of the controversies.19 
In his landmark 1959 publication Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, Samuel 
Hays argued that this dispute was waged over "the two uses" of wilderness: whether "the water 
There are no studies of the Water Power Branch's role in Canada's environmental or economic history. The 
history of the Commission is thus far largely synonymous with the work of Michel Girard: see, for instance, his 
L'ecologisme Retrouve. 
18
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Canada," International Journal of Canadian Studies 37 (2008), 13-39. There is also one comparative analysis of the 
forestry conservationist movement in both countries: R. Peter Gillis and Thomas R. Roach, "The American 
Influence on Conservation in Canada: 1899-1911," Journal of Forest History 30 (1986), 160-174. 
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supply" was best used by being harnessed for the city, or left untouched, visited only by tourists 
90 
seeking wilderness in its untouched form. Where preservationists such as John Muir denounced 
the damming of Hetch Hetchy as sacrilegious exploitation of the environment by "Satan & Co.," 
conservationists such as Congressman William Kent held that "real conservation meant proper 
use and not locking up of natural resources." This line of argument has since been taken up by 
Rosalind Warner, Neil Henderson, Kendrick Clements, and Christine Oravec, among others.22 
Subsequently, William Cronon opened an acrimonious debate by problematizing wilderness 
itself, arguing that it was a peculiar American social construct fusing the sublime (derived from 
European romanticism) and the uniquely American notion of the vanishing frontier (derived 
from the Turner thesis). Wilderness thus became a "cathedral" for spiritual uplift, at the same 
time as it was a dwindling "last bastion" of masculine "rugged individualism."24 To Cronon, the 
Hetch Hetchy controversy was a contest between "the merits of 'reclaiming' a wasteland" and 
the "portray[al of] such an act... as desecration and vandalism" of untouched wilderness.25 
This conventional interpretation of the Hetch Hetchy controversy by American historians 
has particularly striking parallels to the Canadian Spray Lakes tradition, above. Moreover, the 
American tradition does offer an explanation for the support of individuals and groups for a dam 
from which they stood to make no particular personal gain. Canadians such as Pearce, like 
American conservationists, consistently argued that the best use of resources was to develop 
them as efficiently and thoroughly as possible to avoid waste, and in any case that doing so 
would not harm the scenic effects of the lakes, from which the national parks benefited. In 
20
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21
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addition, the portrayal and even celebration of preservationists like Muir certainly parallels the 
description of the Canadian parks movement by Reichwein and Bella. 
At the same time, it may suffer from some of the same shortcomings. Robert Righter's 
recent reinterpretation of the Hetch Hetchy conflict directs new attention to the place and 
problem of wilderness. Righter argues that the significance of the wilderness ideal has been 
exaggerated, and that "wilderness... was not an issue in the Hetch Hetchy fight." Instead, even 
the park's defenders "consistently advocated development... [for] nature tourism."26 Righter 
argues that the conflict was actually between those favouring development of the valley for 
nature tourism, and those favouring Progressive public ownership of water. Oravec has faulted 
early preservationists for rhetorically compromising with their opponents by defending 
"beautiful scenery" on the grounds that it was "a source of profit" (which Bella, in Canada, 
similarly derides as merely "usfing] one economic argument to counter another"); however, 
Righter's analysis suggests that the economic and social potential of such "scenery" was 
precisely what motivated many so-called preservationists in the first place.27 The argument is a 
compelling one, even if he tends to understate the extent to which his basic thesis rests on similar 
previous work by Progressive movement historians such as Kendrick Clements.28 
From a Canadian perspective, it also raises the important question of whether the Spray 
Lakes controversy should be subjected to a similar reinterpretation. Certainly the Alpine Club of 
Canada, the National Parks Branch, and other opponents of dams continued to oppose the further 
construction of dams on Lake Minnewanka during the 1920s and 1930s, although that lake was 
already essentially an artificial one. Moreover, even Reichwein, the historian of the Alpine Club, 
26
 Righter, The Battle over Hetch Hetchy, esp. 5. Ted Binnema and Melanie Niemi have advanced the (in some 
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27
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appears to have overlooked the club's idealized vision of the Spray valley as a mountain resort. 
They also did not hesitate to support hydroelectric projects outside the park, when it seemed 
these might protect the Spray Lakes. Banff and Lake Louise always made use of electricity 
produced within the park, and the Parks Branch even constructed a new hydroelectric 
powerhouse in 1924 (an act which Armstrong, Evenden and Nelles misleadingly term a "sublime 
act of bureaucratic hypocrisy.")29 On the other hand, public utility ownership played only a very 
minor role in the Spray Lakes debate—indeed, it was more often the opponents of the dam who 
claimed that they were defending the rights of the people. 
The initial phase of the Spray Lakes controversy, roughly between 1922 and 1925, 
involved the most recognizable and often-discussed episodes of the larger controversy, such as 
the clash between Alpine Club of Canada director Arthur Wheeler and dam advocate William 
Pearce. Righter's recent reinterpretation of the Hetch Hetchy conflict suggests a need to carefully 
evaluate this stage of the controversy. Opponents of the dam, in a manner similar to what Righter 
finds in California, justified their position on the basis of the attractiveness of the lakes, what 
they offered to visitors (in terms of aesthetics and opportunities to fish), and the public 
ownership of the national parks, not out of a desire to preserve the intrinsic value of pristine or 
untouched wilderness. In contrast, proponents of the dam appealed less often to Progressive 
values of public ownership over power or water, than to the need to conserve and efficiently 
exploit available natural resources in the interest of regional and national economic development. 
This period, where it seemed as though either view might plausibly prevail was actually quite 
short, lasting perhaps three years, after which the process of negotiation began to shift—at least 
in the halls of government in Ottawa, if not in the editorial pages of Alberta—from whether or 
Armstrong, Evenden, and Nelles, The River Returns, 131-132. 
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not to dam the Spray Lakes to how to mitigate damages to Rocky Mountains Park and what the 
significance of the dam would be for future controversies. 
In 1922, the Calgary Power Company submitted a formal proposal to construct a storage 
dam in the Spray River valley. The Water Powers Branch was aware of a pending proposal as 
early as October 1920, when Water Power Branch director John Bow Challies informed Harkin 
that the company intended to apply for an 1100-foot-head dam in the Spray valley, which would 
store water and regulate the flow of the Bow River, as well as power a generator facility of its 
own. When it was finally submitted, the proposal was backed by letters written to Calgary 
mayor George Webster and to the Calgary Board of Trade, requesting that they lobby the federal 
government on the company's behalf. The company also attempted to access minister Charles 
Stewart through at least one Liberal backbencher, Walter Mitchell. There were, company chief 
engineer G.A. Gaherty explained to Stewart, no "power sites in Alberta... which would be 
commercially feasible, other than those within the Government parks." Yet Alberta's economic 
development was "dependent upon an abundant supply of cheap hydro electric power." He 
hoped that both the Spray and eventually Minnewanka would be opened for new development, 
and promised that "the works are so laid out that they are mainly hidden from view and... will 
harmonize with the surroundings." 
30
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Within the city of Calgary, the application for the Spray Lakes was welcomed as the 
latest essential step in modern municipal development. Calgary of the 1920s certainly seems 
caught up in what has been referred to elsewhere as the fascination with water power as "white 
coal." The editor of the Calgary Daily Herald marvelled at the network of lines "through which 
the subtle and powerful electric fluid passes, before lending its strength to the moving of 
hundreds of wheels of industry and traffic in the city and the illuminating of the streets and many 
homes."36 In 1928, the Herald published a special issue on electricity, which eagerly anticipated 
"tremendous enterprises, undreamed of industry, countless luxuries, limitless reduction of the 
hardships which pioneers now living faced," all thanks to "the wizardry of the electric current." 
The new Spray Lakes dam, the same paper excitedly reported in 1923, would "furnish the power 
desired by... Calgary for the next fifty years." 
The power company's actions, however, must be understood within a broader national 
and cultural context. This is so not least because the Calgary Power Company, despite the name 
and its geographically limited sphere of operations, was not a local entity but a Montreal-based 
subsidiary of the massive business empire constructed by Maxwell Aitken (later Lord 
Beaverbrook), and sold to Aitken's business partner Isaak Walton Killam in 1919.39 When this 
sale occurred, Aitken's local partner, Conservative MP (and future Prime Minister) R.B. Bennett, 
also departed the company. In promoting their work along the Bow watershed, the Montreal 
engineers of Calgary Power were appealing to more than a decade of federal work on prairie 
Jessica B. Teisch, "Great Western Power, 'White Coal,' and Industrial Capitalism in the West," Pacific Historical 
Review 70 (2001), 221-253. 
36
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water power development by two conservation agencies, the Commission of Conservation and 
the Water Power Branch of the Department of the Interior. 
When the Commission of Conservation was established in 1909, chairman Clifford Sifton 
declared that "if we attempt to stand in the way of development our efforts will assuredly be of 
no avail," and in any case that "the best and most highly economic development... can only take 
place by having regard to the principles of conservation." During its twelve-year lifetime, the 
Commission produced over 150 special reports, a monthly newspaper, and a periodical, tackling 
subjects ranging from water-power and forestry to urban planning.41 One of its first major 
projects was a systematic study of water-power opportunities and existing hydroelectric plants in 
Canada, culminating in the publication of Water-Powers of Canada in 1911 and Water-Works of 
Canada in 1912. For the Commission (and other federal agencies, for that matter), the Prairies 
offered particularly appealing ground for testing new policies. Although Alberta and 
Saskatchewan were created in 1905, the federal government retained control over natural 
resources on the prairies until 1930—a luxury it did not possess in the other provinces, or under 
the Canadian Constitution (which granted control of resources to the provincial governments). 
The Bow River watershed, which simultaneously presented opportunities for irrigation in 
southern Alberta and electrical development in the Rockies, west of Calgary, drew particular 
attention. In 1911, the Department of the Interior and the Commission arranged a study of power 
possibilities on the Bow River—ultimately published under separate covers by those two 
40
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institutions—by engineers M.C. Hendry and C.H. Mitchell of Toronto.43 Hendry and Mitchell's 
vision of the river followed from the conservationist principle that all exploitable flowing water 
be harnessed for consumption. They envisioned a "comprehensive construction scheme" 
involving Calgary Power's existing dams at the Horseshoe Falls and Kananaskis Falls (outside of 
Rocky Mountains Park), the dam completed at Lake Minnewanka in 1912, a possible fourth dam 
at Bow Lake, and, most importantly, a large dam in the Spray valley. The Spray basin, they 
believed, could store up to 171,000 acre-feet of water, more than four times as much as the 
newly dammed Lake Minnewanka and about two-thirds of the theoretical storage capacity of the 
Bow River.44 In so doing, the Bow would be converted from an "unsuitable, inefficient, and 
commercially unfeasible" river into "an efficient commercial source of power."45 Calgary 
Power's later Spray Lakes proposal was built upon the Hendry-Mitchell report. The vice-
president of its parent company, Royal Securities, even thanked the Water Power Branch, noting 
that the report "greatly simplifies the working-up of power projects and hastens their 
realization."46 Pearce, too, regularly referred to the Hendry report.47 
Eventually, under the influence of deputy chairman James White, the Commission seems 
to have abandoned its earlier work on water-power in favour of promoting coal, which White 
told a Calgary audience in 1919 was "cheaper than water."48 However, Canada's second major 
conservationist organization, the Water Power Branch, was undeterred. When they were first 
created in 1911 (as discussed in the first chapter), the Parks and Water Power branches believed 
their respective areas of work to be complementary, and even approached the first dam on Lake 
43
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Minnewanka as a joint project. However, their paths soon diverged—in part over the 
management of Minnewanka. The first director of the Water Power Branch, John Bow Challies, 
crafted water conservation policy for over a decade, before leaving government service for an 
executive post at the Montreal-based Shawinigan Water and Power Company in 1925.49 Challies 
immediately welcomed the new power company proposal as "reasonable," and recommended its 
prompt approval.50 Water power, he explained on another occasion, was "inexhaustible, 
travelling in the continuous circle ocean-vapour-rain-river and back to ocean again." This meant 
that "true conservation of our water-power resources... lies, not in withholding them from 
development, but in their efficient utilization." ' 
Locally, in Calgary, the company's proposal also earned the enthusiastic support of 
surveyor and booster William Pearce. Pearce had moved west from Ontario as a government 
surveyor in the 1880s, and moved to the Canada Pacific Railway's settlement and irrigation 
department in 1904, taking a position which he held until his retirement in 1926.52 He once 
described the general objective of his work as "hammer[ing] into the public... that there is not a 
drop of water that can be made available for irrigation purposes in any of the three prairie 
provinces that should be allowed to go to the Hudson Bay, [or] Arctic Ocean."53 Pearce was a 
man of grand, indeed grandiose, vision, submitting at various times plans to build a massive road 
network throughout the Rockies; to dam "nearly all the streams" in Rocky Mountains Park, 
converting them into pleasant storage reservoirs; and to create an extraordinary irrigation project 
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along the Upper Saskatchewan River. He had little use for those who challenged his schemes, 
dismissing opponents of the Spray Lakes dam as "a flock of sheep" and as "pure and 
unadulterated faddists who do not know what they are talking about."55 
To Pearce, water was, or at least inevitably would be, in short supply east of the Rockies. 
Proper planning and elimination of "waste" was therefore necessary, in anticipation of a day 
when "every drop of water... will be desired to be used." He drew inspiration from Switzerland, 
where, he claimed, "resources are to a very considerable percentage scenic" but which were 
nevertheless developed in a manner "not considered an injury to the scenic effects." While 
delivering a lecture to engineers and businessmen on the future of Alberta in 1923, Pearce 
pointed out the window towards the Bow and declared, "control it, gentlemen, master it, make it 
your servant, and miraculous things can be accomplished." In place of an untamed river, there 
could be "the rumbling reverberating undertone of huge dynamos... [and] the hum of winds 
singing through miles of high-powered transmission wires."58 
It is important to recognize that, albeit for some of them more than others, the supporters 
of the Spray Lakes dam were not wholly unconcerned about its effects on scenery. Rather, they 
regularly insisted that dams would not have a serious effect on scenery or upon the tourists who 
came to see it. The Hendry Report touted the artificial Lake Minnewanka, with its "very 
beautiful [waters]... of a very deep blue," as an example of the success of industry in protecting 
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and even "enhancing" beauty—what today might be called a multiple use philosophy. 
Opposition to a dam, Pearce wrote to the Deputy Minister of the Interior in 1924, was "a piece of 
lunacy," since "those reservoirs..., in place of marring our parks, would contribute to their 
beauty."60 Pearce's credentials in this regard were impressive: he had been the civil servant 
despatched to examine Banff prior to the creation of Rocky Mountains National Park, and he was 
also the author of an extraordinary memorandum condemning automobiles in national parks, 
provoked by the arrival in Banff of a car driven from Calgary.61 The editors of the Calgary 
Herald, similarly, regularly insisted that Minnewanka had not suffered from damming in 1912— 
indeed, that it was "more popular than ever for... motor-boating and fishing." 
In addition, while Righter has conclusively demonstrated that the Hetch Hetchy 
controversy pitted park defenders like Muir against Progressive advocates of publicly owned 
power in San Francisco, that dynamic was largely absent from the Spray Lakes controversy. 
Certainly the Water Powers Branch might have been willing to own and operate a dam, Albertan 
premier Herbert Greenfield briefly contemplated having his government do so, and in Calgary, 
the Albertan newspaper for a time in 1925 favoured a municipal or provincial dam. In general, 
however, these views were seriously held only by a minority which was efficiently co-opted or 
marginalized by others willing to let (or insistent upon letting) the private sector develop the site. 
Pearce, who fell into the latter category, devoted a pair of lengthy memoranda to the argument 
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that government-owned initiatives inevitably became bloated, unprofitable menaces. He admitted 
that the Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission (OHEC) and the Canadian National Railways, at 
the time the largest public companies in Canada, were both successful. Nevertheless, he 
confidently predicted, both would fail within the decade, after which their executives would 
"have their names execrated by the people." Canada was, in his opinion, "a developing country," 
and therefore had no choice but to attract private investors through the "inducement of 
considerable profit."64 Others were simply unconcerned about who developed the power. Mayor 
Frederick Webster of Calgary, for instance, remarked that he "d[id] not care... who should 
develop and control the power," so long as it was developed quickly. 
The negative response to Calgary Power's proposal by James Harkin and the National 
Parks Branch was swift, and equally as confident as any of Pearce's prolific pronouncements on 
the subject. In a lengthy memorandum prepared after he was warned by the Water Powers 
Branch that the power company was preparing a new application, Harkin wrote that the Spray 
valley was "one of the prettiest in the Park" and that a dam would "seriously impair the scenery." 
Given the damage done by "the small dam at Lake Minnewanka," one could only imagine the 
threat posed by a larger dam on the Spray. "Power engineers seem incapable of recognizing that 
flithy [sic] flats and bare shores without a vestige of timber... destroy scenery," he declared. 
While few visitors reached the Spray Lakes, government policy must anticipate that "with 
increasing numbers and further road and trail development the people will extend further and 
further away from the present centres [like Banff and Lake Louise], and frequent the places now 
UAA, accn. 74-169, box 23, item 378, Pearce to Webster, April 17, 1924, and Pearce to Colley, October 21, 1925. 
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considered remote."66 Harkin ordered his Banff engineer, J.M. Wardle, to prepare "as good a 
collection as possible of the best scenes of the Spray lake country" to bolster his case.67 
That the Parks Branch would emerge as an opponent to new dam projects, and as a self-
styled defender of the rights of visiting people, requires some explanation. In the wake of the 
damage to Lake Minnewanka and in response to subsequent proposals to dam the Waterton 
Lakes, Harkin decided that "the parks without their scenic waters would be of comparatively 
little use."68 In his 1921 annual report, he wrote that "the parks are the property of all the people 
of Canada and that consequently they should not be developed for the benefit of any one section 
of the country or of private interests; second, that such development constitutes an invasion of 
the fundamental principle... [of] the conservation of certain areas of primitive landscape with all 
their original conditions of plant and animal life and other natural features intact."69 A briefing 
note prepared for minister Charles Stewart in 1923 went so far as to state that "the principle 
behind parks is their preservation in their natural state for the public in perpetuity."70 
It is easy to interpret such statements as the genesis of the Parks Branch's so-called 
principle of inviolability—the principle that natural environments contained within the parks 
must be preserved in their original state, out of respect for the intrinsic value of wilderness. 
However, this overarching rhetoric masks the reality that Banff's waters remained a carefully 
managed environment throughout the 1920s, and that the Parks Branch saw no inconsistency 
between articulating such broad policy statements and taking considerable liberties with respect 
to the "conditions of plant and animal life." In the early 1920s, as the Crag & Canyon watched 
approvingly and demanded that "the mosquito pest" be made "a thing of the past," the Parks 
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Branch repeatedly attempted to extirpate mosquitoes from the park by spreading oil on stagnant 
waters. By 1924, the "war" had expanded into a systematic division of the Banff area into "oiling 
districts," and was yielding "excellent practical results."71 
In addition, even as hunting of game was restricted, fishing thrived. Anglers from around 
the world, exulted the Crag & Canyon, came to Banff each year to "test their skills against the 
fighting beauties which abound in the rivers, lakes and streams." As early as 1908, the Bow 
River was described as "pretty well fished out," and the same year, Lake Minnewanka had to be 
restocked with 10,500 trout. (After that lake was dammed, it continued to "depend largely... on 
artificial stocking.")74 However, the Spray River, and the lakes which fed it, was regarded as 
having a particularly good fishery. One travel writer, Walter Wilcox, marveled somewhat 
hyperbolically that "sport is impossible because the fish are too numerous." The quantity of 
fish probably would have declined somewhat by the 1920s, as it did elsewhere in the park, but 
the Spray was still regarded as "one of the best natural spawning grounds known in Alberta." 
In many respects, the Parks Branch's vision of water continued to reflect its earlier approach of 
managing and beautifying the natural setting for the appreciation of human visitors. 
The Parks Branch's opposition to a Spray Lakes dam actually originated in a series of 
papers prepared in 1921 and early 1922, when it first suspected the valley might be targeted. The 
"necessary pipe line, transmission lines and power house... cannot fail to detract from its scenic 
71
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value and... is consequently opposed to the best interests of the park," Harkin informed 
Challies.77 (Challies's reaction, as he told his subordinates, was that "we are in complete 
disagreement.") Branch engineer J.H. Mitchell toured the Spray River valley and reported that 
there were two principal problems, from a parks perspective, with a new dam. First, the valley 
was "a scenic feature of particular interest" to visitors, and the forty-foot Spray Falls in particular 
(which, interestingly, never featured in the controversy after 1923) would be "absolutely 
destroyed." Second, the Spray Lakes were home to important spawning grounds which would 
also be endangered by the annual cycling of the storage dam. Mitchell suggested that the Lower 
Spray Lake might perhaps be safely raised by several feet, but no more.79 
It is important to recognize that the Parks Branch's concern about the fishery was rooted 
not solely in a concern about the fish themselves, but about the value of the fishery to visitors. 
The Branch solicited an assessment of the matter from the Department of Fisheries, which 
predicted "the ultimate destruction of the... trout fishing in this district" and warned that "a very 
large number of tourists are attracted to the Banff Park by the angling to be obtained therein. 
This angling could not help but be effected [sic] badly by this power proposition."80 Between the 
threat to the spawning beds and the probability of rotting vegetation being dispersed through the 
new storage reservoir, the assistant deputy minister of fisheries informed Harkin, "it is doubtful 
if any fish would remain in the water in the completed storage basin."81 
Harkin's suspicions about Calgary Power's ultimate designs on Lake Minnewanka must 
also not be discounted as a major factor in his decision to oppose the Spray development. Before 
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the Spray Lakes proposal was received, Harkin accused Calgary Power of attempting "to mix up 
the Spray and the Minnewanka schemes." After the proposal was received, he repeated these 
suspicions, insisting that the Spray dam proposal might be nothing more than "one of expediency 
and apparently trying to confuse the Department as to the ultimate object." This fear that the 
Spray Lakes might be used as a lever, or as a precedent, to force out of the Parks Branch new 
concessions at Lake Minnewanka remained a persistent concern of many dam opponents 
throughout the 1920s, and seemed to be confirmed when a new application for that lake was 
finally filed in 1930 (discussed in the next chapter). 
The Parks Branch's opposition to a Spray Lakes dam must also be understood within the 
context of its existing commitment not only to permitting both permanent residents and transient 
visitors within the park, but its production of power within the park for use by those two groups. 
From 1904 to 1924, a coal plant at the CPR mining town of Bankhead shared its surplus power 
with Banff townsite. However, the CPR announced in 1922 that it intended to close Bankhead, 
and the Branch was forced to construct its own power house, this one using water released from 
the Calgary Power dam on Minnewanka. 
This Parks Branch power house is the facility that Armstrong, Evenden and Nelles 
dismissed simplistically as "bureaucratic hypocrisy." While the Branch certainly was markedly 
less critical of its ability to integrate its own projects into the natural scenery than it was others' 
ability to do the same, these authors probably go too far in their allegation of mere hypocrisy. 
The Branch did rule out damming the Bow River Falls (which an engineer's report characterized 
as "probably cheaper" but "spoiling" in terms of "scenic beauty"), and also regarded its Cascade 
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powerhouse to be "attractive and in keeping with its surroundings." One engineer even hoped 
that the power station could be made "a feature of interest to tourists, etc." Moreover, as Harkin 
reminded deputy minister W.W. Cory, "practically no further damage" could be done to 
on 
Minnewanka "from a scenic standpoint." The Water Power Branch watched the undertakings at 
the Cascade powerhouse suspiciously, fretting that an investment there would make it more 
difficult to build a new, larger dam on Minnewanka in the future.88 The Parks Branch also 
SO 
tolerated a CPR dam and powerhouse downstream of Lake Louise. 
In opposing the Spray Lakes dam, the Parks Branch was joined by two non-governmental 
organizations, the Alpine Club of Canada and the new National Parks Association of Canada. 
The most thorough history of the Alpine Club of Canada's early years remains the work of 
PearlAnn Reichwein.90 Briefly, the group was founded in 1906 by surveyor Arthur Oliver 
Wheeler and journalist Elizabeth Parker to promote the "national playground" of the Canadian 
mountains to the middle classes. Wheeler was introduced to mountaineering by Swiss guides 
while he was working on the Dominion Land Survey in the Selkirk Mountains; he later claimed 
that those surroundings "had the usual effect and I became a devoted enthusiast of... the 
delightful, devilish Selkirks."91 To Parker, climbers and hikers were "mountain pilgrims" in 
search of "some dawning sense of infinitude and of the immensity and mystery of the 
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creation." By the early 1920s, the Club had grown to 600 members, the majority of which were 
white, middle- and upper-class urban professionals. Its principal activities involved promoting 
hiking and mountaineering, although Wheeler and several of his associates also felt called to 
defend the "great principle" that national parks be "preserve[d]... from spoliation."94 
In its early years, the Alpine Club explicitly linked social progress with the national 
parks. In 1914, Wheeler wrote on club letterhead a letter of recommendation for Norman 
Luxton's livery business in Banff, asserting that Luxton's competition, the Brewster family, were 
a monopolistic, overpriced "machine," which might "work with a certain class but... sooner or 
later, it will be necessary to cater to the middle crowd who wants cheaper facilities." Like 
Pearce, Wheeler was fond of appealing to the "universal law" of delivering "the greatest good to 
the greatest number," which, in his mind, was best realized by "the undiluted joy and happiness 
that is given yearly by our scenic parks to thousands of workers of Canada and from other 
lands."96 Not all visitors were impressed by this approach. One perturbed American guest, 
Walter Wilcox, commented that the Club's newly constructed Lake O'Hara campsite (a "fine 
drawing card," to Wheeler) had done considerable damage to the beauty spot's "wildness and 
grandeur," and would do more through "the making of a trail, the tramping of hundreds of 
horses..., [and] the building of stables."97 
Also like Pearce, Wheeler was an outspoken advocate of what he described as the 
development of the Canadian mountain parks on the Swiss model (although it is clear these two 
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men were envisioning quite different Switzerlands). The very middle class whom Wheeler 
believed would be Luxton's best clients, he wrote, wanted "conditions similar to the European 
QQ 
Alps." The parks certainly benefited from the landscape's "natural beauties" and "beautiful 
solitude," but, he emphasized, 
until some life is imparted to them they will never be able to emulate Switzerland... 
There are a few who are interested... in retaining them as primeval solitudes but... the 
majority look for something in the way of human life. I have heard a great many people 
express the opinion that the superiority of the Swiss Alps over the Canadian Rockies is 
due to the fact that the former are inhabited." 
Although made several years before the Spray Lakes controversy, Wheeler's remarks are 
instructive. In significant respects his argument continues to reflect early Canadian ideas that 
national parks not only were more than mere untouched wilderness, but that untouched 
wilderness—if and where it existed—was actually insufficient and even undesirable. 
Instead, Wheeler, and the Alpine Club in general, consistently strove to popularize and 
democratize the enjoyment of national parks by visitors—who would, it was assumed, access the 
spiritual and physical benefits of the parks via the provision of services by park inhabitants. His 
beliefs were exemplified in his abortive attempt at a tour company, the Mt. Assiniboine Walking 
Tour, which, probably coincidentally, ran through the Spray River valley past the site of the 
proposed dam. Wheeler intended to combat "the very high cost of hotels," which had grown 
"almost prohibitive except to the very wealthy."100 In a somewhat dubious land deal, Wheeler 
arranged for the Alpine Club to first purchase some land at Mt. Assiniboine for his camp, and 
then lease it to him at an inexpensive rate.101 The Tour was a week-long, 75-mile circuit to Mt. 
J
* WMCR, LUX/l/A-110, Wheeler to Bury, November 24, 1914. 
99
 LAC, RG 84 A-2-a, vol. 2243, file Y16-3, pt 1, Wheeler to Harkin, January 23, 1914. 
100
 Reichwein, "Beyond the Visionary Mountains," 207-209. 
101
 WMCR, M200/AC 090M/4a, Wheeler to Foster, December 6, 1922, and WMCR, M200/AC 00M/124, Bell to 
Executive Committee, February 9, 1927. The walking tour's Mt. Assiniboine property is referenced in greater detail 
in chapter 3. 
89 
Assiniboine—the "Matterhorn of the Canadian Rockies," according to promotional material. "Do 
not expect the Hotels of Civilization. There are no Modern Improvements," advised Wheeler's 
brochure, shortly before promising "GOOD FOOD AND CAMP BEDS" in new cabins. This 
tour would be "for the benefit of the general public," and specifically for "mountaineers, Hikers, 
Artists, Scientists, Photographers, and Fishermen." The tour gave Wheeler a financial interest, 
albeit a modest one, in the Spray valley, through which his trail meandered on its way to Mt. 
Assiniboine. 
In late 1922, Harkin drew Wheeler's attention to the Calgary Power application for the 
Spray Lakes, asking him to prepare a written response. Wheeler notified his fellow executive 
members, suggesting—as Harkin doubtless had hoped—that the Club "take an active part in the 
development of the Canadian Rocky Mountains."103 This resulted in a veritable flood of 
resolutions passed by club chapters around the country, declaring that "our national parks... 
should be preserved for the whole people, and not destroyed... for commercial purposes for the 
benefit of a few."104 The executive committee, however, laid out its opposition to the scheme in 
greatest detail, and its resolution may most closely represent Wheeler's own opinion. It, too, 
declared that the Spray Lakes scheme "menacefd]... the privilege of the big majority of the 
Canadian people," and more specifically that it would "work a permanent destruction to one of 
Banff's most attractive scenic features."105 
The rationale for preventing this loss, however, is what is most intriguing. The resolution 
explained that the Spray River valley was the likely future path of a road to Mt. Assiniboine, in 
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which case a storage reservoir would at least remove a scenic attraction, and perhaps even form a 
physical obstacle. Second, the Club argued that the Spray Lakes were valuable for their trout 
fishery, which would be devastated by the annual cycling of a storage dam. This was especially 
problematic because "these lakes will eventually attract summer residents to their shores, and 
will be an incentive to the building of summer cottages."106 The Alpine Club, then, anticipated 
development of the valley as well—but development of a quite different kind than that proposed 
by Calgary Power and supported by Pearce. 
The text of the resolution likely originated with Wheeler, whose subsequent, lengthy 
memorandum for Harkin elaborated on all of its points, predicting that the Spray valley "would... 
be glooded [sic] and filled with water to its steep bounding slopes, alpine meadows would be 
submerged, and park-like tracts of conifers and aspens would be destroyed and converted into an 
array of bleached and ghastly skeletons, chiefly to be avoided." It would also eliminate the 
possibility of a "scenic thoroughfare" from Banff to Mt. Assiniboine, devastate the mountain 
trout fishery, and prevent people from building "summer cottages along the shores."107 Alpine 
Club members Thomas Moffatt and W.J. Selby Walker penned a letter to the Calgary Herald in 
September 1923 reasoning that quality fishing was "an acknowledged lure for the tourist," that 
the Spray Lakes contained "the largest and best spawning bed for trout," and therefore that the 
dam would be a serious detriment to the park.108 In none of these documents did Wheeler 
mention his personal stake in the valley, via the walking tour, though as his acquaintance and as 
head of the Parks Branch Harkin could hardly have missed that connection. 
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Until the passage of the National Parks Act in 1930, the power to approve or reject dam 
proposals in national parks lay with the Minister of the Interior, a post filled during the time of 
the Spray Lakes controversy by Liberal MP Charles Stewart (with the exception of the brief 
Meighen government of 1926). Stewart entered federal politics in 1921, on the strength of a four-
year term as premier of Alberta, and was immediately appointed Minister of the Interior. Having 
the Water Power Branch and the Parks Branch within his Department created a problem: one 
favoured "cheap power for the development of industry," while the other strove to "preserve the 
scenic beauty of our parks for tourist purposes, and as a playground for the people of Canada." 
Initially, he was non-committal but sympathetic to the parks movement. In June 1923, 
Stewart stated awkwardly in the House of Commons that while he would not "say definitely that 
at no time under no consideration" would he authorize a dam project, he did agree "that the 
scenic beauty within the area of National parks... should be preserved."110 When pressed to go 
further, he admitted that "my own inclination is in the direction of reserving these areas purely 
for the purposes for which they were set aside." He had, he reminded critics, flatly rejected 
Calgary Power's most recent application for a new dam on Lake Minnewanka on those same 
grounds.111 He also noted that "very stringent laws against the development of power... in 
national parks" were a "trend of the times." Stewart's opinion seemed so set on the matter that 
his deputy minister, W.W. Cory, informally (and ill-advisedly) remarked "there was not the 
1 1 ~\ 
slightest chance of an application for power in the Spray Basin being accepted." 
Whether genuine or not, Stewart's initial reluctance to decide in the power company's 
favour was politically astute. There was, reported the Calgary Albertan (which favoured the 
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project), "a strong feeling against permitting any power development in the National park."114 
Newspapers outside of Alberta generally weighed in against the scheme. Canada's parks were 
"magnificent playgrounds" at risk of "becoming a grinding workshop," declared the Winnipeg 
Free Press, which envisioned engineers "snorting with scorn at the idea of leaving these 
mountain streams in their primitive grandeur when they might be set to work turning wheels."1' 
The Ottawa Journal freely admitted that it had "no knowledge of the Calgary Power Company, 
or of the aims of their proposed development," but nevertheless protested "the disfigurement of 
the scenic beauties of a great National Park."116 A series of letters published in the same paper 
alleged that Banff would be "rendered valueless as a tourist resort," and compared the potential 
dam to "hideous advertising signs along the waysides of scenic sections of countryside." 
Most local coverage, in Calgary, tended to proceed from the opposite assumption: that 
water-powers were rare, and mountain scenery abundant. "Is it just and right," asked the 
Albertan rhetorically in June 1923, "that the people of the plains... should be deprived of light, 
heat and power... in order that beauties of the park may be completely unimpaired?" Certainly 
not, was the implied answer, particularly when there was such "an enormous amount of park." 
The Herald, too, advocated prompt development, arguing that "the loveliness of mountain valley 
and stream" would be retained and that, in any event, "if it is to be a choice between fishing and 
cheap electrical energy, fishing will have to make way."119 Moreover, beautiful or otherwise, 
dam proponents argued that few people visited the Spray valley. One letter printed in the Ottawa 
Journal claimed that "of 100,000 people that might... visit the Rocky Mountains Park yearly, 
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certainly not more than 10,000 would ever hear of Spray Lakes," and far fewer actually visited 
them. (The Journal's editors pronounced themselves "unmoved" by this argument.) 
The first serious opportunity for the Parks Branch and the power company to persuade 
Stewart of their respective causes came in July 1923, when he personally toured the Spray Lakes 
region. Strangely, few records of the visit seem to survive, despite it being a significant occasion. 
Local newspaper accounts, however, do confirm that it occurred. According to the Calgary 
Herald, the "large party" which accompanied Stewart included mayor George Webster and 
electrical superintendent R. A. Brown of Calgary; chief engineer G. A. Gaherty and president 
V.M. Drury of Calgary Power; D.G. Sturrock, vice-president of the Calgary Board of Trade; 
Harkin, J.M. Wardle, and R.S. Stronach of the Parks Branch; and the provincial MLA for Bow 
Valley, C.R. Mitchell.121 Since the Spray could be reached only by hiking or on horseback (the 
latter is most likely in this case), it would have to have been a substantial party indeed, with 
packers and other unmentioned retinue along as well. 
What transpired on the trip, unfortunately, cannot be fully reconstructed, but it is clear 
that Harkin's contingent was less successful than Gaherty's. On their return to Calgary, Stewart 
told journalists that he was "disappointed with the Spray lakes themselves... They were much 
smaller than I had anticipated." He also accepted the company's argument that "the proposed 
development would make a fine lake," and allowed that since "Alberta needs power... to make it 
a manufacturing centre, we must be prepared to pay the cost." Webster excitedly echoed these 
points, proclaiming that it "would be nothing less than a crime... for the Dominion government to 
shut out... the Spray Lakes project."1 3 The Herald celebrated the outcome of the trip with an 
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editorial claiming that it would have opposed any "general wreck of the natural beauties of these 
world-renowned... reservations," but that there would be no "serious marring," and any roads 
built during construction would "make accessible to the mountain trampers locations that have 
hitherto been well nigh inaccessible."124 Stewart seems to have been prepared to "clos[e] out" the 
matter in January 1924, but was persuaded by Albertan premier Herbert Greenfield to delay 
making a decision to give the provincial government time to consider the benefits of creating a 
publicly owned power company which would then bid on the Spray site.125 
Stewart's failure to be impressed by the Spray valley did not end the controversy, but it 
did underscore the fact that the parks movement would be fighting an uphill battle the remainder 
of the decade. In the meantime, Harkin had more good fortune with another matter he attended to 
on his trip west—overseeing the formation of the National Parks Association of Canada. The 
Parks Association consisted (at least originally) of Alpine Club members, including Wheeler, 
who were dissatisfied with difficulties encountered in persuading the full membership of the 
existing organization to commit to political advocacy. When he introduced the Spray Lakes issue 
as well as unrelated concerns about irrigation dams in Waterton Lakes National Park, Wheeler 
encountered resistance from members who argued that "the matter [lay] outside the jurisdiction 
of the Club." At least one Club member, rancher F.W. Godsal, vocally supported both 
Waterton and Spray dams on the grounds that it was "positively hoggish to trouble about 2 or 3 
lakes, or half a dozen, and thereby hinder the progress of... the country."127 The flagship 
publication of the Club, the Canadian Alpine Journal, printed no material regarding the various 
development controversies of the 1920s. 
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The solution, for the more politically inclined members like Wheeler and Calgary 
resident W.J. Selby Walker, was to spin off a new organization dedicated to political advocacy, 
the National Parks Association of Canada. The first executive members—individuals like 
Frederick C. Bell, H.E. Sampson, Wheeler, and Walker—were all Alpine Club members. An 
initial $300 startup loan was provided by the Alpine Cub "for the purpose of making a start." 
Endorsing the creation of the new organization, the Calgary chapter of the Alpine Club 
expressed hope that it could channel the "power of the people" and "enroll thousands of 
members... in this worthy cause... [of] the safety and preservation for all time of our treasured 
mountain parks."129 Wheeler triumphantly proclaimed in the Alpine Club's Gazette that "a 
national policy of 'Hands off our National Parks' has been declared and is now in force." 
Pearce, for his part, dismissed the new organization as "active propaganda instituted by the... 
Alpine Club."131 
The Parks Association reflected a similar vision of mass use and enjoyment of the 
national parks to that of the Alpine Club. In 1923, Walker, who would serve as the club's 
executive secretary until his death in 1951, warned that "when one power project is safely 
installed in our national parks there is a precedent established which threatens... many other spots 
of great beauty."132 Canada, he reasoned, was involved in a "race for commercial supremacy," he 
explained on one occasion, and in such a race, "a nation of weaklings can never endure." 
National parks were therefore a necessary place where "the people of the large cities" could 
embark upon "health-giving rambles."133 It is telling that the Banff Crag & Canyon, which 
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supported the Spray Lakes dam, nevertheless found reason to praise the creation of the Parks 
Association, noting that "should this district be ruined... tourists would go to parks still fresh in 
the primeval beauty, and Banff... would be spoken of as a deserted village."134 
The Parks Association took aim at the Spray Lakes project immediately after its creation. 
The valley would be ruined by "huge pipes protruding here and there, and power stations droning 
away."135 Presumably appealing more to readers' sympathy than to mathematical precision, 
Walker complained, "confine your waterfalls within power flumes and surround your beautiful 
lakes with the mud flats coincident with water storage, and you remove seventy-five per cent of 
the scenic attractiveness of these areas." Somewhat more dubiously, he wrote to Banff 
superintendent R.S. Stronach suggesting that the latter "stir up" rumours in Banff of the "havoc" 
which would result should the dam, once constructed, break. (Stronach responded diplomatically 
that he was "exceedingly sorry" but he could not do so.) 
The formation of the Parks Association was accompanied by a lengthy running battle 
fought on the editorial pages of prairie newspapers. In the Manitoba Free Press, Wheeler 
touched a nerve still sensitive in the parks community: "if you want to see what happens [after a 
dam is constructed,] study Lake Minnewanka."138 That the Parks Branch initially supported and 
assisted in the construction of the Minnewanka dam might have been a problem in this 
campaign, but, conveniently, it seems to have generally been accepted by the 1920s—and in 
contrast to the evidence presented in the previous chapter—that "the parks authorities gave 
permission for the construction of this dam... [with] considerable reluctance."139 Other activists 
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associated with the Parks Association touched on similar points. When A.S. Sibbald spoke to an 
audience in Saskatoon, for instance, he emphasized "the recreational side of the Parks question" 
and the benefits both to "the people of the plains" as well as "the great numbers who came into 
the country" from abroad.140 Even if the Spray Lakes project did not jeopardize the scenery, 
Wheeler added, it ought still to be opposed, since otherwise the parks would gradually be 
whittled away by "one thing here, another there and something somewhere else and so on, ad 
infinitum," until areas where the scenery was jeopardized would come under threat.141 Wheeler's 
existing walking tour, predicted Sibbald, was merely the forerunner of "a system of mountain 
highways which will render the more remote districts accessible to the general public," who 
would expect, upon their arrival, to be rewarded with appropriately attractive scenery.142 
In addition to the particular problems posed in the Spray case, Wheeler and others 
advanced the argument—characteristic of the Alpine Club's earlier attempts to popularize and 
democratize the parks—that national parks, and not power dams, were held in trust for the 
people of Canada as a whole. It was neither just nor necessary, Wheeler wrote, "to take away the 
poor man's birthright to swell the dividends of private corporations." Too, the national parks 
belonged "to generations yet to come."1 Even in the present, there were "hundreds of thousands 
of people" who relied upon the parks for a chance to "wander... amidst the glorious mountain 
scenery and take in great draughts of ozone to be stored for the year."144 Harkin publicly opined 
that the importance of the parks lay in "the large amount of money brought in annually... [and] 
the human dividends, the greater mental efficiency, physical efficiency and the spiritual 
140
 Saskatoon Star, August 9, 1923. 
141
 UAA, accn. 74-169, file 421.1, Wheeler to Pearce, May 18, 1923. 
142
 LAC, RG 84 A-2-a, vol. 492, file R39-8, pt 2, Sibbald to Stewart, August 14, 1923. 
143
 Manitoba Free Press, June 26, 1923. 
144
 Calgary Daily Herald, May 21, 1923. 
98 
efficiency which was acquired through time spent in the national parks." These benefits could 
only accrue if the parks remained "free... [of] special privileges in monopolies."1 
An argument relying on appeals to scenic beauty and populism could be attacked on both 
fronts—and typically was. The Banff Crag & Canyon, siding with the power company, regarded 
the Spray region as "a valley full of muskeg, nigger heads and old burnt stumps,... that breeds 
uncountable numbers of mosquitos and flies"—in short, "surely a place to clean up... into a big 
lake."146 Pearce, similarly, dismissed the Spray valley as nothing more than a "marshy, mosquito 
breeding area."147 He would "accept second place to no one in admiration for Nature," Pearce 
insisted, but a well-planned dam would "add materially to the scenic effects." Perhaps the 
most idealistic assessment came from the Calgary Herald, which judged that the dam would 
actually "restore nature to more of its original beauty."149 It was not always clear whether dam 
proponents were genuine in such claims—the editors of the Herald, for their part, occasionally 
admitted that water power "if necessary should take precedence over aesthetic claims"150—but 
they were frequent and insistent enough to be accepted as more than mere rhetoric. 
Pearce laid down two conditions he believed necessary to maintain the attractiveness of 
the lakes: proper removal of timber, and proper filling of the reservoir prior to tourist season, 
roughly from June to September. It was possible that some tourists would begin arriving 
before the reservoir was filled, but, he told the Calgary Board of Trade, "seeing the water 
creeping up day by day is an inspiring sight." Significantly, virtually nothing was said by 
proponents of the dam about the detrimental effect on fish in the Spray Lakes, save for a rare 
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admission by Pearce that he did not feel "competent to pass an opinion." His work was 
probably also the basis for a vision of the future Spray Lakes which appeared in Gateway 
magazine (whose editor corresponded with Pearce) in 1927, according to which the power 
company would remove "all dead or standing timber from the flood areas. The lakes would then 
soon be encircled by a green fringe of young trees, and the raising of the water level would 
eliminate the present swampy appearance."154 Pearce's solution for maintaining a beautified, 
flooded Spray River valley did not make it into official plans, but they resemble those applied at 
Lake Minnewanka in 1912, and when that lake was dammed again in 1941. It is reasonable, 
therefore, to assume that Calgary Power would have committed itself to similar plans had the 
Spray project reached the appropriate stage during the 1920s. In any case they were 
unconvincing to opponents of the dam, particularly given that the requisite logging had not 
occurred in 1912, and given the annual problem of late filling of Lake Minnewanka. 
Critics, particularly Pearce, also challenged Wheeler's and Walker's assertion that the 
parks be protected as the inheritance of the people of Canada. H.B. Mucklestone, a Lethbridge 
irrigation engineer, responded to Wheeler's newspaper campaign with the pointed rhetorical 
questions, "how many 'poor men' ever geo [sic] to the lakes...? How many 'poor men' would 
know the difference if the storage were developed?"155 The Spray Lakes were seen by "not half 
of one percent of the people who visited Banff," Pearce similarly observed, but "the time will 
come when every drop of water in the Rocky Mountains Park that can be spared... will be 
required." He hyperbolically accused Harkin of attempting to draw to himself "powers 
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exceeding what the Czar of Russia ever attempted," in the guise of protecting the public. 
According to the Calgary Herald, "sentimental" opponents of the dam would "rob Calgary... of 
its birthright."158 
In the face of this opposition, in 1923 and 1924 dam opponents did attempt, without 
success, to latch onto apparent alternative power sources. It is significant that none advanced the 
broader argument that the growth in electrical power consumption be capped: all seemed to have 
agreed that it should come from somewhere. In 1923, local members of the Alpine Club seized 
upon the city government's investigation of the Elbow River, 35 miles outside of the city, as a 
means of "lessen[ing]" pressure on the Spray. One letter to the Herald called on local citizens 
to support this venture as a way of checking the power of "a group of eastern financiers" 
motivated only by their "keen ambition... [to] enrich their pockets"—a not unsubtle reference to 
Calgary Power.160 In any event, interest in power from the Elbow site did not last long, as it 
became clear that it could supply only a fraction of the theoretical capacity available from the 
park's rivers. The most optimistic estimates were that the Elbow plant could produce 12,000 
horsepower, whereas the Spray Lakes dam was expected to produce between four and five times 
that figure, plus the benefits to downstream power projects of regulated river levels.161 
Although the Elbow River diversion ultimately served as little more than a delaying 
tactic, for several years opponents of the dam hoped to redirect electrical development towards 
coal. There were certainly major economic interests in Alberta which favoured increased coal 
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production.162 It seems to have been Selby Walker—who pronounced coal "practically 
inexhaustible"—who first approached the provincial coal lobby for help in opposing Spray, 
advising the Western Canada Coal Operators Association of Calgary Power's claims that the 
Spray Lakes dam would "save the consumption of two million tons of coal annually"—with the 
implicit message that this would be detrimental to the coal industry. The association obligingly 
passed a resolution opposing "an expensive hydro-electric scheme."164 A. Walker, a leader of the 
provincial Great War Veteran's Association who claimed to be familiar with "White's Report" 
(the Commission of Conservation's endorsement of coal over hydroelectricity), also spoke out in 
favour of coal, and against "impair[ing] the beauty of the Spray Lakes."165 
Like the Elbow River project, though, the argument that coal was a preferable alternative 
to hydroelectricity ultimately convinced few. Coal prices fluctuated, and supply could be 
unreliable, particularly in the event of rail disruptions or mine strikes. In fact, these concerns 
played a role in the Parks Branch's decision to forego taking over the Bankhead coal plant, or 
building a new coal plant of its own, in 1922.166 To conservationists, moreover, the notion of 
using nonrenewable coal when running water was also available was anathema. "The idea is 
wholly wrong," Pearce explained in one letter to minister Stewart: "the coal can be left in the 
1 zr-7 
ground until it is required." Thus there were real challenges to the notion of expanding coal 
production in Calgary in the 1920s, even without beginning to consider the not-insubstantial 
influence of the power company over municipal government. Although a panel of engineers 
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employed by the provincial government did weigh the relative costs of hydroelectricity and coal, 
this was already considered a settled question by the time the report was ordered—indeed, the 
engineers who wrote the study worked for the Ontario Hydro-Electricity Commission.168 
These public campaigns are significant not solely (or even primarily) due to their 
influence on decision-makers such as Stewart, but because of what they reveal about the beliefs 
of the participants. Indeed, if Stewart was moved by the debate, or even simply followed it 
through the lengthy files of press clippings meticulously prepared for him by the Parks Branch, 
he gave no written indication of it.169 In January 1924, the Winnipeg Free Press wrote dejectedly 
that, judging by the editorial content of the Calgary newspapers and the lack of a positive 
response from Stewart, the power interests "were begining [sic] to turn the day against the 
friends of the national parks." 
The last and largest salvo from the Parks Association was a letter-writing campaign 
organized in 1924, which resulted in several hundred sympathetic letters arriving at Stewart's 
office, most of which were relayed to the Parks Branch for preparation of a bland, form-letter 
response assuring the writers that "it is not intended to reach a decision in this matter without 
171 
giving serious consideration to all the representations which have been made." Most 
respondents simply re-typed or re-wrote a form letter of their own, provided by the Parks 
Association, registering their "strong protest against the granting of water power rights or 
concessions in any of the National Parks of Canada," since "the National Parks... should be 
preserved inviolate for the use of the peoples of the Dominion."172 Most letters came from 
lawyers and other professionals who were members of the Alpine Club, the Parks Association, or 
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both; from tourist and sportsmen's organizations such as the Manitoba Motor League, the 
Calgary Anglers Association, and the B.C. Mountaineering Club; and, less easy to categorize, a 
smattering of social clubs with no obvious connection to parks, such as the Gyro Club of 
Victoria and the Ukrainian People's Republic Club of Montreal.173 
Since few of the contributors added to the form letter, it is difficult to speculate about the 
extent to which they shared the positions taken by the Parks Association. A few letters did 
elaborate on the danger of allowing private commercial interests to operate within a public park. 
Lawyer A.B. MacKay, for instance, warned against "breaking] into the policy of our holding 
our National Parks exclusively as playgrounds for our people."174 Another lawyer and a member 
of both parks organizations, H.C. Willson, urged that the government not lose sight of "the 
recreational features of our parks," or the fact that "if the tourists find flumes and reservoirs and 
the scenery wrecked by commercialism, tourist traffic will cease."175 Characteristic of many 
participants in the campaign, the Kiwanis Club of Victoria took pains to point out that it "d[id] 
not wish to stand in the way of the proper development of this country's natural resources but... 
this development can take place without calling upon the power sources in our national parks."17' 
Stewart expressed no public opinion in direct response to the letter-writing campaign. 
However, in general it seems to have failed to make a strong impression on him. In September 
1924, he did emphasize in a letter to premier Greenfield that the power company could carry out 
surveys only at its own expense and risk, since "the Dominion Government has not yet made up 
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its mind." However, his own mind had clearly shifted on the matter: as he stated in the House 
of Commons, he "d[id] not think the development would interfere very materially with the park" 
and was therefore not inclined to oppose it. Later that year, in an unusually lengthy response to 
a protest letter from H.E. Sampson (a Parks Association executive), Stewart opined that "quite 
frankly... the industrial need is great and evidently [the Albertan government] feel that Spray 
Lakes should be made available for storage purposes... the views of the Provincial Government 
17Q 
in the matter of natural resources within its borders must be given reasonable weight." 
The increasingly isolated position of the parks movement can also be seen in the 
Parliament parks budget deliberations for 1925. The Canadian House of Commons, then as now, 
offered substantially less opportunity for individual or opposition politicians to carry out 
substantive debates or hearings, like the Congressional hearings on Hetch Hetchy which 
occurred in the United States. There was, however, the annual debate over park funding, which 
became the stage for debate—or at least rhetorical posturing—on the Spray Lakes question after 
1923. The possibility of a Parliamentary offensive in 1925 was anticipated by dam proponents 
like the Calgary Board of Trade, which lobbied Stewart in advance to put down the coming 
"strenuous effort" by "those who are opposed to the storage of water at Spray Lakes." 
Few parliamentarians, however, were willing to side with the Parks Association. On June 
10, 1925, Harry Stevens of Vancouver rose to urge "a policy in relation to our national parks 
which will preserve them from any alienation or interference... Our parks are not only great play-
grounds, but they may become a splendid revenue producer."181 Stevens demanded that "this 
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invasion of a national park be held off." However, Stevens was an isolated voice. No party 
leaders stood to voice their opinions, although in the past prominent Conservatives R.B. Bennett 
and Arthur Meighen (soon to be Prime Minister, albeit very briefly) had gone on record 
supporting power development. Joseph T. Shaw, the Labour MP for Calgary West, had toured 
Alberta in 1923 declaring his opposition to a project which would "mar" the "scenic effects."183 
However, he now claimed to see "no reason why the Spray Lakes area should be preserved for 
its scenic value, because to be frank it has very little." Stewart responded to the scattered 
criticism by noting that the Greenfield government of Alberta had now passed resolutions 
supporting the development, and that he "dislike[d] holding up a request from a province."185 
The Albertan reported on Stewart's statement in the House as "a definite surrender of the Spray 
Lakes for Power purposes," which was a premature but not wholly inaccurate assessment.186 
By mid-1925 or 1926, it was clear that the initial stage of the Spray Lakes debate—the 
conflict, as the Toronto Globe put it, between "the urgent advocates of utility and the ardent 
protectors of beauty"187—was drawing to a close, with the power company and its supporters the 
clear victors. In June 1925, the Albertan government of premier Herbert Greenfield, which had 
largely constrained itself to passing resolutions in favour of hydroelectric development and 
expressing informal interest in the prospect of a provincially owned dam (should Calgary Power 
not go ahead with its own), submitted an official application for a license for the Spray Lakes 
site.188 Although this was probably less a genuine initiative to create a public power company 
than a ploy to further its broader campaign of asserting provincial responsibility over natural 
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resources, the provincial intervention had the effect of drawing the Spray Lakes controversy into 
a quite different realm of institutional politics, the ongoing federal-provincial negotiations over 
Albertan natural resources. 
Although Harkin and Walker did not let up in response, these moves did result in some 
resignation on the part of other opponents. Wheeler, who retired from the Alpine Club executive 
in 1926, confessed to Harkin that "the pressure may be too strong to overcome" and suggested 
that "withdrawfing] the area from the Banff National Park" might be the best way to prevent 
i on 
Calgary Power's intrusion from setting a precedent. Some proponents of the dam, too, 
departed for unrelated reasons. William Pearce's output dropped considerably after his 
retirement from the CPR in 1926 (which may have deprived him of a secretary, and certainly of 
an office), and Challies left the Water Power Branch for a private-sector job in Quebec. The 
beleaguered Parks Association attempted to put matters in as positive a light as possible, 
insisting that, even if the Spray Lakes conflict had not been won, the organization had still 
"accomplished its primary object... of bringing the matter directly before the representatives of 
the people."190 
Still, the Parks Branch, the Alpine Club and the Parks Association had clearly failed to 
persuade the Minister of the Interior, Charles Stewart, or the federal government's leadership 
more generally, of their cause. From this point forward, although the Parks Association in 
particular kept up with its active public advocacy against the dam, the Parks Branch was 
privately turning to bureaucratic delay and mitigation tactics, including time-consuming 
negotiation over minimum allowable flow levels on the Spray River. A federal-provincial survey 
of the park's borders, arranged in 1928, was premised on "classifying" regions according to their 
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potential "greatest returns to the nation," with an eye toward identifying "areas where certain 
natural resources indicate that such areas will serve Canada best by being open to industrial 
development."191 Alberta's first Director of Forestry, Ted Blefgen, subsequently explained that 
the compromise was made on the principle that the province should receive from the park "areas 
required for industrial development" or otherwise "unsuitable for park purposes." 
This final stage of the Spray Lakes conflict, from roughly 1926 to 1930, has been 
portrayed as a victory for the Parks Branch's principle of inviolability, insofar as the Parks 
Branch jettisoned the Spray Lakes region in exchange for the passage of a National Parks Act 
which ostensibly guaranteed protection of surviving areas within the park. However, as 
Blefgen's statement implies, this phase of the controversy was not nearly so clear-cut. From 
1922 to 1925, the Parks Branch and its supporters in civil society had maintained that 
development of lakes and rivers for park purposes (namely, camping, fishing, and enjoyment of 
the scenery) was incompatible with development for power purposes. This argument would be 
repeated in the second phase of the Spray Lakes controversy, as well as in a new dispute over 
Lake Minnewanka in 1930. In those cases, however, preservationists and conservationists would 
clash over the significance of the withdrawal of the Spray Lakes from the park: whether this was 
(as it is now commonly interpreted) a final compromise before park lands were confirmed as 
inviolable, or whether it was instead a precedent that commercially valuable lands should by 
definition by removed from the national parks, which in turn could consist only (to borrow a 
I QT 
phrase from a prominent American park historian) of "worthless lands." 
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Chapter Three 
Inviolability or Worthless Lands? The Spray Lakes and Lake Minnewanka, 1925-1931 
Late in the 1920s, the federal, provincial, and municipal governments, as well as the Calgary 
Power Company, the Alpine Club of Canada, and the National Parks Association of Canada, 
came to a compromise which all sides could accept, albeit some with extreme reluctance: the 
Spray Lakes could be dammed, but only after they were removed from Rocky Mountains 
National Park. This excision was formalized as part of the transfer of authority over natural 
resources to the Prairie provinces, and the idea that resources within a national park could not be 
developed by outside commercial interests received legislative affirmation in the National Parks 
Act of 1930. The Parks Act required enabling legislation for any new resource development 
projects, rather than a mere Cabinet order drafted by the Minister of the Interior. What it did not 
confirm, however, was one of the most controversial aspects of the controversy: what precedent 
would be established by the removal of the Spray valley. 
The decision to remove the Spray Lakes represented parks defenders' decisive shift from 
what had been their first priority (defending scenic beauty in the Spray valley) to their second 
(avoiding setting a precedent under which other beauty spots would be similarly jeopardized). 
This precedent became known as the principle of inviolability: that is, that sites within the 
boundaries of national parks could not be commercially exploited for natural resources. 
Historians often adopt a variety of metaphors to describe this alleged victory for the Parks 
Branch. According to Alan MacEachern, the Spray Lakes controversy was "a victory for 
inviolability, demonstrating that when threatened by economic exploitation the Parks Branch 
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would chop off its hand rather than have its whole body infected."1 PearlAnn Reichwein has 
similarly written that "despite its Faustian quality, Harkin's boundary surgery [i.e. the removal of 
the Spray Lakes from Rocky Mountains Park] proved effective in warding off immediate 
industrial encroachment on Banff National Park and placed the principle of inviolability firmly 
in legislation."2 
There are a number of flaws, however, with this understanding of the climax of the dam 
controversies. Despite the superficial attractiveness of vivid metaphors, it is highly misleading to 
claim that the removal of the Spray Lakes, combined with the passage of the National Parks Act, 
was a bold strategy to avoid setting a harmful precedent. Indeed, there are at least three possible 
interpretations of the policy and legislative decisions made between 1926 and 1930. The first is 
the above doctrine of inviolability: that the excision was a strategic ploy by the Parks Branch, 
which demonstrated that it would rather lose the Spray Lakes altogether than permit dam 
construction within a national park. The second is that, in the face of determined opposition by 
the National Parks Branch and public organizations, the Department of the Interior chose image 
over substance, sidestepping the debate over development within parks by removing the Spray 
Lakes from Rocky Mountains Park altogether and simultaneously, it might have hoped, 
removing a controversial issue from the realm of federal political debate. As the Albertan 
premier, John Brownlee, remarked privately in 1926, shifting the burden of responsibility to the 
provincial government might "be of some assistance to your [that is, the federal] Government."3 
The third possibility is less cynical, and similar to the first: that this was a loss for the parks, 
' MacEachern, Natural Selections, 176. MacEachern does note that the extent of inviolability was left somewhat up 
in the air in 1930 - since the removal of the Spray Lakes could be interpreted as meaning that "national parks were 
inviolable until they were needed" - but says the Parks Branch rectified this shortcoming later on, in the creation of 
the Atlantic parks which are the focus of his book. 
2
 Reichwein, "Hands Off," 130. 
3
 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 84 A-2-a, vol. 492, file R39-8, pt 3, Brownlee to Stewart, March 22, 
1926. 
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whose defenders thus admitted that in at least some circumstances they could not legitimately lay 
claim to areas containing valuable and exploitable resources, especially in the form of dammable 
lakes and rivers. W.F. Lothian, in his encyclopedic history of Canada's national parks, seemed to 
give credence to this view when he wrote that the Spray Lakes and other "land which failed to 
meet the new criteria"—that is, land which did not lack exploitable natural resources—were 
removed from the park. 
The above is not mere idle speculation. The fact that Calgary Power waged another 
campaign to acquire Lake Minnewanka in 1930 and 1931 (which was successfully opposed by 
the Parks Branch and the National Parks Association) indicates that at least some participants in 
the Spray Lakes affair did not believe the debate over resource development in parks had ended. 
Indeed, many critics, especially tourism business owners in Banff, still believed that a dammed 
lake within Rocky Mountains Park was preferable to a lake (dammed or otherwise) removed 
from the park. To many, the removal of an attractive region from the park, regardless of the 
reason, was a crushing defeat. 
In addition, the third interpretation —that national parks should not include valuable 
resources—is particularly significant because it echoes the well-known argument put forward by 
Alfred Runte to explain the development of early American national parks policy. Runte's so-
called "worthless lands" thesis holds that "the national park system was allowed to expand 
because most of its units were predominantly worthless from the standpoint of natural 
resources"—or, in the more pithy assessment of John Muir, that "nothing dollarable is safe."5 
The Canadian historiography does not yet possess an argument equivalent to Runte's. Robert 
Craig Brown's important article "The Doctrine of Usefulness" might, in one sense, be read as 
4
 W.F. Lothian, History of Canada's National Parks (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1976), 1.30. 
5
 Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, 2nd edition (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1987), 64. 
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advancing a similar perspective. Indeed, both Brown and Runte essentially argued that early 
parks policy prioritized economic growth over nature preservation, the former by arguing that 
Canadian parks willingly did stuff.6 However, at least until the 1910s (as the first chapter has 
shown), resource development within Canadian national parks was generally considered quite 
acceptable. It was only in the new water controversies of the 1920s that Canadian debates over 
national parks policy began to envision a future for parks without resource development. In 
1930, it was the third interpretation—that the removal of the Spray Lakes was a precedent which 
should lead to the removal of other valuable lands—which Calgary Power advanced, and which 
tourism-oriented Banff business groups most feared. 
The second key problem relates, once again, to the motivations of groups within the parks 
movement. The second chapter has already demonstrated that many defenders of the Spray 
Lakes did not believe they were protecting pristine wilderness, especially for its own sake, so 
much as the locale's scenic beauty and rich trout fishery, for the benefit of human visitors. This, 
in turn, calls into question what precise mix of motivations was at work in 1930 and 1931, as 
well. Moreover, the fact that Lake Minnewanka became the subject of a controversy at all 
requires some explanation, given one obvious factor to which none of the published work on the 
subject has devoted serious attention: by 1930, Lake Minnewanka was already an artificial 
storage reservoir. Every year, since 1912, Calgary Power had drained the lake over the autumn 
and winter, and then, under the formal but ineffectual supervision of the Water Powers Branch, 
refilled it over the spring and early summer.7 This put the Parks Branch, the Alpine Club of 
Canada, the National Parks Association of Canada, and—at times—the Banff Advisory Council 
in the curious position of defending from exploitation a lake which had already been exploited, 
6
 Brown, "The Doctrine of Usefulness," 100. 
7
 Problems with refilling the lake on schedule were commonplace; for more information, see chapter 1. 
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and in a manner which, given their reasoning, should have already ruined it from a scenic 
perspective. In this way, at least, the 1930-1931 Minnewanka controversy may be more 
fascinating than the earlier Spray Lakes controversy. 
Where the first phase of the Spray Lakes controversy was concerned with the importance 
of protecting beauty spots and fisheries in national parks, then, the second phase was over 
precedent—specifically, what sort of precedent would be set by the development of the Spray 
Lakes. Indeed, between 1926 and 1931, the principle of inviolability was only part of the 
rationale for removing the Spray Lakes from Rocky Mountains Park. Following the entry of the 
provincial government into the Spray Lakes controversy, the federal government accepted the 
principle that resource exploitation could only occur outside of the parks, but also accepted the 
principle that, on these grounds, exploitable regions should be removed from the parks; this led 
to renewed controversy over the fate of the Lake Minnewanka reservoir near Banff. 
After 1925, some of the major participants in the Spray Lakes debate withdrew. Harkin's 
long-time bureaucratic rival, John Bow Challies, left the public service for a position at a 
Montreal engineering company. William Pearce retired from the CPR and seemingly reduced his 
output of written material, probably as a result of losing his office and secretary (although this is 
difficult to know for certain, because some files potentially containing correspondence from this 
period has gone missing).8 Most importantly, Arthur Wheeler, co-founder of the Alpine Club of 
Canada and one of the leading figures behind the National Parks Association of Canada, also 
began to limit his involvement, after simultaneously retiring from the executive committee of the 
E. Alyn Mitchner, "William Pearce and Federal Government Activity in Western Canada, 1882-1904," PhD 
dissertation, University of Alberta, 1971,11.103. 
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Alpine Club and abandoning his Mt. Assiniboine Walking Tour operation. He was "too old now 
to supply the energy needed," he told Parks Association treasurer Andrew Sibbald.9 
Whether Wheeler had any reason other than his increasing age to retire is unknown. With 
a strange degree of bitterness, he declared that he did not wish the Alpine Club to take over the 
Mt. Assiniboine campground it was leasing to him, since it would "go to ruin... as the O'Hara lot 
has done."10 Although he had once denounced the monopolization of the parks by the wealthy 
and those who catered exclusively to the latter, Wheeler now made arrangements to transfer the 
lease to the Marquis Nicholas degli Albizzi of Lake Placid, New York. He promised the 
executive of the Alpine Council that Albizzi intended only "the personal enjoyment of himself 
and his friends," although the latter had actually given Wheeler the much more equivocal 
promise that "any commercial aspect of the trips" would not "detract from [his] personal 
satisfaction of engaging in them."1' Transferring the campground to "a wild bunch" of wealthy 
"'dude' mountaineers" betrayed the "true Alpine spirit," one section chairman protested, but the 
sale went ahead.12 Albizzi opened a commercial lodge, fell into poor health, and then sublet the 
property to the Brewsters.13 
Although Wheeler, Pearce, and Challies played diminished roles after 1925, this chapter 
does draw to a much greater extent on the actual residents of Banff. Canadian park historians 
have often paid very little attention to park residents; Reichwein and Bella ignore them almost 
completely, although MacEachern's analysis of the Atlantic parks is far more satisfying in this 
regard.14 Possibly this is because Canadian park historians have derived much of their research 
9
 Whyte Museum of the Canadian Rockies (WMCR), M200/AC 00M/124, Wheeler to Sibbald, January 19, 1927. 
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n
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agenda from American historiography; certainly, in both countries, the literature on removal of 
residents, particularly Aboriginal peoples, is much better developed.15 It may simply reflect a 
lack of source material outside of Banff, or doubts that the residents of Banff played a 
substantive enough role to be included in what remains a largely institution-centered 
historiography. Both PearlAnn Reichwein and Christopher Taylor have argued that "the history 
of Canada's national parks has focused most frequently on the dual agencies of the state and 
commerce, yet the parks were also shaped by their users."16 However, one can easily add that the 
early parks must also have been shaped by their residents. 
Producing a comprehensive history of Banff would be a project in itself (some start on 
which has been made by local historians like Eleanor Luxton and E.J. Hart).17 For the present 
purpose, I have turned only to the easiest sources to recover, those of the business community, as 
represented by the town council (the Banff Board of Trade from 1912 to 1915, and subsequently 
the Advisory Council of the Banff Citizen's Association) and the local newspaper, the Crag & 
Canyon. The Council was dominated by local businessmen such as James Brewster and 
Norman Luxton (who also, significantly, ran the newspaper).19 Both institutions were usually 
concerned more with local issues, like electricity rates, zoning, street lights, expelling "Asiatics" 
15
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and "laborers of Latin origin," and jealously guarding Banff's share of the parks budget from the 
"reckless ogre to the north," Jasper National Park.20 When they did venture opinions on issues of 
national parks policy, however, their attitude towards the Parks Branch—seen as the unelected 
arbiter of town administration—was usually hostile. The paper regularly denounced "the J.F. 
[sic] Harkin rule," which it said left Banff "more helpless... than any subject of the late Czar of 
Russia." During one particularly low point in relations, it reported, "J.B. Harkin, Commissioner 
of Parks, is registered at the Banff Springs Hotel"—then sarcastically added, "who the hell 
cares?"21 
Initially, the residents seem to have been divided on the benefits of the Spray Lakes 
scheme. As Reichwein notes, the Citizens' Assembly passed a resolution in 1922 declaring its 
99 
opposition to "the spoilation [sic] of the Spray Lake area by private corporations." While this is 
sufficient for Reichwein to categorize the Citizens' Assembly as a "proconservation" group, it 
reversed its position shortly thereafter, instead calling on the Department of the Interior to 
9^ 
authorize "the construction of the Spray Lakes reservoir." The latter resolution, it now 
declared, had been an "erroneous statement" which it wished to see "corrected."24 A petition, 
20
 WMCR, M212/1, Banff Board of Trade minutes, January 5, 1914, 28-29, and October 11, 1921, 92; and Crag & 
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supposedly signed by the whole of "the business section of Banff," was circulated in 1926 and 
handed to George Webster, the former Calgary mayor who had resigned and entered provincial 
politics.25 
The Citizens' Association did not explain the reasons for the reversal, though they may 
be inferred from other Banff institutions. The Crag & Canyon, which never wavered in its 
support for the dam, declared that the Spray valley was "full of muskeg, nigger heads and old 
burnt stumps,... [and] breeds uncountable numbers of mosquitoes and flies." It anticipated that 
"the raising of these waters would lend much to the beauty of the surrounding mountains," and 
found it "hard to understand why certain cliques at Ottawa... can be so out of balance and time 
with what Alberta is starving for." In general, and understandably, the Banff business 
community was rarely concerned with settlement or development within the parks, lobbying the 
government in favour of house construction outside existing townsites (which the Parks Branch 
opposed) and even opposing an expansion of Jasper park southward in 1927 on the grounds that 
it would eliminate a lucrative hunting ground.27 The Crag & Canyon had an uneasy relationship 
with certain elements of nature, declaring, for instance, that the deer and elk populations had 
grown large enough to be distracting, and even dangerous to children. It was less willing to 
compromise, however, when development might reduce the size of the "army of tourists" which 
annually invaded the "enchanting fastnesses of nature" surrounding Banff.29 If the Citizens' 
Association was persuaded that the scenic beauty of the Spray valley was not endangered, it is 
unsurprising that it supported the project. 
Crag & Canyon, December 31, 1926. 
Crag & Canyon, December 24, 1926, and December 10, 1926. 
Crag & Canyon, August 9, 1924, and May 6, 1927. 
Crag & Canyon, December 28, 1923. 
Crag & Canyon, June 23, 1923. 
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The other major shift in the Spray Lakes controversy to occur in the mid-1920s was the 
decidedly more active role taken up by the provincial United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) 
government, under Herbert Brownlee and then (after 1925) his successor, John Greenfield. 
Greenfield had been peripherally involved since 1923, when he sent a telegram to interior 
minister Charles Stewart urging him to exercise "careful consideration" in making a judgement 
about the Spray Lakes.30 He spent New Year's Day, 1924, in Ottawa, where he first seems to 
have raised with Stewart the possibility of Alberta developing a publicly owned power utility, 
which would take on the Spray Lakes as its first project. In 1925, the province finally filed its 
own application to develop the site, following the commissioning of a panel of engineers— 
drawn from the country's leading public power utility, the Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission 
(OHEC)—to compare the costs of the Spray Lakes dam with an equivalent coal plant (not 
surprisingly, the hydroelectric engineers favoured the dam). 
The Greenfield government had difficulty, however, convincing even the media in 
Alberta that its offer to develop the Spray Lakes site was genuine. The OHEC made clear that the 
government could not feasibly press ahead on the Spray Lakes scheme alone—to be financially 
feasible, it had to be operated "supplementary to the present plant... of the Calgary Power 
Company"—meaning either the latter would have to develop Spray Lakes, or the provincial 
government would have to buy the company. The Lethbridge Herald counseled that it was 
"absurd" to think the "chimerical scheme" at the Spray Lakes was more deserving of government 
attention than "roads impassable and wanting repair" or "children... lacking the facilities of 
30
 LAC, RG 84 A-2-a, vol. 491, file R39-5, pt 3, Greenfield to Stewart, March 29, 1923. 
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education."34 The Crag & Canyon dismissed the notion that the federal government would "let 
the people have this water - IF - the province of Alberta spends the money to develop it" as an 
outright rejection of the proposal: "the Hon. gentleman knows very well the province has not the 
money to spend, so it is just another way of refusing." Even the Calgary Albertan, which 
between 1923 and 1925 was receptive to the idea of a public electrical utility, warned that the 
province could not delay committing to the Spray Lakes if it meant "prevent[ing] development 
by private corporation" in the meantime.3 
The media's skepticism arose in part from the observation that the Spray Lakes power 
controversy was being subsumed into a larger political conflict—that over the transfer of control 
over natural resources from the Dominion government to the Prairie conferences. In theory, the 
Canadian Constitution granted exclusive control over natural resources to the provinces; 
however, the legislation which created the Prairie provinces reserved these powers for the federal 
government. All three negotiated transfers of control during the 1920s. In Alberta, negotiations 
dragged out from 1925 to 1930, with the Edmonton government obstinately insisting that "the 
Province should control water power developments in [the] Province," including those within 
national parks. Although the Spray Lakes were never central to the resources transfer issue, the 
provincial government's involvement meant that it would be difficult to determine the future of 
the former without resolving the latter. 
To this end, Greenfield insisted that the federal government deal only with the province 
T O 
over the Spray Lakes. As he explained to the legislature when tabling the OHEC report, 
34
 Lethbridge Herald, August 9, 1923. The Edmonton Bulletin, February 18, 1925, reached a similar judgement, 
adding that a public utility was a poor policy choice if "Calgary and... southern Alberta would appear to be the sole 
beneficiaries." 
35
 Crag & Canyon, December 18, 1925. 
36
 Calgary Albertan, January 14, 1925. 
37
 LAC, RG 84 A-2-a, vol. 492, file R39-8, pt 3, Greenfield to Stewart, August 25, 1925. 
38
 Edmonton Bulletin, April 9, 1925. 
119 
"should the [provincial] Government then decide it is not advisable to proceed with this project 
as a public enterprise, it reserves the right to grant the water power rights to the Calgary Power 
Company."39 Greenfield's successor as premier and United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) leader, 
John Brownlee, maintained a similar position, declaring in a private letter that "Alberta should be 
placed in a position of equality with the other Provinces."40 In 1928, with no apparent progress 
made, he exclaimed publicly, "we have been fighting for five years to safeguard the water 
rights... [T]urn over the rights to us now and let us negotiate with the company."41 
Refusing to play into the province's hands, Stewart repeatedly insisted that the province 
must declare "whether... [they] plan to undertake the development themselves" before he issued 
them a license.42 The resulting stalemate—in which Stewart and Brownlee were each prepared to 
authorize Calgary Power to dam the Spray Lakes, but only on the condition that the other was 
stripped of any role in the decision—was useful for the Parks Branch, but failed to impress 
observers in Calgary. "We do not get much farther on by such contention," observed the Herald, 
which maintained that "Calgary is not concerned about the manner of developing this power 
project," and both levels of government with "altogether too much shillyshallying about the 
Spray Lakes power project."43 The Albertan, too, denounced the "faint hearted government" for 
its "lack of courage in dealing with important things," calling for it to declare its intentions 
immediately and thus eliminate further "uncertainty and postpones and delays." The municipal 
government, too, grew impatient and exasperated. Mayor George Webster wrote to Stewart 
insisting that since "we are unable to get anything definite from the... Provincial Government," 
39
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the Ministry of the Interior should go ahead and deal with the power company as it had originally 
intended.45 
An opportunity for the province to achieve its resource transfer victory arose in 1925 with 
the idea that the Spray Lakes be removed from Rocky Mountains National Park. Although 
afterwards officials—and, later, historians—insisted that the proposal was rooted in the doctrine 
of inviolability (that natural resource exploitation could not occur within parks), it is somewhat 
difficult to ascertain where the idea first arose, or why. In March 1925, Wheeler suggested to 
Harkin that since "the pressure [at Spray Lakes] may be too strong to overcome," the Branch 
should consider agreeing to "withdraw the area from the Banff National Park" in order to "avoid 
the precedent" of development within the park.46 This seems to be the first written reference to 
the idea of jettisoning the Spray from the park, but Wheeler wrote as though this solution would 
be a capitulation to an existing demand, not an innovation. 
Regardless of its origins, the idea of removing the Spray Lakes from the park appealed to 
more than just Wheeler or Harkin, seeking to advance their principle of inviolability. It also held 
considerable promise for Alberta, which would assume control over any areas thus jettisoned 
from Banff—and to the Calgary Power Company, which still stood as the sole serious candidate 
to dam the valley. In May 1927, Brownlee and Stewart agreed to commission a "resurvey," with 
an eye to reducing park territory and ceding control of territory thus freed up to the province. 
Since Alberta was simultaneously negotiating for control over natural resources in provincial 
territory, the eventual result would be that the province would be involved in authorizing the 
dam, rather than simply the federal Ministry of the Interior. Dominion Lands Surveyor Robert 
W. Cautley was chosen to lead the survey, with assistance from a provincial representative, L.C. 
45
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Charlesworth. Cautley was not a public participant in the Spray Lakes affair, and so his personal 
feelings on the subject are unknown, though he did collaborate with Wheeler on the B.C.-Alberta 
boundary survey, one of the last projects of Wheeler's long government career.48 Charlesworth's 
views are better known; he was the head of the Alberta Irrigation Council, and in 1923 had 
written of the Spray valley that "if the effect of power development were ten times as bad as 
people were alleging, the enormous benefits to be derived from it would still make it worth 
while."49 
Christopher Gainor, the only historian to write in some detail about the Cautley survey 
thus far, sees it as a stalling effort while the more important federal-provincial negotiations were 
worked out, and attributes its genesis to "political trade-offs between the federal and Alberta 
governments."50 However, the report may also be viewed from another perspective: as an 
important step in the re-conceptualization of national parks as free of resource exploitation, 
either because they must be preserved inviolate (as the Parks Branch held) or because, as the 
survey suggested (and in accordance with Runte's American "worthless lands" thesis), they 
should not contain resource-rich regions in the first place. 
What precise parameters Cautley was given in advance are unclear, although Brownlee 
had in mind a project which would "safeguard, as far possible, the scenic beauty o f the parks 
while freeing up resource-rich areas for development by the province.51 The Crag & Canyon 
heard "whispers" which accurately characterized the conclusions of the Cautley survey— 
removal of the Spray Lakes region, Canmore, Exshaw, and Kananaskis country from the park— 
48
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in June 1927. Rumours soon afterward reached Selby Walker, at the Parks Association, that the 
company and the government had reached "an assurance or arrangement of some sort regarding 
the Spray Lakes."53 Cautley's own characterization of his agenda was to "classify" regions of the 
park "on the basis of their being used for such purposes as shall yield the greatest returns to the 
nation." Some areas were most valuable for their "scenic, recreational, and educational 
characteristics," he explained—in which case, "there can be no doubt that their natural and 
proper place is in national parks." Other areas, however, contained valuable natural resources, 
and "such areas will serve Canada best by being open to industrial development."54 This, he 
argued, proceeded from the principle that "any area within the parks in which it is proposed to 
permit industrial development of any kind should first be excluded from the parks before such 
permission is granted."55 Harkin actually downplayed the significance of these parameters, 
writing in his annual report that Cautley was merely seeking out "regions less outstanding from 
the scenic point of view." 
The final report contained a number of recommendations involving both Jasper and Banff 
parks, and extending beyond the immediate context of the Spray Lakes dispute to include 
discussion of forestry as well. However, the core findings of the report were precisely those 
which the Albertan and federal governments had expected in 1927: the removal of the Spray 
Lakes basin, Canmore, Exshaw, and the Ghost River watershed, along with some "secondary 
52
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mountain country" in southern Jasper National Park which he thought might have "possibilities 
of... lumbering, mining, or grazing." In early 1928, Brownlee and Stewart met to discuss the 
Cautley survey and issued a public statement confirming that "when Alberta's resources are 
C O 
returned, the Spray Lakes will automatically pass to the control of the province." The following 
day, Stewart wrote Calgary MP H.B. Adshead, confirming that the Spray Lakes "will be 
excluded from the park" on the basis of the Cautley survey.59 
The removal of the Spray Lakes from the park provided an appealing precedent for two 
different groups—pro-development forces in Alberta, and park movement activists who saw 
promise in a precedent that lands within parks could not be developed. However, it did so by 
offering two potentially different precedents, one of which defined national parks as 
economically worthless lands and thus jeopardized any other park territory found to be resource-
rich—precisely the opposite of the inviolability precedent which the parks movement was 
attempting to establish. The business-dominated Banff Citizens' Association, which had 
previously favoured development, was disturbed by the prospect of the government "throw[ing] 
the Spray site out of the parks area." Luxton, and by extension, the Crag & Canyon, was 
furious that "a large slice of the Park... [including] the Spray Lakes,... Canmore and Exshaw, and 
all the Kananaskis Lake and river Valley Country will be thrown out of the Park." With 
characteristic fervour, the newspaper declared that "Stewart, Harkins [sic] and his entire Park 
Staff at Ottawa should die, but apparently the Gods do not want them and the Devil won't have 
anything to do with them." The maneuver was, the paper thundered, "more criminal" than 
anything else "in the whole of Park history." Not only would the lakes themselves be lost, but the 
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reduction in park boundaries meant that "a country now covered with game" would be subjected 
to an "act of smashing destruction." Even outside of Banff, not all dam opponents were 
persuaded that establishing the inviolability precedent was worth the cost. The Prince Albert 
Daily Herald mourned the "loss of these beautiful lakes in their setting of towering mountain 
ranges,... the best fishing lakes in the park, and a wide expanse of mountain area thickly 
populated by mountain game." It called upon "the people of Canada" to protest "through every 
medium... the granting of further concessions to the commercial interests."62 
In the meantime, as the Cautley survey and its aftermath dominated political discussion, 
Harkin was playing out other delaying tactics, which ranged from the genuinely substantive to 
the surprisingly petty. In the latter category must be placed his response to Stewart's request for 
a draft letter asking premier Greenfield whether he was "seriously considering... a Provincial 
undertaking" at the Spray Lakes.63 The letter was intended to establish whether the federal 
government should negotiate with the provincial government or with Calgary Power. Cheekily, 
Harkin instead prepared a lengthy letter explaining that coal was more cost-effective than 
hydroelectricity and listing a large number of organizations who "are strongly of the opinion that 
the value of Rocky Mountains Park as a tourist resort far outweighs any gain that would result 
from the proposed power development"—before finally, in the last paragraph, asking "whether it 
is the intention of your Government to go ahead [with] the... scheme as a Provincial 
undertaking."64 The letter was not sent; presumably, the minister had a more agreeable letter 
prepared for him by another official. 
Crag & Canyon, June 3, 1927. 
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A more promising delaying tactic presented itself in 1928, following the publication of 
the Cautley report and the agreement to remove the Spray Lakes from the park. Although the 
Parks Branch would lose authority over the lakes themselves, Harkin successfully persuaded 
Stewart that it retained an interest in their management because of its residual right to control 
water levels in the Spray River, which did enter the park before flowing into the Bow River at 
Banff. Harkin maintained that the Spray River must have a flow of at least 500 cubic feet per 
second during the summer months—about two-thirds of its normal summer flow. Tourists 
expected to see "a fine flowing stream," Harkin explained to the Calgary mayor in 1928, and 
anything less would be too "small when compared with the natural flow of the river."66 In other 
correspondence, he added that sufficient water would also aid in fire protection, and "preserve 
fishing in the river."67 In early 1928, Stewart informed Brownlee that, in accordance with the 
Cautley survey, the Dominion would concede the Spray Lakes region, but insisted that in 
exchange, the province surrender its claim to water power rights within the remainder of the 
park, and allow "sufficient water" levels in the Spray River "to assure preservation of the scenic 
beauty."68 
Stewart's demand was far higher than the company's counter-offer, which was just 150-
200 second-feet.69 Osborne, probably on the basis of communication with the company, put 
forward the same figure, insisting to Stewart that it would be enough to "maintain the scenic 
beauty." The Herald interviewed a number of Calgary artists, and printed comments from those 
who favoured its position—including one who went so far as to opine that even at just 50 cubic 
LAC, RG 84 A-2-a, vol. 492, file R39-8, pt 7, Stewart to Carlyle, September 6, 1928. 
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Edmonton Bulletin, March 8, 1928. 
Calgary Daily Herald, October 13, 1928. 
LAC, RG 84 A-2-a, vol. 492, file R39-8, pt 6, Osborne to Stewart, June 7, 1928. 
feet per second, the Spray River would still add value to the park as a "pleasant brook." In 
April 1928, Stewart met with Gaherty from Calgary Power to discuss the matter. As he later 
informed Brownlee, Gaherty was "the only person who has made a searching analysis of the 
power economics of the Spray project." Gaherty found the 500 second-feet requirement 
unacceptable, saying this would "render the project unsound" and that "in such case... [he] had 
79 
no further interest in the Spray Lakes development." Stewart indicated he would fall as low as 
350 second-feet, but to Gaherty this was still far too high.73 
Armstrong, Evenden, and Nelles go so far as to claim that Calgary Power's bid for the 
Spray Lakes "collapsed" and ended when these river flow negotiations stalled during 1928 and 
1929.7 This is only partially true, however. The urgency of the company's case had certainly 
eased, following construction of a new plant on the Ghost River.75 However, it seems relatively 
unlikely that the Ministry of the Interior, having lost the Spray valley itself, would be able to 
defend successfully, against sustained pressure, its argument that park rights to downstream 
scenery required 500 cubic second-feet of flow from a site that now lay outside of the park. The 
Spray Lakes site was eventually fully developed, after the Second World War. In 1929, however, 
Calgary Power was already shifting its sights to a new and more appealing target—Lake 
Minnewanka. 
In the meantime, the federal government moved ahead with the other prong of its parks 
and resources strategy. In early 1930, the King government passed two of its last pieces of major 
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legislation, the National Parks Act and the National Resources Transfer Act (which confirmed 
the transfer of control over natural resources to the provincial government). The Parks Act 
legislated a large number of reforms, including changing the name of Rocky Mountains Park to 
Banff National Park, but its most important clause for the present discussion was a requirement 
that any future resource development projects be authorized through specific enabling 
legislation, rather than—as was previously the case—a mere Cabinet order. "No responsible 
Government at Ottawa will ever shoulder the odium incurred by such a bill," the Manitoba Free 
Press announced confidently.76 The Parks Association similarly enthused that "the day of the 
77 
secret Order-in-Council jeopardising our parks is over." This clause was a powerful tool for the 
Parks Branch, which at times in the 1930s claimed it could prevent even survey work from 
78 
occurring in the absence of an enabling act. 
The Parks Act was—at least for anti-dam groups—a welcome intrusion into what was 
already shaping up to be a second round of the Banff dam conflict. In December 1929, Calgary 
Power submitted a new application, this one for its existing storage reservoir, Lake Minnewanka. 
The new proposal included a new 42-foot dam, and a channel which would divert the north 
7Q 
branch of the Ghost River into Lake Minnewanka. The application left open the possibility of a 
generating station at Lake Minnewanka, although this was not strictly necessary: the new 
reservoir's primary function would still be storage, in order to regulate power generation at the 
company's downstream plants. 
Manitoba Free Press, July 2, 1930. 
77
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There are a number of reasons why Calgary Power might find a new application for Lake 
Minnewanka—and the new struggle with parks groups which predictably resulted—more 
appealing than pressing ahead with its Spray Lakes scheme. The new dam on Lake Minnewanka 
was decidedly less ambitious than the massive Spray Lakes project—meaning the company 
would gain less production capacity, but could get it at a much lower cost. This was particularly 
appealing given the increasingly pessimistic economic outlook of late 1929 and early 1930. By 
the same token, the economic downturn gave Calgary Power another powerful weapon with 
which to apply leverage to the Ministry of the Interior: as the Calgary Albertan noted, dam 
construction meant hundreds of jobs and therefore represented a "possible solution of the 
unemployment problem."80 Later, called upon to explain the decision, Gaherty wrote that "the 
Spray site is an excellent one, but even the initial development would be costly and could not be 
made full use of for some years, and would in consequence impose an excessive financial 
burden."81 
Initially, Calgary Power's proposal was flatly rejected by Stewart, who informed the 
company and the Calgary government that he was not prepared to approve a new project at Lake 
Minnewanka while his ministry was still finalizing the resource transfer negotiations and the 
removal of the Spray Lakes from the park.82 He informed the newly elected mayor of Calgary, 
Andrew Davison, that it would be "impossible" for him to "consider any further applications for 
water power development within park boundaries." Defensively, he maintained that "I have 
Calgary Albertan, December 20, 1929. Employment also figured prominently in a letter by Calgary mayor 
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consistently endeavoured to facilitate the development of cheap power for the people of 
Alberta," and to that end "Spray lakes will be placed outside the Park boundaries."83 
Stewart may have hoped that his swift announcement would end the matter; instead, 
however, it was the beginnings of a new controversy. Selby Walker, director of the Parks 
Association, warned Stewart that the decision to remove Spray Lakes from the park had merely 
delayed the eventual point of decision: eventually, either "many other hydro sites will be 
required..., or the Company will be forced to the logical and cheaper development of power by 
steam."84 The Calgary Board of Trade wrote to the Ministry of the Interior noting the city's need 
for "an ample supply of electric power at low cost." As it had done in the 1920s with respect to 
the Spray Lakes, the Board of Trade professed its "interest in the preservation and use of our 
National Parks, particularly Rocky Mountains" Park, but assured the government that "the 
additional water stored will not in the least mar the beauty of the lake."85 The Banff Advisory 
Council, too, declared its support, although this was conditional on assurances "that the 
scenery... be not unduly interfered with." One engineer contracted by Calgary Power to assess 
the lake, T.H. Hogg, opined that "in the interests of conservation full use should be made of the 
water supply available," and that there would be no "objection from the scenic standpoint so long 
as proper measures are taken in clearing the flooded land" (which the company had failed to do 
on the same lake in 1912).87 
As had occurred at the Spray Lakes, opponents of the new dam proposal did stress the 
damage to scenery and diminished value to visitors which a new dam would cause. "Can anyone 
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seriously believe," asked the Winnipeg Free Press rhetorically, "that the appearance of these 
mud flats around the whole shore lie of the lake during a great part of the summer season would 
not mar the beauty of the lake?"88 Calgary, Walker declared, had been "bamboozled into 
agitating for a 50 ft. dam which very few tourists will ever climb for the pleasure of looking into 
a half empty reservoir." Interestingly, few, if any, outside of the Parks Branch even attempted 
to explain how to relate their positions to the fact that Minnewanka was already an artificial lake, 
which was allowed to fill each spring in time for tourist season. 
However, the Minnewanka controversy even more than the earlier Spray Lakes 
controversy involved concerns over precedent. "Several bites have already been taken out of the 
Banff park," observed the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix. "If another bite is to be allowed every time a 
power company so desires, the park will not be a playground but a hive of industry in twenty or 
thirty years."90 The Prince Albert Daily Herald reached a similar judgement: "not satisfied 
with... alienating Spray and Kananaskis Lakes, the finest fishing region in Rocky Mountain 
National Park,... greedy power interests of Calgary... are reaching out for Lake Minnewanka, 
nine miles from Banff, and the beautiful mountain village renowned in the four corners of the 
world is itself in danger."91 
At the Parks Branch, needless to say, the Calgary Power proposal was also poorly 
perceived. When the Spray Lakes submissions arrived in the early 1920s, Harkin had claimed 
that the company was attempting to "to mix up the Spray and the Minnewanka schemes."92 The 
new application, he felt, vindicated his suspicions: given the "tremendous propaganda and 
agitation carried on in connection with the Spray during the past seven years, it does seem 
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extraordinary that when the Spray is practically available the Calgary Power Co. is now turning 
its eyes on Lake Minnewanka and ignoring the Spray." The Spray Lakes proposal was now 
revealed as the mere "forerunner of a super-scheme" involving multiple projects along the Bow, 
which were being "introduced on the excuse of relief for winter unemployment."94 There could 
be "no excuse for even asking for Minnewanka so long as the Spray is available." 
Harkin laid out the position of the Parks Branch in a pair of memoranda handed to his 
deputy minister in March and April 1930. "Any storage scheme at Minnewanka will wreck it 
from a scenic standpoint," Harkin declared, noting that his Branch based this belief "on its own 
experience with the present 12 foot Minnewanka dam." Lake Minnewanka had not been 
eliminated from the park by the Cautley "resurvey": this, Harkin declared, was an implicit 
recognition by both federal and provincial governments that the lake was "more important for 
Parks purposes than for Power."96 It was "very short-sighted," Harkin concluded, "for a people 
to destroy or damage some unrivalled or irreplaceable creation of Nature for some alleged 
immediate gain." Again, Harkin did not attempt to explain how Minnewanka simultaneously 
remained an "irreplaceable creation of Nature" under threat, and a ruin of its former self, thanks 
to the 12-foot dam installed in 1912. What he probably placed more stock in was his appeal to 
"the principle of inviolability," which had to be upheld so that there was a "real difference 
between [parks] and the surrounding territory open to commercial utilization." 
Harkin was playing a dangerous game, however. There was nothing about the Cautley 
survey which necessarily made it the final word on the comparative value of resource 
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development and park use, and an enabling act (as required by the National Parks Act) was a 
more serious legislative hurtle for Calgary Power to vault than a mere Order-in-Council. 
Nevertheless, the latter was merely a difficult obstacle, not an insurmountable one, and so the 
prospect remained that the precedent which would be set was not that lands in national parks 
could not be exploited through natural resource development, but rather that such lands could not 
be exploited until they were removed from the parks. Harkin strayed even closer to this position 
himself later in the year, when he wrote that "there should be within parks only such areas as 
are... more valuable for parks purposes than for any other purposes," and that "if it should be 
found that parks did contain areas more suitable for ordinary commercial utilization than for 
parks purposes, then... [the government] should eliminate them from the parks."99 
It was certainly more difficult to remove Lake Minnewanka from the park than the Spray 
Lakes—less because of respect for the sanctity of the storage reservoir than because of its 
popularity with tourists. Nevertheless, the immediate reaction from federal politicians to Calgary 
Power's proposal was still somewhat favourable. In June 1930, Stewart reversed his earlier 
dismissal of the project and told an audience in Calgary that he would consider removing 
Minnewanka from the park, on the same grounds that the Spray had been removed, once he was 
convinced that it would remain a "playground" under provincial supervision, adding that "the 
provincial authority is not insensible to the desirability of preserving beauty spots."100 He 
repeated this assertion in July, during the election campaign which ultimately ousted the King 
government.101 
King was ousted by the Conservative Party under R.B. Bennett, who not only had co-
founded Calgary Power decades before (along with Maxwell Aitken, later Lord Beaverbrook) 
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but represented a Calgary constituency. In September 1930, Calgary Power attempted to 
capitalize on the potential sympathy of the new government—by submitting a new application 
for Lake Minnewanka, this one to the new Conservative Minister of the Interior T.G. Murphy. 
Under the Spray Lakes precedent, Harkin explained in a briefing document for Murphy, 
resource-rich areas could be removed from national parks so that development could commence. 
However, he claimed, Minnewanka had not been covered by the Cautley survey, which 
implicitly meant that it had been recognized as one of those areas where park value exceeded 
resource value. As for the existing dam on Lake Minnewanka, it was "an experiment, made at a 
time when probably nobody realized the importance of the principle involved."103 The Parks 
Association, too, wrote to the new government expressing its "amazement" at the "contemplated 
grab of part of a park area which belongs equally to all Canadians," and urging a firm, immediate 
rejection by the new Minister of the Interior. 
The new Bennett government, however, initially seemed disposed to support the 
application. One of the first groups Bennett chose to speak to regarding the Minnewanka 
proposal was the Calgary Board of Trade—a group which ardently supported the new dam. 
After Calgary Power filed its revised application, Murphy promised to submit it to Cabinet "at 
the earliest possible date" and then to present an act to Parliament for approval in 1931.106 Even 
more importantly, there is some evidence that Bennett targeted one of the most outspoken 
opponents of the project, the Alpine Club—which still depended on its annual federal grant. In 
late August, a member of the club executive in Calgary, Hector Allan, reported being "worked 
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over" by one of Bennett's local supporters, Board of Trade president Harry Ross. Ross allegedly 
told him that "opposition to the Calgary Power Company would certainly mean... [that] all 
favours from the Government would forever cease." Calgary Power was using "their big club 
most unfairly," complained Walker.107 Whether Ross was speaking for Bennett or simply for 
himself is unknown, though the Club's grant was cancelled after it decided to speak out 
I OS 
anyways, resulting in considerable financial hardship. 
At the same time, the notion that Lake Minnewanka—just miles from Banff, and at the 
time one of the park's most popular lakes—might be removed from the park altogether, based on 
the Spray Lakes precedent, was enough to persuade many residents of Banff to reconsider their 
support. The councilman who put forward the motion, James Brewster, announced in May that 
he had "acted hastily" and now wished to retract the resolution and instead demand more 
information from both the federal government and the power company about whether the 
reservoir would be removed from the park prior to development. The result was that the 
Council passed new resolutions expressing its concern and demanding information from the 
Parks Branch.110 Somewhat dubiously, Luxton explained via the Crag & Canyon that the 
Council's earlier support for the bid had only been given because they had "not thought... the 
department would... consent to it" anyways. ' 
In the pages of the Crag & Canyon, Luxton and his editor, Eugene Duncan, unleashed a 
remarkable torrent of invective against corporate political influence in general, and Calgary 
Power's influence in particular. Lake Minnewanka was said to be a "the biggest asset... within 
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the Park boundaries, and is worth far more to the citizens in its present stage than it is to the 
Calgary Power Company... as a power site."112 Calgary Power, Luxton declared, was "a soulless 
corporation" which had "remained in the background, coaching its henchmen" on various 
municipal councils and boards of trade, engaging in "a well-thought-out scheme" to "obtain a... 
strangle hold on the people of the province." Stewart's endorsement of the company's new bid 
was derided as "one of the smallest pieces of vote-catching ever attempted" and as a foolish 
attempt by a "petty politician" to "barter away without any consideration" a vital component of 
the "playground of the people of Canada."114 The newspaper also reportedly favourably on the 
Alpine Club and Parks Association annual meetings, held consecutively at Maligne Lake in 
Jasper National Park, which passed resolutions demanding that "the present suggestion that the 
Lake Minnewanka area be taken out of the Banff National Park not be acceded to." The Crag & 
Canyon agreed that Banff was already "the most congested tourist district," and thus was not 
amenable to "any further cutting down."115 In September, the Advisory Council even organized a 
local plebiscite, the results of which were that "the majority [of Banff residents] are against using 
Lake Minnewanka as a storage reservoir only" due to the risk of "unsightly mud flats," but did 
favour "the larger scheme of... the erection of a high head power plant within the park 
boundaries."116 To the residents of Banff, another power development was preferable to losing 
Lake Minnewanka altogether. 
Given the significance of the dispute, the anticlimactic nature of its resolution in 1931 is 
almost disappointing. As early as October 1930, Bennett was reportedly worried about the 
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"insurmountable difficulty" he would face attempting to pass enabling legislation—perhaps 
anticipating criticism if he sided too openly with a company he had co-founded, albeit two 
decades before. Ultimately, however, the decision of whether he and Murphy would brave a 
Parliamentary debate on the matter was taken out of their hands when Calgary Power withdrew 
its application in 1931.118 According to the historian of the company William Hawkins, the 
company "barely managed to survive" the debt it incurred through its last, smaller expansion 
project on the Ghost River, and lost its appetite for new capital projects as the Calgary economy 
faltered and "power demand leveled off."119 During the 1930s, the company's existing network 
produced a surplus of power, and it built only one new, small dam, to augment storage on Upper 
Kananaskis Lake.I2 For the remainder of the decade, Lake Minnewanka remained in the park, 
without being re-dammed. 
Calgary Power's abandonment of its plan to re-dam the Minnewanka storage reservoir 
was not the final end of water power development in national parks, or even Banff National Park. 
Calgary Power ultimately was able to construct its dam in 1940, when the federal government 
granted it a license under the emergency powers of the War Measures Act in order to power a 
new military explosives plant in Calgary. (The extent to which this was a genuine war need is 
debatable; the company's case may well have been taken up by H.J. Symington, in his dual 
capacity as a Calgary Power director and as Power Controller on the Wartime Industries Control 
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Board of CD. Howe's Department of Munitions and Supply).121 Eventually, in 1948, the same 
company returned to the Spray Lakes as well, completing its development of the Bow watershed 
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outside of the park. In that case, in 1951, concerns about downstream water flows took an 
unexpected turn when construction workings broke, the river flooded, and considerable damage 
was done to lands downstream within the park. 
In neither case, however, did the sort of national controversy, or debate about the 
meaning of national parks, occur during the 1940s. The Parks Association, with an aging Selby 
Walker still at the head, denounced both projects as affronts to the purpose of the national 
parks.124 However, in neither case were development within parks, or arguments that the 
Minnewanka reservoir should be removed from the park, extensively publicly contested. Clearly 
by the 1930s dam projects in national parks had grown increasingly controversial. However, 
although the 1941 dam (which continues to define the lake's contours today) is beyond the scope 
of the present analysis, it does make clear that the parks movement's victory was a very gradual 
rather than sharp and definitive one. 
In the past, park historians have attributed this outcome to the Parks Branch's successful 
introduction of the principle of inviolability during the 1920s—that is, the agreement that the 
Spray Lakes could be dammed, but only if they were first removed from the park, following 
which legislation assured that there would be no further dams or other resource exploitation 
within parks. However, this is an insufficient explanation. The principle that water power 
development should not occur in parks actually lent itself to more than one interpretation: either 
121
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that there should be no further power controversies over lakes and rivers within parks, or that the 
latter should simply be removed from the parks whenever they were found to be valuable for 
power purposes. The Cautley survey of 1927 and the Lake Minnewanka controversy of 1930-
1931 were contentious precisely because they were attempts to determine the significance of 
inviolability within park boundaries. 
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Conclusion 
Nature and Power in Canadian Parks 
Canada's national parks, Harkin wrote to deputy minister W.W. Cory in 1930, were "outdoor 
museums of the finest in primitive conditions."1 While it would be easy to read more into this 
phrase than Harkin probably intended, it is worth observing that museums are by their nature 
carefully constructed and maintained—and that the "primitive conditions" which visitors to 
Canada's mountain parks during Harkin's tenure at the Parks Branch could expect to find were, 
in many cases, carefully if not always consistently shaped and modified for their apparent benefit 
over several decades by 1930. 
When Lake Minnewanka was first dammed in 1907, park officials hoped to beautify its 
shores; when it was dammed again in 1912 (the same year that Lake Louise's shoreline was also 
extensively modified), park officials again hoped that one of the consequences would be a more 
attractive lake. Pro-development conservationists initially found common ground with the Parks 
Branch over this dam, envisioning a project which would simultaneously improve the scenic 
value of the area for human visitors and increase the hydroelectricity potential of the Bow River 
watershed. While the latter objective was achieved (and, in turn, led to new Water Power Branch 
and Commission of Conservation work on how to further increase the capacity of the watershed), 
the Parks Branch and several local tourism business operators reached quite a different 
conclusion, denouncing damage to the forested shoreline and struggling to keep the reservoir 
draining and re-filling cycle to a schedule compatible with summer tourism. 
When Calgary Power decided to expand its Bow River facilities by damming the Spray 
Lakes in the 1920s, it was this negative experience at Lake Minnewanka which informed sharp 
1
 Taylor, "Legislating Nature," 133. 
140 
Parks Branch opposition to the new scheme. The Branch was joined by public organizations such 
as the Alpine Club of Canada and the National Parks Association of Canada in opposing the new 
dam and countering water power development advocates' claims that the project could beautify 
an unattractive valley. This opposition, significantly, was not based on reverence for untouched 
or pristine natural lands (or wilderness), per se, so much as the damage dams could do to the 
enjoyment of the site by visitors, including those who came to enjoy scenery (which, the parks 
movement held, would be obliterated by a continuously cycling artificial reservoir). As with 
Robert Righter's reinterpretation of the American parks movement in the Hetch Hetchy 
controversy, this approach to the Spray Lakes and Minnewanka controversies illustrates ways in 
which the Canadian parks movement adopted a subtler and less anti-development, anti-
commercial, or wilderness-inspired position than commonly assumed in the Canadian 
historiography. Opportunities for tourists to enjoy beautifiul scenery and fishing (and for 
businesses to cater to such tourists), stressed the parks movement, were endangered by dam 
projects within national parks. 
Where numerous American historians (including Righter) have argued that Progressive 
advocates of publicly owned water utilities were a driving force behind the Hetch Hetchy 
project, however, this analysis shows that this was not a primary factor in the Spray Lakes 
controversy. The Canadian conservationist movement of the 1910s and 1920s was not 
insubstantial. Canada, unlike the United States, had followed through on its commitment to 
create a new Commission of Conservation following the North American Conservation 
Conference of 1909, and this organization, together with the new Water Power Branch, produced 
a careful inventory of water power possibilities on the Bow River, including within Rocky 
Mountains Park. While some voices did call for the creation of a provincially owned power 
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utility, they were marginalized by others within the conservationist movement; even the 
provincial government, which submitted an application to develop the site, was demonstrably 
more interested in securing the right to determine who would develop resources within the 
province than in actually developing those resources itself. 
The Spray Lakes controversy ended with a novel resolution: a "resurvey" of park borders 
on the principle that economically valuable resources should be excised from the park. This did 
not mark the end of contests over such resources: rather, in 1930, the conflict shifted back to 
Lake Minnewanka, and the parks movement found itself in the curious position of defending 
from further hydroelectric encroachment not what Harkin described as his "museum of... 
primitive conditions," but rather a body of water which was already an artificial storage 
reservoir. Canadian park historians have typically accepted this as effective (if desperate) 
"boundary surgery" by the Parks Branch, jettisoning the Spray Lakes district to avoid setting a 
precedent which would threaten other park lands. However, the actual conflict over the Spray 
and Minnewanka lakes between 1926 and 1930 was considerably more complex; initially, it 
seemed that if a precedent were to be set, it would not simply be that parks and power projects 
were incompatible uses of land, but that in the event of such a conflict, the latter, and not the 
former, would take precedence. For at least a brief time during the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
debate over Canadian parks shifted towards what Alfred Runte identified in much earlier 
American parks policy as an emphasis on parks as "worthless lands." 
It would be erroneous to suggest that Calgary Power's retreat from Lake Minnewanka in 
1931 represented a final triumph for the parks movement, so much as one particularly important 
tactical victory. When Lake Minnewanka was dammed again during the Second World War, the 
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project was authorized by regulation under the emergency War Measures Act rather than 
Parliamentary legislation, as envisioned in the National Parks Act. Calgary Power did cease 
attempting to acquire new reservoirs within the parks, even though the original surveys by the 
Water Power Branch and the Commission of Conservation had suggested additional possible 
storage sites, like Bow Lake. However, a full history of water power controversies, stretching at 
least into the 1950s, remains to be written; in the meantime, it would be premature to suggest 
that 1931 marked a definite change, rather than one of many dramatic moments in a process of 
gradual evolution. A National Park Policy Statement, clarifying that even human habitation was 
an "intrusion," would not appear until 1964—the same year as the American Wilderness Act, but 
largely a response to the controversial Banff-Lake Louise bid for the Olympic Games.4 
Given the striking similarities between American and Canadian national park 
controversies, a full-fledged comparative history of the park systems now seems particularly 
relevant. While drawing out a number of important similarities and differences between the two 
conflicts, this project did not present such a detailed comparative analysis. It does, however, 
suggest some potentially significant sites of further analysis. In Canada, the federal National 
Parks Branch actually predated all of the water power controversies in Rocky Mountains Park (as 
did its conservationist counterpart, the Water Power Branch), whereas the American National 
Park Service was created only after Hetch Hetchy. The decision to place both Canadian 
organizations within the Ministry of the Interior then led to the mass of internal correspondence 
on the conflicts produced by government officials during the 1910s and 1920s. In the U.S., by 
contrast, the Congressional system allowed for substantially greater political debate than the 
more limited confines of budget debates or oral questions in the Canadian House of Commons. 
Moreover, although federal-state conflicts are not unknown in the U.S., certainly the Spray 
4
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Lakes and Minnewanka controversies, and possibly other controversies over national park lands 
as well, cannot be fully understood without considering the role played by provincial 
governments. 
Between 1907 and 1931, there were two major dam projects undertaken in Rocky 
Mountains National Park (both on Lake Minnewanka) and two more proposed but not 
undertaken until the 1940s (one on Lake Minnewanka, and another in the Spray valley). The 
context in which each project was advanced differed in ways which expose important insights 
about the early Canadian parks and conservation movements. Both the 1907 and 1912 dams on 
Lake Minnewanka were supported by the parks movement on the grounds that they would 
beautify the valley; the latter, moreover, was seized as an important opportunity by the emerging 
conservationist movement, as well. By the 1920s, the two movements' positions had diverged 
sufficiently—in part, over Minnewanka itself—that a bitter conflict resulted from Calgary 
Power's proposals to install new dams on the Spray Lakes and on the Minnewanka storage 
reservoir. The parks movement did succeed in garnering wider support for its new position that 
parks and water power projects were incompatible uses of land. While this did not represent a 
final end to resource development controversies in Canada's national parks, it did close one vital 
phase in which the positions of the emerging parks and conservation movements diverged and 
clashed over how a culturally and economically developing Canada would define and use its 
mountain lakes and rivers. 
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Appendix 1 
Researching the Pearce Papers at the University of Alberta Archives 
William Pearce's papers at the University of Alberta Archives are a rich historical source on 
Prairie and Albertan history, including the national parks, irrigation, land grants and speculation, 
the history of Calgary, and other subjects. Unfortunately, the organization of the Pearce Papers 
currently leaves much to be desired. This appendix involves notes which may be helpful to other 
researchers consulting the Pearce Papers. The information in this appendix was largely provided 
to me by assistant archivist Raymond Frogner in summer 2010. 
William Pearce originally organized his files according to a filing system which is not 
reflected in the contemporary organization of the Pearce fonds. Shortly after his death in 1930, 
his family commissioned Wallace Sterling, a University of Alberta graduate student, to reorder 
the files and prepare a finding aid (the "Sterling finding aid"). Sterling's detailed finding aid is 
the most comprehensive to date. A small number of miscellaneous files are still numbered only 
according to the Sterling system and are kept out of order, apart from the main collection. 
Some time after Sterling prepared his finding aid, an unknown number of files were 
removed from the fonds and sent to the national archives in Ottawa; subsequently, an unknown 
number of those files were then returned to the University of Alberta. In the 1970s, University of 
Alberta chief archivist James Parker therefore began to prepare a second finding aid reflecting 
the current state of the fonds. The original Parker finding aid was divided into a number of 
1
 University of Alberta Archives (UAA), accn 74-169, William Pearce fonds. The historical information about the 
Pearce Papers which follows is based on informal discussions with University of Alberta Archives associate 
archivist Raymond Frogner in June 2010. 
2
 Wallace Sterling, ed., Inventory of the Papers of William Pearce (Edmonton: University of Alberta Archives, 
undated). 
"5 
subject series, with individual volumes prepared covering each series. However, funding for 
Parker's project ended after the publication of only the first several of the intended volumes. 
In the 1980s, Parker therefore arranged for another, complete finding aid, which was 
published in 1987.4 The descriptions found in the 1987 Parker finding aid are in some cases less 
comprehensive than those contained in the Sterling finding aid. However, the Parker volume is 
essential because it contains the new file numbers prepared under Parker's tenure, whereas 
Sterling used a separate and now obsolete ordering system.5 
In addition, and perhaps most frustratingly, a number of files have been separated from 
their normal boxes and, as of June 2010, are housed in a separate set of unordered boxes, 
misleadingly labelled "Duplicates." Some of these files contain the original Sterling file 
numbers; others have been given new file numbers. In this thesis, references to files in the 
Duplicates boxes are always identified as such, although in the future they may be subject to 
renumbering or reinsertion into their proper location in the fonds. 
As of June 2010, University of Alberta associate archivist Raymond Froger is engaged in 
constructing a fourth finding aid for the Pearce Papers, in addition to publishing digital versions 
of a number of Pearce letters and of his manuscript, Titles to Land in the Three Prairie 
Provinces: Early Administration and Development, Pearce's monograph on the early history of 
Prairie homesteading and land policy.6 Ultimately, as part of the new process, some files may be 
renumbered for a third time, rendering this information about the Sterling and Parker finding aids 
obsolete. 
3
 James M. Parker, ed., A Guide to the William Pearce Papers, 17 vols. (Edmonton: University of Alberta Archives, 
1976). 
4
 James M. Parker, ed., A Guide to the William Pearce Papers, 1869-1930 (Edmonton: University of Alberta 
Archives, 1987). 
5
 As of June 2010, the University of Alberta Archives possess at least one copy of a Sterling finding aid in which the 
new Parkera-era file numbers have been handwritten in the margins. 
6
 University of Alberta Archives, "William Pearce Fonds Finding Aid," Internet: 
<http://archivel.macs.ualberta.ca/FindingAidsAVil1iamPearceAVilliam%20Pearce.html> (accessed July 2010). 
